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Abstract.
In this thesis I take the cognitive view of language according to which language has to
be studied in terms of the processes occurring in the minds of speakers and hearers when
they are producing or understanding discourses. According to this view, the
explanation of linguistic phenomena also has to be in terms of the mental
representations of discourse used in language production and constructed in
comprehension. Another consequence is that a satisfactory theory has to provide a
theory both of the architecture of the human language processing mechanism and of the
detailed representations it uses or constructs in discourse.
I provide a theory of the architecture of the human language processor. The central
notion of the notion of knowledge activation. The model postulates three different
components which represent different degrees of knowledge activation. Another
important idea is the idea of embedded models in each of these components, which are
used to represent the beliefs and knowledge the language processor ascribes to his
fellow discourse participants.
The detailed representations which are used or constructed in discourse are
postulated to be frame based in the sense in which this notion has been developed in
Artificial Intelligence. I define an expressively somewhat impover- ished formal
knowledge representation language for which I define a direct model-theoretic
semantics using the theory of arbitrary objects developed by Fine. The fact that my
knowledge representation formalism has a formal semantics sets it apart from the
majority of alternative frame based representation languages.
Finally, I sketch analyses of a number of referential and quantified expressions in
English. I use both the proposals made for the overall architec- ture of the human
language processing mechanism and for the detailed representa- tions it uses or
constructs, thereby illustrating their potential usefulness in the explanation of the
behaviour of certain expressions in English.
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A lot of work in the area of natural language is based on the belief that the mental
processes which go on when one is learning or employing certain concepts ought not
to play a role in the analysis of these concepts. This is evident in the formal
semantics approach to language, as started by Carnap (1947) and further developed
by Montague. It also underlies the transformational approach to syntax.
Notwithstanding Chomsky's insistence that
linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a mental reality
underlying actual behavior.
Chomsky (1965,4)
transformational linguists never ask psychological questions (McCawley, 1982). In
other words, the Chomskian position also seems to be that one can study the
structure of language independently of the cognitive processes going on in speakers
and hearers who use language.
However, with the emergence of cognitive science the opposite view has
become more popular. Many, especially in Artificial Intelligence, have argued that
the study of the semantics of natural language has to take processing factors into
account (Cf. Winograd, 1976). Lakoff (1982) reviews some of the examples in the
literature that indicate that in both syntax and semantics one has to take into
account the processing of sentences as they are uttered. He concludes:-
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After a generation of research in which it was implicitly assumed that language could be
described in its own terms, it has become more interesting to ask how much of the structure of
language is determined by the fact that people have bodies with perceptual mechanisms and
memory and processing capabilities and limitations, by the fact that people have to try to make
sense out of the world using limited resources, and by the fact that people live in social groups
and have to try to communicate with each other. It seems to me that a great deal of the
structure of language is determined by such factors.
Lakoff (1982,155)
This thesis is an attempt at providing a theory in which some of the
structure of language can be explained in terms of the factors Lakoff mentions. I will
provide a theory of the human language processing mechanism, or processor for short,
and attempt to show that some of the structure of language can be more lucidly
described in this theory.
By adopting the cognitive view of language, one does not necessarily reject
work based on the formal view of language. The issue at stake is not a better
solution to the problems as they have been posed, but rather a redefinition of the
nature and the structure of the relevant problems, as Winograd (1976,282) points out.
The claim is that the redefinition of the problems from the cognitive point of view will
enable us to highlight and clarify some aspects of the problems which remain obscure
under the old definitions.
The outline of this thesis is as follows. In chapter 2, I briefly discuss the
cognitive view of language and its implications for theories of the human language
processor. In particular, I argue that a complete theory has to provide both an
overview of the overall structure of the processor (its architecture if you like), and of
the detailed structures it creates in language understanding, or uses in language
production.
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In chapter 3, I review some of the theories which have been proposed in the
literature. I discuss two proposals for the overall architecture of the processor, and a
number of proposals concerning the detailed representations used in discourse. On the
basis of my discussions of the latter I conclude that the representations used in
discourse are structurally identical to the representations used to store long-term
knowledge. The question of the structure of discourse representations thus is identical
to the question of knowledge representation.
In chapter 4, I introduce my own model of the overall architecture of the
language processor. The model I propose is very similar to that of Sanford and
Garrod, one of the proposals discussed in chapter 3. Two notions will play a cental
role:- the notion of knowledge activation and the notion of embedded models which
can be used to represent the beliefs one language user ascribes to another.
In chapter 5 I provide a knowledge representation scheme which describes
the detailed structures used in the language processor. The knowledge representation
system is very similar to but admittedly less expressive than a number of existing
knowledge representation schemes. The major innovation lies in the fact that I
provide a direct denotational semantics for parts of the system. One of the most
important aspects of the proposed knowledge representation scheme is the fact that
knowledge is stored in relatively large chunks.
In chapter 6 I first discuss the notion of reference and I then use the model
developed in chapter 4. and 5. to discuss the behaviour of some expressions in
English. The expressions which are analysed are indefinite NPs, definite descriptions,
pronouns, universally quantified NPs and quantified NPs including the so-called non¬
standard quantifiers most and few. Chapter 6. is intended as a practical argument for
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the viability of the cognitive view of language and procedural semantics in general
and the more specific proposals made in this thesis in particular. The analyses which
I propose rely heavily on the proposals made in chapters 4. and 5. and to the extent
that they throw some light on some of the open problems in the semantic analysis of
the expressions discussed, to that extent can the cognitive view of language be said to
have proved its usefulness.
Chapter 7. is a critical discussion of the achievements and shortcomings of
this thesis. In it I also discuss some ways in which the present thesis could be
expanded.
In this thesis I will often have to use the term 'speaker' and 'hearer'. I will
assume that the speaker is female while the hearer is male. The personal pronoun
'she' will thus always denote the speaker while the personal pronoun 'he' stands for
the hearer.
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Chapter 2:- Philosophical background
1. Introduction
In this chapter I will first briefly discuss the philosophical view of language
underlying the present approach to language. I will then defend it against a number
of objections which might be raised against it. Finally, I will discuss some of the
consequences which this philosophical view has for theories of language and the
human language processor.
2. Procedural semantics
What I have called the cognitive view of language, is also known under the name of
procedural semantics. Maybe the best summary of this view of language can be found
in Winograd (1976, 262-63). Winograd gives a list of six assumptions underlying the
procedural view of language, which I will call the axioms of procedural semantics.
They are:-
Axiom 1. The primary focus in the study of language should be on the
mechanisms underlying language production and comprehension.
Axiom 2. The essential properties of language reflect the cognitive structure
of the human language user.
Axiom 3. Language use takes place within a structure of ongoing thought
processes.
Axiom 4. Each utterance is constructed to serve a combination of
communicative goals.
Axiom 5. The most appropriate formalisms for building theories of language
are those that deal explicitly with the structure of knowledge and the
processes using it.
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Axiom 6. There is a set of structures modified by speakers and hearer in the
course of communication, and the theory of language use has to deal with a
succession of structures and the nature of the changes
Thus, according to the cognitive view of language, language cannot be
studied independently of the people using it. We have to study language as part of
the ongoing thought processes of speaker and hearer. We are therefore primarily
interested in the mechanisms underlying language production and comprehension.
This involves the study of the overall architecture of the human language processor.
One may for example want to distinguish between various parts of human memory
which can be shown to play different roles in language understanding. However, we
will also have to study the structure of the representations which are built up during
language use, and the way in which they are constructed in response to certain
expressions in English. One of the questions is for example the difference between an
utterance of an indefinite NP as opposed to one of a proper name on the
representation the hearer is constructing, or the related question under what
circumstances the speaker will use an indefinite rather than a proper name. The fifth
axiom claims that the most appropriate formalisms here are those which can also be
used in the more general area of knowledge representation. We will return to this
point in the next chapter.
There are a number of problems associated with this view of language. In
the next two sections I will describe these problems, and sketch possible replies to
them.
2.1. Intersubjectivity
A first problem for this cognitive approach to the study of language, is the
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intersubjectivity of language. In general, we are reasonably successful at
communicating whatever it is we want to communicate. We get our messages across
and we understand what information others try to communicate to us. Since I cannot
explain the success of language in terms of something external to the language user,
the question arises how the intersubjectivity of language can be accounted for. What
guarantee is there that the structures one language user constructs or uses when
understanding or producing a piece of discourse are in some sense similar to the
structures of another language user.
The answer to this question is based on the work of the naturalistic
epistemologists. They have put forward some arguments for the trustworthiness of
our perceptions. Without wanting to go into this philosophical doctrine in detail, I just
summarise the argument very briefly:- the human species is very successful in
evolutionary terms and there is therefore sufficient ground for assuming the
trustworthiness of its cognitive system. After all, the evolutionary success of the
human species indicates its success in coping with its environment and therefore one
can suppose that there is a very close connection between the way the world is and
the way the human species perceives it. This evolutionary explanation of the
structure of the human cognitive system has the consequence that the structure is (at
least partly) genetically determined. If the human cognitive system has been
determined by its evolutionary development, then its structure has to be 'wired in' in
each individual member of the species. Indeed, the earlier stages in the development
of the human cognitive system as studied by Piaget and Bower and their associates,
are very much the same for all members of the species. The structure of the human
cognitive systems thus can be expected to be very similar among human beings, and
success in communication can be explained on the basis of this fact. We all have the
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same basic cognitive make-up and we deal with incoming information in very similar
ways. What actual information there is in the individual cognitive systems depends
on the experience the individual has had, but the way experiences are processed is by
and large identical for all individuals. I will call this hypothesis the Thesis of
Cognitive Similarity.
The Thesis of Cognitive Similarity is important not only on this theoretical
level. It is also relevant in our dealings with each other. When we explain the
behaviour of our fellow human beings, we take what Dennett (1978) calls 'the
intentional stance'. We predict the behaviour of another person
by ascribing to the system the possession of certain information and supposing it to be
directed by certain goals, and then by working out the most reasonable or appropriate
action on the basis of those ascriptions and suppositions.
Dennett (1979,6)
The problem with this idea is how one works out what the 'most reasonable
and appropriate action' is. In the processor-centric view there is only one possible
answer:- you decide on the most reasonable action by working out what you would do
yourself, if you yourself held the beliefs and goals ascribed to the individual whose
behaviour you want to explain.
Occasionally, the Thesis of Cognitive Similarity, and its collorary that
everybody is rational, have to be given up in face of the facts. If someone consistently
behaves in an unexpected (or irrational) way, one will give up the assumption that
the person in question is a rational person. In Dennett's terms, we give up the
intentional stance and take the design stance.
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The Thesis of Cognitive Similarity plays an even more crucial role in
language use. Without it, communication would be impossible. Searle (1969,16)
writes:-
When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be an instance of linguistic
communication, as a message, one of the things I must assume is that the noise or
mark was produced by a being or beings more or less like myself and with certain
kinds of intentions.
So the Thesis of Cognitive Similarity is used on two different levels. First,
we use it in our dealings with each other. Secondly, on a theoretical level an
evolutionary argument can be advanced to show that this assumption is warranted
and it can thus be used to explain the successfulness of communication in a purely
cognitive approach to language use [1],
2.2. Language and the world
Another problem for the cognitive approach to language is the fact that people often
use language to transfer information about the world. But if using language involves
the construction of mental representations of some sort, then the problem arises how
one can transfer information about the world. Again, the thesis of Cognitive
Similarity can provide an answer to this objection.
Comprehending a piece of discourse often involves the activation of already
existing knowledge and the transmission by the speaker of knowledge which is new
to the hearer. The hearer is aware of the close relationship between most of his own
knowledge and the world. Because of the Thesis of Cognitive Similarity, he will also
assume this close relationship in the speaker. Therefore, if the hearer takes the
speaker to be authoritative and cooperative (and to have the intention to talk about
real-world objects), he will in general also assume that the new information he
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receives from the speaker will bear the same close relationship to the world as his
own knowledge. Conversely, the speaker assumes that if the hearer takes her
seriously, the hearer will treat the information she is encoding in the utterance in the
same way as she herself does. Therefore, she assumes that the hearer will in general
take the information she is providing him with as applying to the real world as well.
3. Consequences for theories of the language processor
As said before, according to the cognitive view of language, a theory of language has
to study primarily the mechanisms underlying language comprehension and language
production. It follows that a complete theory of language consists of two parts. First,
one will have to provide an overall theory of the structure of the human language
processor i.e. a theory of its architecture, and theories developed in this area will
have to be in accordance with psycholinguistic findings about language understanding
and production. Secondly, a complete theory of the processor will also have to provide
a theory about the detailed structures which it uses when generating a piece of
discourse, or constructs when understanding a text. Clearly, theories in these areas
also have to take into account the psycholinguistic findings which were relevant to
theories about the architecture of the human language processor. However, since one
is also making claims about the effects of certain linguistic expressions, or the
conditions under which the speaker will use them, one will also have to take into
account linguistic findings about the distribution of the expressions in question in
discourse. There are thus two distinct types of criteria of adequacy on theories of the
human language processing mechanism, linguistic and psycholinguistic ones. I will
discuss the psycholinguistic criteria first.
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3.1. Psychological criteria of adequacy
As a psychological theory, an adequate theory of the mental representation of
discourse has to be compatible with at least four rather basic psychological facts.
3.1.1. The 'veil of perception'
The first psychological fact is the 'veil of perception' (Locke, 1690). Locke observed
that human language processors do not have direct access to the world but only have
their mental representations of the world. They can only get in contact with their
environment through their cognitive systems. Even our perceptions are mediated
through the structure of our cognitive systems. Modern psychology has proved Locke
right:- it has shown that the view of our cognitive systems as directly mirroring the
world around us has to be given up. An adequate theory of the human language
processor should respect this fact.
3.1.2. The finiteness of our cognitive systems
A second basic psychological fact which a theory of the human language processor has
to take into account is that our cognitive capacities are finite. Thus, the mental
representation discourse processors construct in response to a discourse have to be
finite and have to be constructable in a finite amount of time. A theory that
postulates infinite structures as an integral part has to be rejected.
3.1.3. Left-to-right processing
A third psychological criterion which has to be met is a consequence of the claim that
processing takes place on a left to right basis. The claim can be made in various
forms but I will use it in its weakest form. The claim is that sometimes some part of
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the mental representation of an utterance will have been constructed before the
processor encounters the end of the utterance. Experimental evidence is presented by
Crain (1980), Crain and Steedman (1983) and Altmann (forthcoming). Previous
discourse and other information of a 'semantic' and/or 'pragmatic' kind can heavily
influence the outcome of the parsing process. Crain and Steedman conclude:-
The results suggest that there is no such thing as an intrinsically garden pathing
sentence structure, but rather that for a given sentence, certain contexts, (.possibly
including the null context) will induce a garden path effect, while others will not.
A satisfactory theory about the human language processor thus should be
compatible with the fact that the human language processor is able to do some
semantic work before the entire utterance has been parsed.
3.1.4. The relevance of background knowledge
A final psychological fact which I take to be of central importance to any theory of the
mental representation of discourse is the relevance of background knowledge. There
is ample psychological evidence showing the relevance of background knowledge both
in text comprehension and text recall. I do not want to give an extensive review of
the psychological literature on text recall, or discuss the methodologies used by the
various researchers in detail. I will rather concentrate on the main conclusions from
their experiments. Moreover, I will restrict myself to those papers which deal with
'normal' use of language as opposed to those which deal with for example verbatim
memory.
One of the first illustrations of the relevance of background information in
text recall and text comprehension can be found in Bartlett (1932). He presented
British subjects with red Indian folk stories. Obviously, these stories came from a
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very different culture and hence were hard to understand. When Bartlett asked his
subjects to reproduce the stories, they tried to "make sense out" of the story. They
omitted details which they found incomprehensible or included certain sentences
which made for example the causal connections between different episodes in the
stories clear from their cultural perspective. People thus do not remember the stories
only on the basis of the information in the actual text, but also use their background
knowledge.
As further support of the relevance of background knowledge in text recall
and comprehension, consider the following. If one uses two different referring
expressions which people know to stand for the same object, because of their
background knowledge, then there is a certain confusion in a recognition task as to
which expression was used in the original sentence. Anderson and Bower (1973,248-
52) for example presented subjects with a list of sentences which included sentences
like (1):-
(1) The first president of the United States had bad health.
In a later recognition task, people were also presented with sentences in
which the definite description was replaced by a co-referring proper name. So, people
were presented with sentences like (2):-
(2) George Washington had bad health.
Anderson and Bower found that there was a confusion as to which term the
original sentence contained and people often said that sentence (2) actually occurred
in the list which was presented to them.
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Sulin and Dooling (1974) found a similar interference from background
knowledge in another recognition task. Two groups of subjects were presented with
the same story, except that in one conditions the story contained an arbitrary name,
whereas in the other it contained a well-known name. So, in one story they used the
name 'Carol Harris' and in the other 'Helen Keller'. They found that people who were
presented with the version of the story in which the name 'Helen Keller' was used,
wrongly claimed that sentence (3) had occurred in the story, while the other group
correctly claimed it had not.
(3) She was deaf, dumb and blind.
Both Anderson and Bower's and Sulin and Dooling's results indicate that
even in recognition tasks the influence of background knowledge is immense.
Background knowledge and information from the actual text combine to form a
mental representation of the text. The afore-mentioned results indicate that
background knowledge can actually override the information from the text itself.
A final illustration of the relevance of background knowledge for the
comprehension of texts is provided by the experiments done by Bransford and
Johnson (1972,1973) They showed that if one gives subjects some clues about what
background knowledge is relevant for the comprehension of a particular text, either
by giving cue words or titles, or by showing pictures, or by giving the story a title
which was suggestive of the background against which the story was to be
understood, both comprehension and memory for the text improved dramatically.
Garrod and Sanford (1982) report similar results in a comprehension task:- reference
to an object which would be expected to be present because of the title of a story is
just as easy to understand independently of whether it has been introduced explicitly
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before or not, whereas the same reference takes much longer to resolve if the object is
not expected to be present in the situation and has not been explicitly introduced into
the discourse before.
The conclusion which the psycholinguistic findings force one to make is that
a theory which does not at least allow for a straightforward inclusion of background
knowledge into the mental representations it postulates cannot be adequate.
It has to be admitted that one can always claim that one's theory is aimed at
explaining only part of the representation which has been constructed in response to
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the actual linguistic input. According to this view, it is irrelevant that part of the
representation in question has been constructed because of background knowledge.
One is simply not interested in that part.
Although this reply might be satisfactory in its own right, it does not relieve
one from the obligation to make clear at least how background knowledge could be
integrated into the representations one has defined. Moreover, one has to explain
what background information is activated, and how this is done. After all, it is
certainly not the case that every piece of background information is relevant, as the
following examples illustrate. Discourse (4) is consistent and readily understandable
because we expect to find waiters in restaurants whereas discourse (5) is not because
butchers are not expected to appear in restaurants [2].
(4) John went to a sea-food restaurant.
The waiter advised him to have the lobster.
(5) John went to a sea-food restaurant.
The butcher advised him to have the lobster.
Thus, only a limited amount of background information is activated at any
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particular stage of a discourse, and, as the topic of interest is how people use
language, this fact has to be explained.
3.1.5. Conclusion
Concluding then, we have mentioned four basic psychological facts which have to be
taken into account in order for a theory of the human language processor to be
satisfactory. Thus, such a theory is processor-centric, finite, allows for left-to-right
processing, and takes the relevance of background information into account.
3.2. Linguistic criteria of adequacy
As pointed out, a satisfactory theory of the human language processor also has to
take into account linguistic findings. This is true in particular of those theories
dealing with the representations processors use when generating a piece of discourse
or construct when comprehending a text. I want to mention two criteria specifically.
3.2.1. Empirical adequacy
The first linguistic criteria of adequacy is that the theory be empirically adequate in
the sense that its predictions about how people understand a discourse agree with the
"semantic" and "pragmatic" intuitions of native speakers. A theory which predicts
counter-intuitive readings has to be rejected. In particular, if we restrict ourselves to
the interpretation of pronouns, it is undeniable that often expressions or objects which
at one stage of a discourse can be referred to using a pronoun or which at that stage
of the discourse can be used for the interpretation of a given pronoun, can no longer
play this role (much) later in the discourse. Now, if the theoretical entity which is
postulated as a representation of the mental representation of discourse is to be used
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in an account of pronoun use, then it will also have to be made clear how objects
which at one stage of the discourse exists in this component can disappear out of it.
An adequate theory not only has to account for the introduction of objects into the
'pronominalizable' part of the discourse representation, it also has to account for their
disappearance out of it.
3.2.2. Non-adhocness
Another 'linguistic' requirement is that we want our theories to meet certain
standards of 'formal' rigour. A theory which is completely ad hoc and does not specify
precisely what possibilities are open to the language understander in response to a
particular utterance in a particular discourse has to be rejected. I do not intend to
imply that certain 'heuristics' do not play an important role but an appeal to
'heuristics' without some indications what these 'heuristics' look like is vacuous. The
same applies of course to unmotivated appeals to 'pragmatics'.
3.2.3. Conclusion
Summarising then, a satisfactory theory about the human language processor has to
meet two linguistic criteria of adequacy, namely consistency with the native speaker's
"semantic" and "pragmatic" intuitions, and a certain formal rigour and non-
adhocness.
4. Two caveats
Before I review the literature and discuss my own model, I want to make two caveats.
The first concerns the type of language I will be discussing and the second the status
of the discussion in general.
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A number of authors have (for analytical reasons) made a distinction
between two different functions of language and consequently two different types of
language use. I am alluding to the distinction between "transactional" and
"interactional" language use. (Brown and Yule,1983;l). Primarily transactional
language is language which is used to convey "factual or propositional" information.
The speaker primarily intends to efficiently transfer information to his hearer and it
is essential that the hearer get the informative detail right. (Brown and
Yule,1983;2). In primarily interactional language use, on the other hand, the speaker
is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of social relationships. An
example is discussion about the weather between people standing at a bus stop and
waiting for a bus. (Brown and Yule,1983;3).
I do not want to make any claims about the relationship between these
different types of language use, nor do I want to maintain that there is a sharp
distinction between the two. As Brown and Yule (1983;1) stress, the distinction is one
of analytical convenience and most real discourses have both interactional and
transactional aspects. I will concentrate mainly on transactional language use. How
far the system I present can be extended to also deal with interactional language use
is an open question. I suspect that certain aspects of it can.
A second caveat concerns the status of the discussion in general. I will
primarily discuss what the ideal speaker and the ideal hearer do in discourse. For
instance, I will in general assume that both discourse participants are highly
cooperative and sincere. The speaker will always be maximally informative and only
try to transfer information which she considers to be true. The hearer on the other
hand will always take the speaker to be authoritative and trustworthy.
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It is clear that the speaker need not be maximally co-operative for an
utterance to be successful. The reason for this is what one might call the principle of
retrospective updating of the knowledge base, or the principle of retrospective updating
for short. A number of rules governing the use of a particular type of expression
state, as I will argue, that one cannot use a certain expression unless certain
assumptions about the state of the knowledge base of one's hearer are warranted.
Often, however, speakers seem to make the assumptions in question without any
evidence. Clearly, communication does not always break down in these circumstances.
The hearer, who as a somebody who knows the language, will also know the rules
governing the use of the expression in question, will retrospectively update his
knowledge base in response to the utterance in order to make the utterance which is
technically speaking infelicitous, felicitous in the updated knowledge base. Thus,
suppose that one can only utter an expression X if one can assume that the hearer
has knowledge A activated. Now suppose that the speaker uses expression X even
though the hearer has not activated knowledge A. Then technically speaking the
utterance is infelicitous. But a co-operative hearer will realize that the utterance
would have been felicitous if he had activated knowledge A. What the hearer may do
in cases like these, is retrospectively update his knowledge base and activate A thus
retrospectively making the utterance felicitous. Seuren (1985; 291) postulates a
similar principle that is however more restricted in its application, the principle of
post hoc or backwards suppletion:- if a definite term has no address, i.e. discourse
object, to denote in D, i.e. the mental representation of the discourse, then such an
address is created in response to a use of the definite term. In chapter 6. we will see
that Clark and Marshall (1981) postulate a very similar principle.
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5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I outlined a procedural view of language use according to which
language cannot be studied without taking into account the structure of the human
language processing mechanism. I also discussed a number of consequences of this
view for theories about discourse comprehension. In the next chapter I will turn my
attention to theories in the literature proposed to deal with discourse comprehension.
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Footnotes:-
1. It is interesting that the thesis of Cognitive Similarity is also central in
intuitionistic mathematics. Troelstra (1969,4), having said that the intuitionistic
mathematician is mainly interested in constructions which exist in the
mathematician's mind, writes:-
The (mental) constructions we consider, are thought of as to exist in the
mind of an individual (idealized) mathematician. The language of
mathematics is an attempt (necessarily nearly always inadequate) to describe
these mental constructions. Talking about intuitionistic mathematics is
therefore a matter of suggesting analogous mental constructions to other
people. Similarity between the thought processes of various human
individuals makes such communication possible.
2. If one changes the tense in the second sentence of discourse (5) to a pluperfect, the
discourse becomes acceptable and understandable. The event in which the butcher
advised John to have a lobster no longer takes place in the restaurant but has taken
place earlier (and presumably the butcher has been talked about earlier in the
discourse or is mutually known for other reasons.) So, the activated restaurant script
is not relevant for the interpretation of the definite description the butcher.
(1') John went to a sea-food restaurant.
The butcher had advised him to get the lobster.
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Chapter 3:- Theories of the human language processor
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I want to discuss theories which have been proposed to account for
discourse production and discourse comprehension. As stated in the previous chapter,
satisfactory theories fall apart in two parts:- theories about the overall structure of
the human language processor, and theories about the specific representations used in
discourse production and discourse comprehension. Unfortunately, very few authors
have actually paid attention to both of these separate aspects. One of the few
exceptions is Johnson-Laird who formulates proposals both about the overall
architecture of the processor and about the detailed representations used in discourse
production and comprehension. Given the need for two separate parts in a satisfactory
theory, I will divide the literature review in two sections. First, I will discuss theories
about the overall structure of the human language processor. Secondly, I will discuss
theories about the specific representations used in discourse production, and
constructed in discourse comprehension. But first I want to discuss another approach
to theories about the human language processor, which can best be described as
psychologizing the formal approach to language.
2. Psychologizing the formal approach
At the beginning of a paper which discusses the relationship between psychological
semantics and truth conditional or model-theoretic semantics, Johnson-Laird (1982,1)
writes :-
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Logicians have only related language to models in various ways; psychologists have only related
it to the mind; the real task, however, is to show how language relates to the world through the
agency of the mind.
Given the sub-division of the relation between the world and language into
two sub-relations, one between the world and the mind, and the other between the
mind and language, it is tempting to develop a theory of the human language
processor which is analogical to the system in Montague (1973). Montague defined an
algorithm to map syntactic analyses of sentences of a fragment of English into
formulae of a logical language. The logical language whose formulae Montague
translated the natural language sentences into, had been shown to have a clear and
unproblematic model theoretic interpretation [1], Given the proof in Montague
(1970b) that the translation algorithm, i.e. the mapping from the syntactic analyses
of the English sentences onto formulae of the logical language, preserved the model-
theoretic interpretation, one thus had an (indirect) model-theoretic interpretation for
the English sentences.
In the psychological reconstruction of the Montague programme, one could
regard the intermediate language as a language of thought (Cf. Fodor, 1976), which is
then mapped into a model, or the world. One thus replaces Montague's logical
language by a mental language but keeps the rest of the programme unchanged. The
usefulness of this programme then partly depends on the independent use one can
find for this intermediate level.
The idea of psychologizing Montague's work goes against the spirit of his
work. In the first place, Montague was not interested in psychology at all. He saw
English as just another formal language, perhaps more complicated than but not
theoretically different from the language of first-order predicate calculus. He wrote
(Montague, 1970a):-
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I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between formal and
natural languages.
Secondly, Montague regarded the intermediate level as not necessary, but
purely one of convenience. Montague (1973) included it, but Montague (1970a) had a
direct model-theoretic interpretation of English, i.e. a model-theoretic interpretation
without a mediating translation of the English sentences into formulae of a logical
language.
However, the fact that the psychologically oriented analog of Montague's
programme goes against the spirit of his work, has not deterred psychologists and
formal semanticists. Indeed, Kintsch (1974) and Fodor (1976) propose to see the
mental representation of a text as a set of propositions in some mental language.
Johnson-Laird (1982) points out that the research strategy of
"psychologising" Montague's programme crucially depends on the assumption that the
relation between language and the mental representations of sentences or texts can
be described independently of the relation they bear to the world. In order for the
strategy to be viable it has to be possible to get from discourses to mental
representations of discourse without taking into account the world as such, or the
world as seen by the discourse participants. One can even go further and say that the
research strategy depends on the assumption that the relation between language and
the mental representations of sentences can be described independently of factors
other than the linguistic input. If the transition from actual sentences to mental
representations of sentences is more or less like Montague's translation algorithm,
then this has to be describable independently of factors such as the mental
representation of the immediate environment in which the sentence is being used,
knowledge of the world, previous discourse etc.
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This assumption however is unwarranted. First, the inputs to Montague's
translation algorithm are syntactic analyses of sentences rather than just sentences.
As a consequence, his algorithm gives different results for the different readings of
syntactically ambiguous sentences. Since Montague's work is based on what Bach
calls the rule-to-rule hypothesis (for every syntactic rule there is one and only one
semantic rule), for semantically ambiguous sentence, there is a separate syntactic
analysis as well. The problem for the psychologically oriented theorist is clear:- the
utterances hearers or readers are faced with are not syntactically disambiguated.
Now, one of the requirements one has to put on the prepositional representations is
that they are in general unambiguous, especially if it can be shown that the various
purported readings have different effects on the following discourse. If a sentence has
two readings, the theory should generate two different propositional representations.
The transition from sentences to mental representations therefore has to be
disambiguating. But the disambiguation of an utterance depends on factors such as
previous discourse and real-world knowledge (Altmann, forthcoming). As a
consequence, the transition from utterances cannot be described on the basis of the
linguistic input alone.
Another minimal requirement of adequacy on the mental representations of
sentences is that intersentential pronouns are given their right interpretation. Again,
it is known that the resolution of anaphora in general, and intersentential anaphora
in particular, depends often on real world knowledge and previous discourse.
A third argument is demonstrative pronouns. An adequate representation of
discourse will have to make clear what the hearer takes the speaker to deictically
refer to. This obviously cannot be done if one does not relate the mental
representation of utterances to the world, or to the mental representations of the
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world.
It follows that a mental representation of discourse based purely on the
linguistic information in the utterance is not satisfactory. The mental representation
of discourse is also constructed on the basis of the hearer's mental representation of
the environment in which the sentences is being used, his world-knowledge, his
recognition of the speaker's intention, his understanding of previous discourse etc.
Using language amounts to constructing mental representations based not only on
the linguistic input but also on other factors such as the afore-mentioned, and thus
this simplistic approach to 'psychologizing' the Montague programme fails [2]. I will
return to this approach to the mental representation of discourse when I discuss the
truth-conditional approach in section 4.2. of this chapter.
3. Theories about the general structure of the processor
In this section I want to discuss two theories which have been proposed as models for
the architecture of the human language processor. The first model is that of Sanford
and Garrod and bears a large resemblance to the model I will present in chapter 4.
The second model I want to discuss in some detail is that of Johnson-Laird (1983,
chapter 11).
3.1. Sanford and Garrod's model
One of the best known models of the human language processor is the model of
Sanford and Garrod. The model has been developed to account for the understanding
of written language.
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Sanford and Garrod (1981;157-60) claim that, from the point of view of a
semantic processing system, it is useful to see the various elements in a sentence as
instructions to the hearer/reader to perform certain operations. When the hearer
encounters a verb in a sentence for example, he has to retrieve the semantic
representation of the verb. But understanding a piece of discourse also involves
constructing a mental representation of it. The hearer has to keep a record of the
information he received from the speaker. The comprehension process thus consists of
both retrieving the appropriate information and constructing a representation of the
text, partly based on the retrieved information.
Both the retrieval and the construction process can be specified in terms of
three variables. For the retrieval process, they are:-
(i) the memory domain to be searched,
(ii) a partial description of the information
the processor is looking for,
(iii) the type of information to be retrieved.
The construction process can be characterised in terms of
(i) the memory domain in which the construction
is to be recorded,
(ii) a description of the information to be incorporated,
(iii) the type of structure to result
Sanford and Garrod distinguish between four components in the model for
the language understander:- Explicit Focus, Implicit Focus, Long-Term Semantic
Memory and Long-Term Text Memory. The different components are to be seen as
memory partitions, i.e.
independently addressable and capable of being treated by the processor as a distinct search
domain.
Sanford and Garrod (1981,158).
Explicit focus is the memory partition that contains representations of
entities and events explicitly introduced in the text. It is a short-term store of limited
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capacity. In Sanford and Garrod's model tokens representing entities explicitly
introduced into the discourse, point to computational spaces in Explicit Focus. The
size of the space is the realization of the degree to which it is foregrounded, or
activated. The larger the computational space a token points to, the more
foregrounded the corresponding entity is, and the more likely the speaker is to use a
pronoun to refer to it. One could in fact "measure" the degree of foregrounding in
terms of the ease with which one can "access" it using a pronoun. As discourse goes
on and new entities are introduced, the highly foregrounded tokens will gradually
return to the background and eventually disappear out of Explicit Focus altogether.
Implicit Focus is the component which contains the background knowledge,
scenarios etc., relevant for the comprehension of the utterance currently being
processed. Sanford and Garrod (1981,162) say that it can be thought of as
a partition of long-term memory which is simply currently priviliged in terms of ease of access.
The knowledge store out of which information in Implicit Focus has been
activated is called Long-Term Semantic Memory. Long-Term Semantic Memory thus
contains the long-term knowledge a discourse participant brings to a discourse.
The last component, Long-Term Text Memory, contains a long-term
representation of the content of the text. The reason for distinguishing between this
component and Long-Term Semantic Memory is that Sanford and Garrod claim that
it is important to retain a separation between memory for the text itself and other
general knowledge.
The definition of a memory partition entails that in order to have sufficient
reason for distinguishing between components in memory, Sanford and Garrod have
to show that two components are indeed independently addressable, or are treated by
28
processors as distinct search domain. Given their theoretical assumptions about the
comprehension process, there are two ways of doing this. In the first place, they can
show that a particular type of linguistic expression is an instruction to retrieve
information from one of the components but not the other. The second way would be
to show that the result of the construction process has to be recorded in one particular
component and not the other. A theory-independent way of testing this would be to
show that subsequent retrieval of the discourse can only be viewed as a retrieval of
information in one of the components.
If we apply this to the distinction between Implicit Focus and Long-Term
Text Memory, either Sanford and Garrod have to show that the retrieval procedures
for a particular type of linguistic expression have as their search domain Implicit
Focus but not Long-Term Text Memory or vice versa, or they have to show that
subsequent retrieval can be explained solely in terms of the contents of Long-Term
Text Memory or exclusively in terms of what is in Implicit Focus. I will argue that
neither of these criteria licenses a distinction between these two components.
Sanford and Garrod argue for the distinction between Implicit Focus and
Long-Term Text Memory on the basis of an analysis of definite descriptions. They
claim that the retrieval procedures for definite descriptions specify that the memory
domain to be searched is focus, i.e. implicit focus or explicit focus [3]. A search
triggered by a definite description is successful in Explicit Focus if one can find a
token which has the property described by the noun in the definite description; if the
search domain is Implicit Focus, then one has to be find an entity whose existence is
implied by the background knowledge currently in implicit focus which has the
property in question.
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Example (1), taken from the novel by Jean Rhys After leaving Mr Mackenzie,
shows that definite descriptions can also be used to bring back into focus entities
which were in focus earlier in the discourse. They not only set up entities which act
as slot-fillers in the current frame, they also re-activate entities which have been
spoken about before.
(1) The bed was large and comfortable, covered with an imitation satin quilt
of faded pink. There was a wardrobe without a looking glass and a red plush
sofa and - opposite the bed and reflecting it - a very spotted mirror in a gilt
frame.
The ledge under the mirror was strewn with Julia's toilet things - an
untidy assortment of boxes of rouge, powder, and make-up for the eyes. At
the farther end of it stood an unframed oil-painting of a half empty bottle of
red wine, a knife, and a piece of Gruyere cheese, signed 'J. Grykho,1923'. It
has probably been left in payment of a debt.
Every object in the picture was slightly distorted and full of obscure
meaning. Lying in bed, Julia would sometimes think: "I wonder if that
picture's any good. It might be; it might be very good for all I know .... I bet
it is very good too."
But really she hated the picture. It shared, with the colour of the
plush sofa, a certain depressing quality. The picture and the sofa were
linked in her mind. ...'
The definite description the plush sofa in the last paragraph of the quote has
the function to bring back into focus an object which has been introduced earlier in
the discourse, and whose existence does not depend directly on general knowledge one
has about the setting of the scene. So, definite descriptions trigger searches not only
of Implicit Focus but also of other memory partitions. The question now arises
whether this other memory partition is Explicit Focus or not. If it is, then Sanford
and Garrod are home and dry; if not, and if moreover the other partition can be
shown to be Long-Term Text Memory, then they are in trouble, as there would be no
linguistic reason to distinguish between these two components.
It is clear from example (1) that definite descriptions can be used to re¬
introduce entities which have been introduced in the text before and must have
existed in Explicit Focus. If one is to believe Sanford and Garrod's analysis of definite
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descriptions, and sees them as instructions to search focus, then one is committed to
the view that the objects remain in Explicit Focus almost indefinitely. However,
Sanford and Garrod (1981;162) write:-
If, as we suggest, explicit focus is a short-term store of limited capacity, then the amount of
information being held in it must, of course, be limited. Accordingly, we suggest that explicit
focus only contains tokens and scenario pointers. As new tokens are added, old ones will
gradually diminish in terms of the computational space to which they point, until, eventually,
they are no longer in focus at all.
Of course, things which disappear out of Explicit Focus cannot go into
Implicit Focus, since this component contains an activated part of Long-Term
Semantic Memory. Given the role of Long-Term Text Memory, it is more likely that
the entities disappear into this partition. Thus, definite descriptions can be used to
instruct the reader to access material either in Explicit Focus, or Implicit Focus, or
Long-Term Text Memory. It follows that one cannot use definite descriptions as
evidence that Implicit Focus and Long-Term Text Memory are independently
addressable.
Sanford and Garrod do discuss the possibility of bringing back into focus
earlier topics. To this end, they introduce the notion of 'secondary processing'. They
write (Sanford and Garrod, 1981;167):-
referential resolution can be successful because there is either a token in explicit focus, or a
suitable slot in implicit focus, or both. In any piece of discourse, this need not be the case, and
when such resolution is not possible secondary processing is called for.
Secondary processing is done over an extended search domain. The
appropriate search domain now also includes the long-term memory partitions, Long-
Term Text and Long-Term Semantic Memory. Since the search domains are larger
than in the case of primary processing,
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secondary processing is both slower than is primary, and longer partial descriptions are required
for its success. Taking a general view of comprehension once more, secondary processing
provides the means by which new topics can be introduced, or earlier topics reintroduced to
current focus.
Sanford and Garrod (1981,171).
There are various problems with this notion of secondary processing. In the
first place, its introduction in the theory has the consequence that one can no longer
describe the retrieval procedures for definite descriptions in terms of the three
variables mentioned earlier in this section. It will be remembered that Sanford and
Garrod described the search domain for the retrieval procedures for definite
descriptions as focus, either Explicit or Implicit Focus. The fact that there is also
secondary processing means that this no longer is true.
Sanford and Garrod give two characteristics for secondary processing. First,
secondary processing is supposed to take more time, and secondly it is supposed to
require longer partial description to guide the search.
The second criterion can easily be dismissed. In some cases, we need
relatively long partial descriptions even if the search is confined to focus, e.g. in a
discourse such as (2).
(2) There are three blocks, a red one and two black ones. One of the black
ones is small and the other is large. The red block is a bit smaller than the
large black one. The little black block is on top of the red one.
Note that in the last sentence of this constructed example one had to
construct a definite description using all the information one had about the object one
was talking about in order to be sure that the hearer would have no doubt which
object to access. Thus, we have an example of an extremely long partial description
which has to be used even though the intended referent is in Explicit Focus.
Conversely, a minimal description such as the sofa would have been sufficient in
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discourse (1), even though the intended referent must exist in Long-Term Text
Memory. Similarly, one can come up with examples where an object is introduced
with a minimal description. For instance, discourse (3) which is the first sentence of
the Hemingway story Cat in the rain.
(3) There were only two Americans staying at the hotel. They did not know
any of the people they passed on the stairs on their way to and from their
room.
In this example, the definite description the hotel introduces hotel-knowledge
into the discourse. The definite descriptions the stairs and their rooms and the state of
affairs described in the second sentence clearly have to be understood against the
background of a hotel. Hemingway thus uses a minimal definite description to
introduce a frame.
The other criterion, that of slower processing, needs to be tested. It may be
true that definite descriptions which require secondary processing require more
processing time. The question however remains what the exact explanation of this
phenomenon would be. It is unlikely that the most feasible explanation would be in
terms of the size of the search domain. For if this were the explanation, then it would
be predicted that the interpretation of indefinite NPs, which presumably have as
their search domain Implicit Focus and Long-Term Semantic Memory (and maybe
even Long-Term Text Memory), would be considerably slower than the interpretation
of any other type of expression.
But even if the notion of secondary processing can be shown to be of
relevance to a theory of language processing, then it still remains to be shown that
one needs a distinction between Implicit Focus and Long-Term Text Memory, as
Sanford and Garrod maintain. At least from the point of view of search procedures, it
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seems, there is little if any reason to conclude that the processor treats these
components as distinct search domains.
It must be noted that Sanford and Garrod could still use the argument that
Implicit Focus and not Long-Term Text Memory, or vice versa, contains all the
information which people use when asked to recall a piece of text. However, given the
data on text-recall given in chapter 2. and indeed Sanford and Garrod's discussion of
the representation of text in memory, it is highly unlikely that they would be willing
to uphold such a claim.
The conclusion then has to be that there is little reason to distinguish
between Implicit Focus and Long-Term Text Memory, as Sanford and Garrod do, and
that there is reason to believe that there is a "component" which simultaneously
plays the different roles Sanford and Garrod ascribe to Implicit Focus and Long-Term
Text Memory.
3.2. Johnson-Laird's procedural model
Although Johnson-Laird is probably best known for his detailed proposals concerning
the structure of mental models, which will be discussed in section 4.4. of this chapter,
chapter 11 of his book Mental Models contains a proposal for an overall theory of
comprehension. Johnson-Laird first outlines a number of assumptions and then gives
a list of procedures which the processor is claimed to use when interpreting a
discourse. He does not make any detailed proposals for discourse production. I will
first discuss the assumptions underlying Johnson-Laird's approach, and then turn to
the procedures which he proposes people use when comprehending a discourse.
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Johnson-Laird (1983,246-37) lists five assumptions underlying his theory of
discourse comprehension. They are:-
1. The processes by which fictitious discourse is understood are not
essentially different from those that occur with true assertions.
2. In understanding a discourse you construct a single model of it.
3. The interpretation of discourse depends on both the model and the
processes that construct, extend and evaluate it.
4. The functions that construct, extend, evaluate, and revise mental models,
unlike the interpretations functions of model-theoretic semantics,
cannot be treated in an abstract way.
5. A discourse is true if it has at least one mental model that can be
embedded in the model corresponding to the world.
According to Johnson-Laird (1983,249-50), the process of translating an
assertion into a mental model requires several general procedures. They are:-
1. A procedure that begins the construction of a new mental model whenever
an assertion makes no reference, either explicitly or implicitly, to any
entity in the current model of the discourse.
2. A procedure which, if at least one entity referred to in the assertion is
represented in the current model, adds the other entities, properties, or
relations, to the model in an appropriate way.
3. A procedure that integrates two hitherto separate models if an assertion
interrelates entities in them.
4. A procedure, the verification procedure, which, if all entities referred to in
an assertion are represented in the current model, verifies whether the
asserted properties or relations hold in the model.
5. A procedure that adds the property or relation (ascribed in the assertion)
to the model in the appropriate way. This procedure is used when the
verification procedure does not return a definite truth value for the
assertion.
6. A procedure, called whenever the verification procedure returns the value
"true", that checks whether the model can be modified in a way that is
consistent with the previous assertions but so as to render the current
assertion false.
7. A procedure, called whenever the verification procedure returns the value
"false", that checks whether the model can be modified in a way that is
consistent with the previous assertions but so as to render the current
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assertion true.
Johnson-Laird (1983,244) assumes that the process of discourse
understanding has two stages. One first constructs a propositional representation of
the utterance, which is very near the surface form of the sentence to be understood,
and is the result of a first superficial understanding. In a second, and optional, stage
the propositional representation serves as a partial basis for the construction of a
mental model. It triggers one of the procedures listed above. Which of the procedures
is triggered is a function of a variety of factors including the referring expressions in
the propositional representation, the context as represented in the current mental
model, and the background knowledge that is triggered by the sentence.
There are a number of problems with the proposed procedures, and especially
with the last two procedures. Johnson-Laird probably includes procedures 6. and 7.
because most of his work on mental models deals with the problem of spatial
inference (Mani and Johnson-Laird, 1982) and the problem of solving syllogisms
(Johnson-Laird and Steedman, 1978; Johnson-Laird, 1983;64-145). His theory on
spatial and syllogistic reasoning can be summarized as follows. When solving
problems of this sort people first construct a mental model on the basis of the first
premise, and then do the same on the basis of the second premise. They then combine
the two premises, and read off a (preliminary) conclusion from this model. Finally,
they try to modify the model in order to make the conclusion false while leaving the
truth of the premises intact. If they fail to do so, then the conclusion is put forward as
a valid conclusion; if they succeed and can modify the model in such a way that the
first tentative conclusion is falsified, then they read off another preliminary
conclusion and try to falsify this one. Johnson-Laird (implicitly) claims that similar
processes are going on in discourse comprehension.
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There are various reasons to doubt the truth of this claim. If we initially
restrict our attention to syllogistic reasoning then the first problem which crops up
concerns the time it takes people to solve a syllogism. In general, it takes 5 to 30
seconds to solve a syllogism and a syllogism involves only two premises. Assuming
that not too much time is taken up by the actual formulation of the conclusion, it
should take about as much time to process a number of sentences in natural
language. However, it is clear that understanding discourse happens at a faster rate
than 2 or 3 sentences per 20 seconds.
To be fair to Johnson-Laird one has to admit that it may take longer to
translate into a mental model sentences used in syllogisms than it takes to translate
other sentences, especially given the necessity for producing an explicit response in
the syllogism task, a necessity not present in ongoing discourse processing. On the
other hand, given that there can be quite a number of sentences in any single
discourse, the complexity of the model would increase considerably, thereby making
manipulation of the model presumably harder and more time-consuming.
A second criticism concerns the way the procedures in question are supposed
to work. If the current assertion is found to already have a definite truth value in the
model, the procedures try to modify the model so that it is still consistent with the
previous sentences in the discourse while giving the current assertion a different
value in the model. Since mental models are constructed on the basis of propositional
representations, it follows that for the procedures in question to work, the
propositional representations have to remain available. One has to check the proposed
alterations of the model against the stored propositional representations to make sure
that they are not directly ruled out by one of the premises [5], As Johnson-Laird
(1983,254) himself points out, it follows that the propositional representations of
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sentences uttered earlier in the discourse remain available [6].
The problem is that there is ample evidence that people do not normally
store texts using prepositional representations which are very near the surface form
of the sentences contained in the discourse, some of which was presented in the
previous chapter. People build mental representations of texts which, whatever form
they take, are quite remote from the surface forms of the sentences they received, and
include a large amount of the relevant background knowledge.
Johnson-Laird (1983,160-2) discusses an experiment by Mani and himself
(Mani and Johnson-Laird, 1982) which is intended to support the view that there are
different levels of representations. They presented subjects with spatial descriptions
which were either determinate in that they allowed for only one spatial lay-out, or
indeterminate in that they allowed for more than one possible spatial lay-out. It
emerged that subjects remembered the gist of determinate descriptions much better
than that of the indeterminate descriptions, in the sense that sentences from the text
or inferrable sentences were ranked prior to confusion items significantly better for
the determinate descriptions than for the indeterminate ones. On the other hand, the
verbatim details of indeterminate descriptions were remembered significantly better
than the verbatim details of the determinate descriptions. Mani and Johnson-Laird
concluded from these findings that there are two levels of representation: a
prepositional level and a mental model level.
However, it still does not follow that in every discourse prepositional
representations are mentally stored. What the Mani and Johnson-Laird experiment
shows is that there are two forms of representation of text in memory:- texts can be
stored either in a prepositional representation or in a representation of the mental
model type. What Johnson-Laird needs to show in order for his theory of
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comprehension to go through is that representations of the prepositional type and
representations of the mental model type are used simultaneously and throughout the
discourse. What he has shown is that there are two types of representation; what he
needs to show is that the prepositional representation and the mental model co-exist
throughout the discourse. After all, the testing procedures 6. and 7. imply that one
compares alternative mental models, i.e. representations of the mental model type,
with propositional representations of previous sentences. The experiment has not
shown that one stores mental models and propositional representations
simultaneously, and indeed strongly suggests the opposite conclusion.
The criticism in the previous paragraphs is not intended as an argument
against using both propositional representations and mental models. There are many
arguments for believing in a propositional representation mediating between the
spoken string and the mental model. Apart from the Johnson-Laird and Mani
experiment, Johnson-Laird (1983;394) also cites the evidence of VP-deletion, which
can only be explained on the basis of the linguistic string. What the criticism is
aimed against is the fact that for the procedures to be applicable the propositional
representation has to remain available all the time, and that is psychologically
implausible.
From a discourse comprehension point of view, most of Johnson-Laird's
experiments on spatial and syllogistic inference are artificial. The reason is that,
unlike in spoken language, the premises remain available while the subject is
reasoning. Subjects therefore do not need to store mentally propositional
representations of the premises. They can concentrate completely on the reasoning
task which, as Johnson-Laird has quite convincingly shown, requires mental
representations of the model type. If the mental model has to be revised then subjects
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can compare their new mental model with the information in the sentences they have
before them. Subjects who find out that it is impossible to univocally construct a
mental model on the basis of the sentences given, then have a choice of storing the
propositional representations, or to make certain decisions so as to make the
construction of a single mental model possible. Johnson-Laird (1983;164) mentions
an experiment by Stenning (1981) who found that subjects sometimes do take the
latter option and construct a mental model by arbitrarily adding information which
cannot be retrieved or deduced from the sentences presented to them.
The conclusion then has to be that from a purely theoretical point of view,
the procedures which Johnson-Laird proposes to account for discourse comprehension
are somewhat dubious, because they rely on storage of propositional representations
alongside and simultaneous with mental representations of a model type. But in
practice, this problem is less critical. Radical revision of a mental model built on the
basis of a discourse is not often called for. Speakers and hearers generally obey
Gricean principles, and make discourses as easy to comprehend as possible, and
therefore, from a practical point of view, it is not necessary to keep both
representations around (Cf footnote 6).
4. Theories about the mental representations of discourse
There are a number of different formal proposals in the literature about the specific
mental representations of discourse. They can be divided roughly in three different
groups. First, there is the "model-theoretic" group which postulates some theoretical
entity corresponding to the mental representation of a discourse which is interpreted
through some embedding function into standard logical models. In a sense, this
approach differs least from the normal model theoretic account of formal semantics as
proposed by Montague. Logical models still play a major role in the interpretation of
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a discourse and a sentence. The only difference is that there is an intermediate level
between the language and the models and this intermediate level is a formal
representation of the mental representation people construct in response to a
discourse. Examples of this approach are Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982).
The second approach can be called the "description" approach. It has been
developed mainly to account for the interpretation of pronouns. The idea is to
generate descriptions of discourse objects on the basis of a given sentence and then
use them in the interpretation of anaphora. Webber (1979) and Richards (1984) are
examples.
The final approach is that of mental models. In response to the discourse a
hearer constructs a mental model, which more or less takes over the role played by
the mathematical model in formal semantics.
In each of the cases discussed below I interpret the theory as a theory of the
mental representation of discourse, whether or not the author chooses to see it so.
This will lead in a number of cases to criticisms which are not entirely fair. Thus, I
will judge a number of theories which are proposed mainly for semantic reasons on
psychological criteria. Although in the end I agree with Kamp (personal
communication) that this is probably the right way to go, I realize that not everybody
shares this view. What I criticise in this chapter are therefore often my
interpretations of the various systems proposed in the literature.
Before I turn to a discussion of the various proposals for the representation of
discourse, I would first like to discuss briefly the so-called donkey sentences. The
reason is that they have taken a central place in discussions about the discourse
representation. Indeed, part of the reason why formal semanticists became interested
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in discourse representations was the fact that Kamp (1982) claimed to be able to solve
the problem of these sentences by means of his Discourse Representation Structures.
4.1. Digression:- donkey sentences
Given the importance of the so-called donkey sentences for both Kamp's and Richards'
theory, it is necessary to divert our attention to sentences of this type for a moment.
Examples of sentences of this type are (3) and (4).
(3) Every miner who owns a donkey beats it.
(4) If a miner owns a donkey he beats it.
Formal semanticist have traditionally analysed indefinite NPs as existential
quantifiers. Although this analysis is not without problems, I will assume for the
sake of argument that the analysis is correct and that the indefinite NPs a miner and
a donkey in (4) have to be analysed as involving an existential quantifier. The
problem posed by the donkey sentences is that translating the indefinite as an
existential quantifier would lead to binding problems. That is, the most
straightforward translation of (3) would be (5) and (5) would be true if there was a
miner who did not own a donkey, or even if there was an object which was not a
miner or a donkey, clearly a counter-intuitive result.
(5) (Ex)(Ey)[(miner(x) & donkey(y) & own(x,y))
--> beat(x,y)]
Moreover, it was also argued that the only way to capture the truth
conditions of (4) was by giving the indefinites a miner and a donkey universal import,
i.e. translate them as universally quantified NPs, as in (6).
(6) (x)(y)[(miner(x) & donkey(y) & own(x,y))
~> beat(x,y)]
There certainly is no uniform agreement about whether (6) is the correct
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rendering of the truth conditions of the sentences in question, as Kamp (1981,179)
himself admits. For some speakers the indefinites a miner and a donkey should be
given 'generic' rather than 'universal' import. The claim made concerns the
prototypical miner and the prototypical donkey which he owns, rather than all
individual miners and all individual donkeys which they own (Cf. Seuren, 1985;
section 4.2.4). Thus, the sentence in question is almost equivalent to (7) [7],
(7) A miner who owns a donkey beats it.
It is in general not very useful to discuss varying intuitions to any great
length. I will therefore accept the claim that indefinites occurring in antecedents of
conditionals or in relative clauses governed by a universally quantified NP have to be
translated as universal quantifiers. It is sufficient to say that the intuitions are not as
clear-cut as one would like them to be. In section 4.3 of chapter 6 I will return to
donkey sentences.
4.2. The model theoretic approach
Proponents of the model-theoretic approach to the description of the mental
representation of discourse postulate a structure which intermediates between
language and the world. One can graphically represent the model-theoretic approach
as follows:-
discourse --> discourse representation —> world
Kamp (1981) calls the intermediate structures Discourse Representation
Structures whereas Heim (1981) uses the term file.
Kamp writes about Discourse Representation Structures
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I conjecture that the structures which speakers of a language can be non-trivially described as
forming to represent verbal contents are, if not formally identical, then at least very similar to
the representations here defined.
Kamp (1981,282).
Kamp thus claims that the formal structures the theory postulates have to be
regarded as formal representations of the mental representation of discourse. Heim
(1982) is less explicit about the status of her files, but by comparing entries in the
file, or file cards, to Karttunen's discourse referents (Karttunen, 1976) and Webber's
discourse entities (Webber, 1979), and files themselves to Stalnaker's notion of
common ground (Stalnaker, 1979), she gives her notion of file a strong cognitive
flavour.
One of the central aspects of the model-theoretic approach to the mental
representation of discourse is the central role it gives to the standard models from
logic. The intermediate structures which are postulated get their semantic status
because of the relationship which is defined between them and the standard models.
Apart from the theoretical reasons of giving a formal description of the
mental representation of discourse, Kamp and Heim also see more linguistic reasons
for their respective systems. Kamp uses his system to give an account for the donkey
sentences, whereas Heim uses hers to account for the indefiniteness-definiteness
distinction. Rather than discussing both systems in full detail I will discuss only
Kamp's system. The main reason is that I believe that all the criticism which I raise
against Kamp also apply in some form to Heim's system. Given that Kamp's system
has the advantage of greater formal rigour, I will restrict myself to Kamp's system.
4.2.1. Kamp's theory
Kamp's theory consists of two parts. The first part is a formal system for constructing
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the representations which users of the language are claimed to form in response to
verbal input, so-called Discourse Representations Structures. They are partially
ordered sets of Discourse Representations which in turn are ordered pairs consisting of
a set of individual constants, the discourse referents, and (occurrences of) formulas of
a language closely resembling a quantifier-free first-order language. The second part
of the theory links these representations to arbitrary (standard logical) models, thus
defining truth conditions. The basic idea is that a discourse D is true in a model M if
and only if the Discourse Representations Structure DRS constructed on the basis of
D is compatible with M. I will return to some of the details of the formal definition of
compatibility later [8],
4.2.2. Constructing Discourse Representation Structures
Intuitively, one constructs a Discourse Representation Structure as follows:- given a
discourse D in a language L one constructs the first Discourse Representation whose
set of individual terms is originally empty and whose set of formulas originally
contains just the first sentence in the discourse. One then applies the rules for the
construction of Discourse Representation Structures, as far as possible. Some rules
add new discourse referents and new sentences to a Discourse Representation. Other
rules also add more Discourse Representations to the Discourse Representation
Structure. It is important to point out that the order in which the rules are applied to
a given sentence depends on the syntactic analysis of the sentence.
After the rules, when applicable, have been applied to the first sentence of
the discourse, one adds the second sentence of the discourse to the principal Discourse
Representation, i.e. the highest Discourse Representation, which still contains the
first sentence in the discourse. One then applies all possible rules for Discourse
Representation Structure construction. Then one treats the next sentence in the
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discourse in the same way, and so on until the last sentence in the discourse has been
dealt with.
The partial ordering of the Discourse Representations in a Discourse
Representation Structure is a consequence of the fact that the construction rule
triggered by conditionals and universal sentences instruct one to create two new
Discourse Representations in the Discourse Representation Structure. These new
Discourse Representations are called subordinate to the Discourse Representation
which contains the occurrence of the universal or conditional sentence.
I will illustrate Kamp's theory by working through an example in some
detail. Consider sentence (8).
(8) If Pedro owns a donkey he beats it.
The first step in the construction of a Discourse Representation Structure for
this sentence is to create a Discourse Representation with (8) as its only element.
m 1
If Pedro owns a donkey he beats it
The next step is determined by the fact that sentence (8) is a conditional. We
thus have to apply the rule for conditional sentences to ml. The rule tells us to create
two Discourse Representations which are subordinate to ml, containing respectively
the antecedent and the consequent of the original sentence.
m 1
If Pedro owns a donkey he beats it
m 2 m 3
Pedro owns a donkey he beats it
We now have to apply the appropriate construction rules to m2, and the first
rule we can apply is that governing proper names. It says to create a new discourse
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referent in the principal Discourse Representation and to add a sentence to it
asserting the identity between the newly created discourse referent and the name.
Moreover, one has to add a sentence to the Discourse Representation the sentence
which gave rise to an application of this construction rule occurred in. It is formed




If Pedro owns a donkey he beats it
m 2 m 3
Pedro owns a donkey
u owns a donkey
he beats it
The next rule to be applied is triggered by the indefinite NP a donkey. It
instructs one to introduce a new discourse referent into the Discourse Representation
which contains the sentence with the indefinite NP in question. Moreover, one has to
add two new sentences. The new sentences are constructed by predicating the noun in
the indefinite NP of the newly created discourse referent, and by substituting the
discourse referent for the indefinite in the original sentence.
m 1
u = Pedro
If Pedro owns a donkey he beats it
m 2 ra 3
he beats it
Pedro owns a donkey
u owns a donkey
d o n k e y ( v )
u owns v
This is the last step one can take as far as Discourse Representation m2 is
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concerned. However, there is one rule which as to be applied twice to Discourse
Representation m3. This rule, which deals with pronouns, instructs one to find a
suitable antecedent for the pronoun, i.e. a suitable discourse referent in a
superordinate Discourse Representation, and add a new sentence to the Discourse
Representation in which the sentence with the pronoun occurred. The new sentence is
formed from the old one by substituting the discourse referent for the pronoun. This
rule is the only one which relies on the partial ordering of the Discourse
Representation in a Discourse Representation Structure:- one condition on what a
suitable antecedent for a pronoun is is that the discourse referent exists in a
superordinate Discourse Representation. The results of applying this rule twice to the
consequent of the sentence we are dealing with, taking Pedro as the 'antecedent' of he




If Pedro owns a donkey he beats it
m 2 m 3
he beats it
v ubeatsit
Pedro owns a donkey u beats v
u owns a donkey
d o n k e y ( v )
u owns v
Kamp gives just one other construction rule for universal sentences. The idea
is to create two subordinate Discourse Representation, one containing a sentence
based on the subject of the sentence and one containing a sentence based on the
predication made. Thus in response to sentence (9) one would construct two new
Discourse Representations, the first one originally containing just a discourse referent
x and the sentences 'man(x)' and 'x owns a donkey', and the second containing only
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the sentence 'x beats it'. As a consequence, sentence (9) and (10) give Discourse
Representation Structures which only differ in the sentence contained in the principal
Discourse Representation.
(9) Every man who owns a donkey beats it.
(10) If a man owns a donkey he beats it.
Kamp has two reasons for wanting his subordinate Discourse
Representations. They not only determine the set of possible antecedents of a given
pronoun, but they also enable him to give a uniform account of indefinite NPs
including those occurring in donkey sentences. In order to see how this works we
have to turn to the truth definition.
4.2.3. The truth definition
The basic idea underlying the truth definition of a universal or conditional sentence is
as follows:- A universal or conditional sentence is true in a model M if and only if
every verification of the first Discourse Representation constructed in response to the
sentence can be extended to a verification of the second Discourse Representation. It
is this idea which gives indefinites when they occur in a 'donkey-context', i.e. either
in the antecedent of a conditional or in a relative clause hanging of a universally
quantified NP, their universal import.
We can illustrate this if we look at the Discourse Representation Structure
which we constructed in response to sentence (8). This sentence if true according to
the truth definition if every verification of the first Discourse Representation can be
extended to one of the second. Thus, if there is a donkey which Pedro owns, then this
donkey will also have to be beaten by Pedro. However, in order for the sentence to be
true, the above has to hold for every verification of the first Discourse Representation,
i.e. every donkey which Pedro owns also has to be beaten by Pedro. We thus see how
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the indefinite NP a donkey gets universal import in sentence (8).
4.2.4. An appraisal of Kamp's theory
Kamp's theory suffers from a number of shortcomings. As a linguistic theory, Kamp's
theory suffers from the fact that he does not account for the fact that entities which
can be referred to by using a pronoun at one stage of the discourse can lose this
status later in the discourse. Kamp (1981,283) says that he is not concerned with the
strategies used in selecting the referents of personal pronouns but rather with the
sets of referential candidates from which the strategies select, and he could of course
reply to the above objection that the disappearance of referential candidates out of
these sets is a process which has to do with the selecting strategies. However, as this
implies that in principle something remains for ever available for pronominalization,
this reply has to be rejected.
One of the main achievements Kamp would claim for his theory is the fact
that he is able to provide a uniform analysis of indefinite NPs across a variety of
contexts. In particular, he can account for the universal import indefinites are
claimed to get when they occur in a 'donkey-context'. However, there is a problem
here. As Richards (1984) points out, if one accepts that a donkey in (9) and (10) has
universal import, then surely it also has universal import in (11).
(11) Most men who own a donkey beat it.
However, if Kamp wants to account for this example using the same
machinery, then he would run into problems. If the interpretation of most is to be
parallel to that of every, then a quantified sentence with most as its highest quantifier
is true if and only if most verifications of the first Discourse Representation
constructed in response to sentence (11) can be extended to verifications for the
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second Discourse Representation. However, this would not give a donkey in (11) full
universal import. Rather, (11) would mean that most donkey-owning men beat most
of the donkeys that they own.
There are a number of reasons for doubting the validity of Kamp's theory as
a psychological theory. I will first give some arguments against the truth conditional
approach in general. Soames (1984,163) claims that psychology and truth conditional
semantics have nothing to do with each other. He writes:-
Psychological theories are theories of the states and processes mediating sensory inputs and
behavioral outputs. For mentalistic theories, the important states and processes are those
occurring in the head (as opposed to the environment). ...
Facts about truth conditions are not of this kind. To give the truth conditions of
sentences is to specify the non-linguistic conditions that would make them true. ... [A] complete
specification of the non-linguistic conditions under which they are true will not follow from a
specification of mental states and processes, or a descriptions of the relationship between sensory
input and behavioral output. Consequently, claims about the truth conditions of sentences are
not (purely) psychological and linguistic semantics must be distinguished from theories of the
mental states and processes underlying semantic competence.
However, apart from these higher level theoretical criticisms one can also
give some more specific psychological arguments against Kamp's theory. All these
arguments can also be made in some form against Heim's system. If we first look at
the requirement posed by the claim that natural language is processed on a left-to-
right basis, we see that the order in which the rules for the construction of Discourse
Representation Structures are to be applied is determined by the syntactic analysis of
the sentence. Thus, the component which contains these rules received full syntactic
analyses as its input. Processing can therefore not take place on a left-to-right basis.
This also applies to Heim's system who constructs her files on the basis of the logical
form of a sentence. Second, Kamp's Discourse Representation Structures contain only
information derived from the text, and do not also include information derived from
background knowledge. Moreover, it is not at all clear that he could extend his theory
to make the inclusion of background knowledge possible. Heim's theory has the edge
over Kamp's in this respect. She allows her files to keep track of objects which are
contextually salient. She thus can introduce objects into the file which have not been
explicitly introduced into the discourse.
4.2.5. Conclusion about the model-theoretic approach
Summarizing then, the model theoretic approach to the mental representation of
discourse suffers from a number of essential shortcomings as a psychological theory.
Since at least some of the criticisms I propose are not dependent on the specific
theories developed thus far, I conclude that the model-theoretic approach in general
has to be rejected as a fruitful approach to the problem of the mental representation
of discourse.
4.3. The 'description' approach
The 'description' approach to the representation of discourse is exemplified by Webber
(1979) and Richards (1984). The approach is essentially syntactic in that it heavily
relies on the syntactic analysis of the sentences in a discourse. Both Webber and
Richards give rules which can be used to construct certain descriptions based on the
syntactic analyses of a given sentence. Webber calls them invoking descriptions
whereas Richards uses the term reconstruction terms. Both use the constructed
descriptions in an account of the interpretation of pronouns.
4.3.1. Webber's approach
Webber (1979;1-21 - 1-25) writes that an objective of discourse is the communication
of a model ffom speaker to hearer. A discourse model is a set of entities naturally
evoked by a discourse, the set of discourse entities, linked together by the
relationships they participate in. Discourse entities are seen as hooks for descriptions,
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the underlying conception being very much like that of KRL (Bobrow and Winograd,
1977; cf chapter 5). Discourse entities can be invoked in the hearer's discourse model
either linguistically, perceptually, or inferentially. The first description to be attached
to a discourse entity, i.e. the description which was attached when the discourse
entity was invoked, is called the invoking description. What Webber sets out to do, is
to identify those aspects of a text which are essential to forming appropriate invoking
descriptions of discourse entities evoked by a text. Thus, one can regard Webber's
invoking descriptions as descriptions of the mental objects which are constructed by
the hearer in his mental representation of the discourse.
Webber gives a number of rules for the construction of discourse entities and
their invoking descriptions. However, I will consider only one, as the point of the
exercise is not to criticise the detailed theory Webber proposes, but rather to review
the general approach of which Webber is one representative. It must be stressed that
Webber considers a remarkably wide range of examples and different types of
anaphora but in order to illustrate her approach, I will only consider her treatment of
singular pronouns. Consider (12).
(12) Sam saw a cat.
Webber's rules take as input a logical translation of the sentence under
consideration. The logical translation of (12) is (13).
(13) (Ex:cat).saw(Sam,x)
If we call sentence (12) S, then the rule which Webber gives takes the logical
formula (13) as input and returns as output a discourse entity el together with the
invoking description (14).
(14) the x: cat(x) & saw(Sam,x) & evoke(S,x)
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(14) is informally rendered as the cat which Sam saw and which was
mentioned in sentence S. The discourse entity el together with the invoking
description can now be used as the interpretation of a subsequent pronoun.
Webber does not raise the issue about the relationship between evoked
discourse entities and entities in the long-term knowledge base. However, given the
fact that her work is firmly placed in the context of Artificial Intelligence, it is not too
difficult to see how the frame-work she provides could be extended to do so. A first
approximation might be to see the descriptions as linked to concepts in the long-term
knowledge base, and discourse entities which correspond to long-term mental objects
as pointing to their long-term counterparts.
Webber does not consider the question of how a given pronoun finds its
antecedent. All she sets out to do, is to make clear how discourse entities are evoked,
which at a later stage of the discourse can be used in the interpretation of a
discourse. As a consequence, she also does not consider the question how a given
discourse entity which is pronominalizable at one stage of the discourse gradually
looses this status.
There is also a problem about the possibility of left-to-right processing of a
sentence. Given that the input to the algorithm which constructs evoking descriptions
is a logical translation of the sentence, this question of left-to-right processing reduces
to the question of whether a logical translation of a sentence can be found in a left-
to-right fashion. Given the fact that quantified NPs often appear in the verb phrase of
a sentence, yet have to end up in the front of the logical translation of the sentence, it
is not very likely that a sentence can be translated into a logical formula on a left-to-
right basis.
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Summarising then, Webber considers an impressive range of examples. Her
theory is very precise and given that she works within the framework of AI, it seems
straightforward to extend her theory to make inclusion of background information in
the discourse models possible. It is less clear how left-to-right processing and the fact
that discourse entities can loose their "pronominalizable" status can be accounted for.
4.3.2. Richards' approach
Another example of the description approach is Richards (1984). Richards's rules
take as input not a logical translation of the sentence, but rather a syntactic analysis
which is constructed along the lines laid down in Montague (1973). Thus, in order to
illustrate how Richards' rule for the construction of reconstruction terms works, we
have to a consider a syntactic analysis of (12). There is a problem here because there
are in principle two different syntactic analyses of (12). One can either first combine
the verb saw and the indefinite a cat to give a verb phrase which can then be
combined with Sam, as in (15), or one can first combine Sam and saw x to give
something which can be combined with a cat to give a sentence, as in (16)
(15) Sam saw a cat
I I
Sam x saw a cat
I I
a cat x saw y
I I
a cat
(16) Sam saw a cat
I I
a cat Sam saw y
III I
a cat Sam x sawy
The difference is not trivial because one gets different reconstruction terms
for the different syntactic analysis. The algorithm for constructing reconstruction
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terms relies on the syntactic analysis of the sentence. If we have a pronoun with an
indefinite NP as its antecedent, then we construct a term interpreting the pronoun by
looking at the syntactic analysis of the sentence the indefinite occurs in. The
reconstruction term is then constructed out of all the predicates within the scope of
the indefinite article in the syntactic analysis tree. Thus, if we take (15) as the
syntactic analysis then the reconstruction term constructed in response to a pronoun
in a following sentence which has a cat as its antecedent would be 'y[cat(y) &
saw(x,y)]', a reconstruction term containing a free variable and hence not
interpretable without additional machinery. On the other hand, if one takes the (16)
as the syntactic analysis, then the reconstruction term would be 'y[cat(y) &
saw(Sam,y)]'. Richards does not give any principled reasons why one should prefer
one analysis to the other. In the rest of this section, we will, whenever relevant, take
the analysis which would give the results Richards desires.
If we look at the reconstruction terms Richards constructs from a purely
logical point of view, then we see that they syntactically behave just like logical
constants, i.e. they appear in the same places in formulas as logical constants do.
However, semantically they behave differently from ordinary logical constants. A
sentence of the form 'F(x[Cx])' with x[Cx] a reconstruction term, is true in a model M
just in case all individuals which have the property C also have the property F.
Thus, if sentence (12) was followed in a discourse by sentence (17), then under
Richards' analysis, (17) would means something like (18).
(17) It was black.
(18) All cats Sam saw were black.
This analysis predicts some counterintuitive results. Let us assume that Sam
did indeed see a black cat, but that, unbeknownst to the speaker, he also saw another
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cat at the same time which was white. According to Richards' analysis of (17), the
speaker has then uttered an untruth. After all, only one of the cats which Sam saw
was black, while the other was white. Thus, (17), under the analysis given in (18)
would be false. However, this is a counter-intuitive result. While one may say that
the speaker did not utter the whole truth, or even that, if she knew that Sam saw two
cats, she had been deliberately misleading, it seems too strong to say that she lied.
Given the importance of this point for the appraisal of Richards' theory, let
me make the same point in a slightly different way. Consider the following somewhat
stilted discourse.
(19) Sam saw a cat.
It was black.
He saw that it was fighting with a white cat.
According to Richards' analysis, discourse (19) is inconsistent. Given that it
follows from the fact that Sam saw a black cat fighting with a white cat that Sam
saw both a white and a black cat, the speaker of (19) would claim at the same time
that all the cats Sam saw were black, and also that one of the cats Sam saw was
white. Hence, the speaker of (19) would utter an inconsistent set of statements.
However, discourse (19) is perfectly acceptable.
Richards admits that his analysis may seem somewhat counterintuitive, but
he argues that the theory should be judged not only on the basis of one example, but
on the basis of a variety of examples. If a theory can be shown to give the right
results in the case of a number of examples which are problematic for other theories,
then, so the argument goes, we might be prepared to overlook a counterintuitive
result in another case. While I can in general agree with this view, the argument
should be used with caution. A syntactic theory which gives a perfect explanation of
the formation of tag questions in English, but would make the wrong predictions
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about the order of subject, verb and object in the main clause would be regarded with
suspicion.
There are two advantages Richards sees for his theory. The first concerns the
interpretation of plural pronouns. Richards argues that they will have to be analysed
as universal quantifiers and that his theory of reconstruction captures this intuition.
Richards' theory does indeed get the right results for the distributive interpretation of
plural pronouns; the interpretation of the collective reading, which cannot be
captured by a universal quantification over individuals, is left open.
The second main argument Richards sees for his theory is the treatment of
the donkey sentences. His treatment enables one to account for the alleged universal
import of pronouns which have as their antecedents an indefinite NP in a "donkey-
position". Unlike Kamp's treatment of these examples which did not give the desired
result for those cases where the indefinite occurred in a relative clause governed by a
non-standard quantifier, such as most, Richards' treatment gives all the results he
requires.
Richards sees the main objective of his theory as providing a translation of
sentences of English into an appropriate logical language. In a sense, Richards is
giving an extension of Montague's treatment of English. His theory therefore suffers
from all the shortcomings of the model-theoretic approach to the mental
representation of discourse which were discussed in sections 2. and 4.2. of this
chapter.
4.3.3. An overall appraisal of the 'description' approach
It is clear that the roles of the Webber's invoking descriptions and Richards'
reconstruction terms are very different and that this has important repercussions for
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the value of the theory as a theory about the mental representation of discourse.
Richards uses the reconstruction terms in providing a translation algorithm from
English into a logical language. He thus runs into all the problems associated with
the truth conditional approach to language. Webber sees the invoking descriptions as
attached to discourse entities, mental constructs which can act as the interpretation
of pronouns. She thus avoids the problems of the truth conditional approach.
Given that Webber's theory meets most of the criteria of adequay mentioned
in the previous chapter, her theory is superior to those developed in the model-
theoretic approach. Her theory suffers from two weaknesses however:- left-to-right
processing and the fact that discourse entities can loose their "pronominalizable"
status cannot be accounted for.
4.4. The mental models approach
The last approach to the mental representation of discourse is the mental models
approach. There is a growing number of proponents of this theory (e.g. Karttunen,
1976; Fauconnier, 1979; Seuren, 1985; Johnson-Laird, for example 1983). All agree
that the aim of a lot of discourse is the transfer of information from speaker to hearer
and that the processes which led the speaker to produce the discourse and the
processes by which the hearer understands the discourse are of crucial importance to
the study of human language. There is therefore an intimate connection between the
mental models approach and procedural semantics paradigm discussed in chapter 2.
Most theories proposed in this framework lack the formal rigour of the other
approaches to discourse representation. Moreover, there is also lack of agreement
about the exact nature of the models. Because of this I will not discuss any of the
formal proposals in detail as I did in the case of the model-theoretic and the
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description approach. Rather, I will concentrate on some of the properties which have
been ascribed to mental models.
An essential feature of the mental models approach which distinguishes it
from other approaches to the mental representation of discourse lies in the fact that
the mental representations which underlie the processes of comprehending and
producing discourses, are regarded as having semantic status themselves and not in
need of any further interpretation. Unlike the truth conditional approach where the
discourse representations have to be embedded into standard logical models and
derive their semantic status from this embedding function, the structures postulated
in the mental models approach are themselves semantic entities. Seuren (1985)
makes this point forcefully when he writes:-
possible worlds should be done away with in semantics; their role should be taken over by a
theory of mental machinery accounting for everything, and a great deal more, that possible
worlds were meant to account for.
Thus, in Seuren's theory, and in this respect he is representative of the
mental models approach, mental models take over the role of the possible worlds in
standard formal semantics. Consequently, in the mental models approach once the
task of establishing a relationship between discourses and mental models has been
fulfilled, one has given a complete semantic theory.
Johnson-Laird (1984, chapter 15) lists a number of properties of mental
models. He gives six principles concerning the nature of mental models and three
principles concerning the concepts which mental models can embody. The latter need
not concern us here. The six principles about the nature of mental models are:-
1. the principle of computability,
mental models, and the machinery for constructing and
interpreting them, are computable
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2. the principle of finitism,
a mental model must be finite in size and cannot directly
represent an infinite domain
3. the principle of constructivism,
a mental model is constructed from tokens arranged in a
particular structure to represent a state of affairs.
4. the principle of economy in models,
a description of a single state of affairs is represented by a single
mental model even if the description is incomplete or
indeterminate
5. mental models can directly represent indeterminacies if and only if their
use is not computationally intractable, i.e. there is not a
exponential explosion in complexity.
6. the principle of structural identity,
the structures of mental models are identical to the structures of
the states of affairs, whether perceived or conceived, that the
models represent.
The first three principles are more or less equivalent to the psychological
criteria of adequacy for representational systems for the mental representation of
discourse; the structures postulated to represent discourse have to be psychologically
plausible. The fourth principle is equally plausible and therefore I will not discuss it
in any detail. Indeed, the findings of Stenning (1981) that people tend to make
specific assumptions even if they are not warranted to do so by the actual discourse,
which were mentioned in section 3.2. of this chapter, provide experimental support for
this principle. Principle 5. is almost a corollary of the principles 1., 2. and 4., and is
therefore also plausible.
The principle of structural identity is central to Johnson-Laird's conception of
mental models. Johnson-Laird (1983,419-22) uses it to clarify the distinction between
the mental models he postulates and the partitioned semantic networks of Hendrix
(1975,1979). He dismisses the semantic network approach partly because it does not
obey the principle of structural identity. There is no structural analogy between an
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(external) state of affairs in which an assertion would be true and the semantic
network constructed on the basis of the assertion. There has to be a structural
identity between structures used in ontology and those postulated in epistemology
and semantic networks do not have this.
In section 2.1. of chapter 2 I put forward an evolutionary argument for the
assumption that the representations which humans construct of reality are likely to
bear a close resemblance to reality itself. I thus put forward an evolutionary
argument for the principle of structural identity. However, it seems to me that the
practical usefulness of the principle is somewhat restricted. The claim that the
structure of a mental model is identical to the structure of the state of affairs it
represents is only a substantial claim if the structure of states of affairs can be
clearly specified independently of our cognitive apparatus. But there is no such
specification. Indeed, ontologists have argued over the centuries about the structure of
reality, and although the debate might be slightly less fashionable these days, the
problem has never been solved, as far as I am aware. One may actually doubt that
the question can ever be solved. Given Locke's 'veil of perception' (section 3.1.1. of
chapter 2), it is impossible to get direct access to the world. Johnson-Laird seems to
agree when he writes:-
In short, our view of the world is causally dependent both on the way the world is and on the
way we are. There is an obvious but important corollary:- all our knowledge of the world
depends on our ability to construct models of it.
Johnson-Laird (1983;402)
Thus, we have no independent means of determining the structure of states
of affairs independently of ourselves. The principle of structural identity, true as it
may be, is therefore of little practical use when we are trying to determine the
structure of our mental representations.
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There are two ways forward. One can either postulate what the structure of
reality is, or one can make proposals about the structure of the mental models. One
could argue that logicians take the first option when they construct a model theoretic
interpretation of the language they are concerned with. Thus, when one is dealing
with a non-modal language, all one needs in one's ontology is individuals and truth-
values [9]. All the other elements one needs for interpretating the language, such as
the interpretations of predicates, can be built up out of the set of individuals by
standard set-theoretical means. When one is dealing with a modal language, then one
needs a set of possible worlds, or something similar, to build up all the constructs one
needs for interpreting the language [10].
There are however two problems with this option. First, logicians do not
agree among themselves about the proper structure of their models. Quine's crusade
against the use of possible worlds in the semantics for modal logics has already been
mentioned in footnote 1, and more recently Barwise and Perry (1983) have proposed
an ontology which is completely different from the one normally used by logicians.
Secondly, unlike logicians, cognitive scientists cannot just postulate the structure of
reality in order to determine the structure of mental models. They are restricted in
their options by certain empirical considerations, some of which are for example
embodied in the other principles Johnson-Laird proposes.
Given the failure of the first option, one is forced to take the second option,
rather than postulating what the structure of reality is, one postulates the structure
of the mental models. This problem has of course been extensively studied in
Artificial Intelligence under the name of knowledge representation, and various
knowledge representation schemas have been proposed (cf Barr and Feigenbaum
1982; chapter III). Although we also not have direct access to our own mental
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representations, and although we therefore cannot directly determine the structure of
our mental representations, we have the advantage that we can experiment with
different proposals by implementing them on a computer. In chapter 5., I will return
to the question of knowledge representation and propose a knowledge representation
schema which is very similar to Minsky's frames (Minsky, 1975), and Bobrow and
Winograd's Knowledge Representation Language (Bobrow and Winograd, 1977).
In the previous discussion, we have drifted from the question of the structure
of the mental representation of discourse to the question of mental representations in
general. The question naturally arises what the relationship between the two is, and
it is here that the fifth axiom of procedural semantics, mentioned in section 2 of
chapter 2, becomes relevant:- the most appropriate formalisms for building theories of
language are those that deal explicitly with the structure of knowledge and the
processes using it. The principle can be argued for as follows - language is used as a
vehicle for the transfer of information from speaker to hearer. Speakers have
information available in their long-term knowledge stores which they want to
transfer to their hearers. Hearers, on the other hand, receive information in a
discourse which, if we restrict ourselves to the ideal situation and abstract from
factors such as memory limitations, will become part of their long-term knowledge
bases. If we apply Occam's razor, then it can be expected that the representations
used in discourse production and the representations constructed in discourse
comprehension have the same structure as the representations used to store long-
term knowledge. It thus follows that the question about discourse representation




The first task facing those interested in the mental representation of discourse is to
specify the structure of the long-term knowledge base in the human language
processor, since it can be expected that the mental representations used in discourse
production and comprehension are of the same form as those in the long-term
knowledge base. However, having done so, they will also have to specify the
relationship between certain expressions in the language and parts of the structures
in the knowledge base. After all, if language is a medium for transferring information
from speaker to hearer, and the representations constructed in response to language
reflect the structure of the knowledge base, then there have to be systematic
correlations between certain expressions in the language and certain structures in the
knowledge base. The first problem will be discussed in chapter 5., the second in
chapter 6.
5. Summary and conclusion
In this chapter I discussed two theories about the overall architecture of the human
language processor. In the next chapter I will present another model of the human
language processor which resembles Sanford and Garrod's model. My model however
avoids some of the problems raised in connection with their model.
I also discussed some theories about the specific representations used in
discourse production and comprehension. I came to the conclusion that it can be
expected that the representations in question will be of the same structure as the
representations in the long-term knowledge base. I will therefore introduce a
knowledge representation schema in chapter 5., while in chapter 6. I will discuss
certain linguistic expressions to see how their behaviour in discourse could be
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accounted for using the representation schema developed in chapter 5.
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Footnotes:-
1. The model theoretic interpretation of intensional logic is unproblematic only from a
logical point of view. Indeed, Quine has spent a good deal of his career arguing that
the model-theoretic interpretation of modal logics as developed by Kripke is not
without its problems from an ontological point of view as it relies on the notion of a
possible world. Quine argues that a commitment to this notion leads to undesirable
extensions of the ontology.
2. A number of Montague's intellectual heirs (e.g. Partee, Dowty, Kaplan) have
attempted to extend the basic Montague programme to deal with world-knowledge.
However, in their work world-knowledge only plays a role in the interpretation of
propositions and not in the construction of propositions from linguistic input.
Therefore, most of these arguments also hold against their position, as it now stands.
It is an open question whether their efforts can be extended to address these problems
as well.
3. Sanford and Garrod distinguish between Explicit and Implicit Focus because
pronouns, they claim, can only be used to trigger searches of explicit focus. It has to
be noted that this way of drawing the distinction is incorrect. Yule (1982) reported a
number of examples of pronouns which refer to entities which have not been
explicitly introduced in the discourse but have to be derived from activated
background knowledge. I will return to Yule's examples and pronominalization in
general in chapter 6. For the time being I will restrict myself to definite descriptions
and the memory searches they trigger according to Sanford and Garrod.
4. A syllogism is an argument with two premises, each of which has one of the four
following forms.
All x are y.
Some x are y.
No x are y.
Some x are not y.
One of the terms (i.e. the x or y in the above formulas), the so-called middle term, is
the same in both premises. The conclusion which also takes one of the four forms,
then contains the other two terms in the premises. An example syllogism is the
following:-
Some x are y
All y are z
Some x are z
5. Mark Steedman pointed out to me that this is not a necessary consequence of the
overall approach. In the case of syllogisms, one can imagine that the models which
change the initial model do so in such a way as to leave the premises true on the
model. Thus, one can imagine procedures which change the model in such a way that
the premises remain true. However, it seems to me that it is harder to see how one
could do so in, for example, spatial reasoning.
6. Johnson-Laird qualifies his position in a number of places. The point of the
procedures is to show in principle how one model can 'stand for' many models.
However, Johnson-Laird admits that in practice the extent to which the procedures
can be carried out is restricted by for example the limits on working memory
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(Johnson-Laird, 1983; 264). He also point to the Gricean principles which speakers
and hearers obey. As a consequence, radical revision of a model is not often called for
in ordinary discourse. (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 164).
7. Sentence (8) feels somewhat strange and is much improved if one expands the verb
phrase, as in (1') and (1").
(1') A miner who owns a donkey will beat it.
(1") A miner who owns a donkey has the right to beat it.
8. The actual truth definition Kamp gives is rather complex. It contains basically all
the machinery of a standard Tarskian truth definition with separate clauses for
atomic formulas and the different connectives. However, as van Benthem and van
Eijck (1982) point out, this complexity is necessary. The simplest definition of
extentability would be:- discourse D is true in model M if and only if Discourse
Representation Structure DRS can be extended to M. But this is not adequate as one
can prove that it can only apply to purely existential sentences and would not give
the right results for universal sentences.
9. In principle one could do away with truth values. Tarski's original definition of an
interpretation for predicate calculus did not make use of truth values. The idea is to
see the interpretation of a formula as the set of those assignments of individuals to
variables which satisfy the formula. A formula can then be defined to be true just in
case its interpretation is the set of all assignments, and false if its interpretation is
empty.
10. In fact, it is to also construct possible worlds from the set of possible individuals
and truth values by standard set theoretical means (Cf Reichgelt, 1981). The basic
idea is to treat a possible world as a standard interpretation for a non-modal first
order language.
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Chapter 4:- The architecture of the human language processor
1. Introduction
In this chapter I will develop a psychologically motivated computational model for the
human language processor. Earlier versions of the model can be found in Reichgelt
(1982) and Shadbolt (1983). The model is intended to model the more 'semantic' and
'pragmatic' aspects of the processor, and is not intended as a theory about how
humans parse sentences. The question about the specific representations which people
use or construct in discourse understanding will be largely left until chapter 5.
1.1. Knowledge activation
Using language in discourse involves the activation of knowledge. This is obvious
from the speaker's point of view. After all, a speaker wants to transfer certain
information which is stored in her long-term knowledge base to the hearer. In order
to be able to do so, this information will have to be made available for the language
generation processes, i.e. it will have to be stored in a more activated format.
Moreover, since speakers generally cannot transfer the information in one utterance,
but have to transfer it in different utterances, they have to be able to keep track of
what information has already been transferred. So, the information has to remain
available in its totality during the entire discourse in a more accessible, i.e. more
activated, format.
Understanding language also involves the activation of knowledge.
Comprehending a discourse often is impossible without an understanding of the
background against which the discourse is set. Various authors have noted that the
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early stages of discourse often have the function of making the hearer realize against
which background the discourse is to be understood. (Cf. Garrod & Sanford, 1982).
The early stages of discourse often have no other role than enabling the hearer to
activate the appropriate background knowledge. Another reason for assuming that
understanding a discourse requires the activation of knowledge emerges from a closer
look at what a hearer has to do during discourse comprehension. The point of the
discourse is the transfer of information from speaker to hearer. The hearer is
therefore faced with the task of reconstructing in his own mind the information which
led the speaker to produce the discourse. This means that hearers not only have to
understand each of the single utterances speakers produce; they also have to
integrate the interpretations of the different utterances into a consistent and coherent
informational structure. Clearly, this presupposes that the hearer keeps information
provided earlier in the discourse available in a format which makes integration of
new information easy, i.e. in an activated format.
The model I will present here distinguishes between three functionally
different components for modelling knowledge and its activation. The first component
is the discourse model. It contains a representation of the interpretation of the
ongoing discourse. A second component, the general epistemic model, is the
representation of the long-term knowledge processors bring to a discourse. A third
component, the discourse specific epistemic model, contains knowledge activated on
the basis of previous discourse as well as the long-term background knowledge which
is necessary for the production or comprehension of the discourse. The distinction
between the three components has to be seen as a distinction between various degrees
of activation of the different pieces of information or knowledge. The information in
the discourse model can be thought of as more highly activated than the information
in the discourse specific epistemic model and similarly for the discourse specific
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epistemic model and the general epistemic model.
The distinctions are thus functional rather than ontological. There are
various ways in which one can represent degrees of activation of knowledge in a
theory of the human language processor. One way would be to have an index
representing the degree of activation attached to each piece of information
represented in the system modelling the processor. Another possibility is the one I
adopted here. Rather than having a direct representation of the degree of activation, I
represent the most activated information as being in the discourse model, the least
activated information as being in the general epistemic model, and pieces of
information which are activated to an intermediate degree as being in the discourse
specific epistemic model. This gives an indirect method of stating the degree of
activation of a particular piece of knowledge. The main drawback of this way is that
it appears that there are only three possible degrees. Information is either in the
discourse model, or in the discourse specific epistemic model, or the general epistemic
model. This is an abstraction. There are probably many more degrees of activation. It
is even likely that the scale of activation is continuous, thus giving an infinite
number of degrees of activation.
1.2. Comparison with Sanford and Garrod's model
There is a large similarity between the model presented here and the model proposed
by Sanford and Garrod which I discussed in section 3.1. of chapter 3. If one compares
the various components Sanford and Garrod distinguish and the functional
"components" in the model presented here, then one will notice a large similarity
between the two. At least at first sight, there is a correspondence between Sanford
and Garrod's Explicit Focus and the discourse model, between Long-Term Semantic
Memory and the general epistemic model. The role of the discourse specific epistemic
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model is taken in Sanford and Garrod's model in part by Implicit Focus and in part
by Long-Term Text Memory. I argued in section 3.1. of chapter 3 that Sanford and
Garrod's distinction between Implicit Focus and Long-Term Text Memory could not
be maintained. Since there is one component in my model which combines the roles of
the different components in Sanford and Garrod's model, my model is not susceptible
to this criticism. I will return to this point in section 3.
There is also a major difference between Sanford and Garrod's views and the
ones presented here concerning the status of the different components in the model.
Sanford and Garrod see the different components as memory partitions and they
define a memory partition (1981 ;158):-
as independently addressable and capable of being treated by the processor as a
distinct search domain.
I see the various components in my model as ordered along an axis of
activation. I thus make a quantitative difference between the various components,
whereas Sanford and Garrod's distinction can be seen as qualitative. It has to be
pointed out however that Sanford and Garrod certainly seem to be a bit ambivalent
in their position on the status of the different components in the model. While the
above definition of a memory parition suggests a rather "monolithic" view of the
various components, their discussion of Explicit Focus certainly implies that not all
information in the various components has the same status, but that at least within
Explicit Focus there are various degrees of activation. After all, entities in Explicit
Focus are seen as taking up computational space, and the more space they take up,
the more foregrounded, or in my terms activated, they are. Sanford and Garrod also
say that Implicit Focus is simply an activated part of Long-Term Semantic Memory.
In other words, the notion of activation of knowledge which is central to my account
creeps into Sanford and Garrod's model in a number of places.
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Although there thus are some differences between Sanford and Garrod's
model and the present one, these differences do not yield any empirically testable
consequences:- there are no psychological experiments which would allow one to
distinguish the two theories. The only reason for preferring the present theory is the
principle of parsimony. Since the present theory postulates fewer components than
Sanford and Garrod's theory, it has to be preferred. Notice incidentally that the
absence of empirically testable differences implies that the wealth of empirical
evidence which Sanford and Garrod put forward in defence of their model also applies
to mine.
1.3. Speakers and hearers
The model postulates the same components for speakers and hearers. This may look
counter-intuitive especially since from an intuitive point of view speaking and
hearing are two different activities. However, the model allows one to explain the
difference between speaking and understanding in terms of the interaction or flow of
information between the different components. Although the (static) components are
the same in speaking and hearing, the (dynamic) processes are different.
One reason for preferring this solution to one which postulates different
models for speaker and hearer is Occam's razor. It is more parsimonious to assume
that the same components can model both speaker and hearer. However, it is possible
that this assumption has to be given up later in face of the facts.
There is another argument for assuming that the components have to be very
similar for speaker and hearer. In a lot of discourses discourse participants switch
roles quite regularly. Speakers become hearers and hearers become speakers. This
suggests that the structure of the human language understander and the structure of
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the human language generator have are very similar. By having the same
components for the speaker and the hearer, but by changing the processes underlying
speaking and hearing, the above model is in accordance with the ease with which
discourse participants change roles.
2. The general epistemic model
The first component in the model for the human language processor is the general
epistemic model. It can be identified with our long-term knowledge store. Sanford
and Garrod (1981) use the term long-term semantic memory. The general epistemic
model contains the long-term knowledge which speakers and hearers bring to a
discourse.
Since the other components of the system are to be seen as modelling further
degrees of activation of knowledge, the remarks I make in this section about the
structure of the general epistemic model also apply to the other components. In this
section I will sketch only in the roughest outline the way in which knowledge is
represented in the processor. I will return to this question in the next chapter.
2.1. Conceptual entities
In chapter 5. I will follow Bobrow and Winograd (1977) and opt for an organization of
the knowledge base around conceptual entities rather than the structuring of
knowledge around sets of facts, each referring to one or more objects. The best way to
see the basic unit in the knowledge base is as a focal point plus a set of properties or
beliefs hanging off it. In a similar vein, Collins and Quillian (1972) write :-
In fact, human concepts are probably more like hooks or nodes in a network from
which many different properties hang.
In order to avoid confusion, I will use conceptual base for the focal point and
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the term conceptual entity for the whole basic unit, i.e. the conceptual base plus the
set of beliefs.
It is important to stress here that the notion of conceptual entity which I
propose is a relatively rich one. A conceptual entity is not just the mental counterpart
of an object in the world, as used by logicians when they define model-theories for
logics. The notion of a conceptual entity is much richer: a conceptual entity is a
relatively large chunk of knowledge. I will clarify the notion of conceptual entity in
chapter 5.
2.2. Embedded models
In chapter 6. I will argue that whenever a speaker introduces a new object into the
discourse with the intention of providing her hearer with new information about it,
the choice of the linguistic expression partly depends on the beliefs about that object
she ascribes to her hearer. It follows that part of the knowledge in conceptual entities
has to be the processor's beliefs about the beliefs of others. There thus must be
various sets of beliefs in conceptual entities. The set of beliefs in a conceptual entity
to which the processor itself ascribes will be called the primary model or perspective.
The set of beliefs which the processor thinks some other processor x ascribes to is the
secondary model or perspective for x. The tertiary model then is the set of beliefs in
an conceptual entity which represent the beliefs which the processor thinks some
other processor x believes that the processor itself ascribes to the conceptual entity,
etc.
It is useful to reiterate that the general epistemic model models the least
degree of activation a piece of knowledge can have. Both the discourse specific
epistemic model and the discourse model model higher degrees of knowledge
75
activation. They have the same structure as the general epistemic model, however.
This of course applies to the existence of embedded models as well. So, there are also
embedded models representing the beliefs of the processor itself and the beliefs it
ascribes to others etc. in the discourse specific epistemic model and the discourse
model.
The idea of embedded models put forward here is a generalization of an idea
proposed by various authors, such as Fauconnier (1979), Johnson-Laird (1983;430-
438), Shadbolt (1983), and Seuren (1985). Hendrix' work on partioned networks can
be interpreted as introducing similar machinery. (Hendrix, 1975 1979). Fauconnier
did the most detailed work on embedded models. He does not explicitly use them to
represent the beliefs one processor ascribes to another however; rather, he uses them
to account for a number of expressions including the verbs of propositional attitude,
negation, conditionals etc. Roughly, the idea is that certain expressions in natural
language are "space-creating" expressions:- in response to them the hearer will create
an embedded model. If we restrict ourselves to the verbs of propositional attitude,
then the embedded models constructed in response to them are representations of the
beliefs, wishes, doubts, hopes, or any other propositional attitude that the object
referred to in the (grammatical) subject of the verb of propositional attitude may
have. The various components in my model always contain embedded models
representing the beliefs processors ascribe to their fellow interlocutors. In this respect,
my ideas are a generalization. In chapter 6. I will make use of the idea of embedded
models.
2.3. Mutual knowledge
The notion of mutual knowledge [1] will also be shown to be of crucial importance to
an explanation of discourse production and comprehension in chapter 6. One can use
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the above idea of embedded models to define a notion of mutual knowledge:- mutual
knowledge about an object can be read off from the different perspectives by looking
at what is constant between the different levels. So, what a processor thinks is
mutually known is what is constant between all levels. What a processor thinks
somebody else thinks is mutually known is what is constant from level 2 downwards.
There is of course a problem with the recursion in the definition of the
various levels which are necessary in the account of mutual knowledge outlined
above. Obviously, there has to be an end to the number of levels. If there was not, our
beliefs would be infinite sets and this can hardly be maintained as a psychological
possibility. Clark and Marshall (1981) speak in this context of the mutual knowledge
paradox. Mutual knowledge seems to involve knowledge of an infinite number of
conditions. On the other hand, definite reference can only be explained in terms of
mutual knowledge (cf chapter 6). People clearly can handle expressions which are
used to refer definitely in a finite amount of time. But people cannot handle an
infinite amount of information in a finite time. We are therefore forced to admit that
mutual knowledge has to be expressible in a finite way.
In the above system mutual knowledge can be implemented in a finite
knowledge base by stopping when there is no difference between the sets of beliefs on
level n and those on level n + 1 except for the fact that level n contains level n + 1
as a substructure. In other words, when there is no difference between one level and
the next, then there is no reason to go down any further in the representation. Lewis
(1969) proposes a similar rule. However, the above definition should not be taken as
a claim about how mutual knowledge is acquired and stored in the human knowledge
base. I will follow Clark and Marshall in assuming that humans use heuristics to
decide whether something is mutually known, and may not use the different
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embedded models in the way I suggested here when it comes to determining mutual
knowledge.
This account of mutual knowledge for particular conceptual entities is
processor-dependent, as it should given the philosophical points made in chapter 2.
What you think is mutually known may differ from what I think is mutually known
or even from what I think you think is mutually known. Clark and Marshall (1981)
call this account a "one-sided definition of mutual knowledge". Schiffer (1972;30-1)
originally defined mutual knowledge in a processor-independent way [2], But as
Clark and Marshall rightly point out this definition represents mutual knowledge as
an omniscient observer would see it, an observer who can look into people's heads and
determine what they know. But obviously people are not omniscient. Language users
can only determine for themselves what they think they and their fellow interlocutors
mutually know. They can only make assumptions about the knowledge of others and
have no direct access to it. It is for this reason that Clark and Marshall claim that
the one-sided definition of mutual knowledge is more useful.
Clark and Marshall discuss some of the heuristics people might employ in
determining whether something is mutually known and in this discussion the thesis
of cognitive similarity plays an important role. They claim that mutual knowledge
can be seen as a function of a number of factors. The main factor is a mutual
knowledge induction schema, which is an adaptation of a similar schema in Lewis
(1969):-
a and b mutually know that p iff
some state of affairs g holds such that
1. a and b have reason to believe that g holds
2. g indicates to a and to b that
each has reason to believe that g holds
3. g indicates to a and b that p.
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The problem with this formulation of the schema is that it again is
processor-independent. Although Clark and Marshall point to the greater usefulness
of one-sided definition of mutual knowledge, they are a little too careless in the
formulation of the induction schema. They admit that they will loosely speak about
mutual knowledge as such. The problem, however, is that it is not entirely trivial to
reformulate the induction schema in a processor-dependent way. A possible
formulation is:-
a believes that a and b mutually know that p
iff a thinks that some state of affairs g holds such that
1. a has reason to believe that g holds
and has reason to believe that
b has also reason to believe that g holds.
2. a believes that g indicates to both a and b
that each has reason to believe that g holds.
3. g indicates to a that p and a
believes that g indicates to b that p.
In both induction schemata, there are two variables which have to be
specified in order for the induction to be possible. The first concerns the state of
affairs g itself, or the basis, as Clark and Marshall call it. (g stands for ground). The
second variable concerns the reasons a has for believing that b has reason to believe
that g holds and moreover to believe that a believes that g holds. This variable is
called '(auxiliary) assumptions'. Clearly, the thesis of cognitive similarity introduced
in chapter 2. is a very elementary auxiliary assumption.
There is a certain trade-off between the basis and the auxiliary assumptions.
The stronger the basis, the less auxiliary assumptions I will have to make, and vice
versa, the more auxiliary assumptions I make, the less strong the basis I can rely on.
So, if we are looking at each other across the table with a candle between us on the
table, then the physical copresence of the candle is obvious and the auxiliary
assumptions I have to make are relatively weak. If the candle is behind you, however,
79
and I saw that you saw it before, the physical copresence is less clear. In order to
suppose that the candle is mutually known, I not only have to assume that you
actually noticed it when you looked at it, I also have to assume that you remember
seeing it.
3. The discourse specific epistemic model
Although understanding a discourse usually requires a lot of background knowledge,
I showed in chapter 2. that at a particular stage of discourse only a small part of the
general epistemic model is activated. Understanding a particular discourse requires
access to only a limited part of the long-term knowledge base. The discourse specific
epistemic model is intended to model this.
The discourse specific epistemic model has more roles however. It will be
clear that it is not always the case that we remember all the information we receive
in a discourse in the long term. We tend to forget quite a lot of what we have been
told. But, while we are participating in a discourse, we generally have an accurate
idea of what was said in the preceding discourse, independently of whether it will
eventually be integrated in our long-term knowledge store. Of course, when we
participate in a long discourse, we do not retain all the information we have received.
Our working memory is simply too small. In general, however, we will have a fairly
accurate idea of what the speaker is talking about at the moment. How much
information and what type of information one retains depends on a number of factors
which I will not go into. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that we have a
discourse memory where we retain information relatively independently of whether it
is ever going to be integrated in the general epistemic model. Part of the function of
the discourse specific epistemic model is to act as a store for information received
earlier in a discourse. So, the discourse specific epistemic model receives its
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information from at least two sources. Some of it comes from the general epistemic
model and is the activated background knowledge. Other information comes from
previous discourse.
The above hypothesis makes some predictions about the way texts are stored
in human memory. If the discourse specific epistemic model contains information
derived from the text itself and activated relevant background information, then
memory for texts should show this. Recall for texts should show that people produce
both information from the text itself and information which has been retrieved out of
the general epistemic model. The psychological data discussed in section 3.2 of
chapter 2. confirm this prediction.
3.1. A dilemma
The discourse specific epistemic model combines the roles of implicit focus and long-
term text memory in Sanford and Garrod's model. Although neither psychological
data on text memory and text understanding nor the behaviour of definite
descriptions warrant the distinction, Sanford and Garrod made the point that it was
important for the hearer to distinguish between information he received in the
discourse and information he retrieved from his long-term knowledge store. As I will
argue below, this is certainly true for the speaker, and since in a lot of discourses
hearers can become speakers, the distinction is also important for hearers. In the rest
of this section I will show how one can make this distinction for speakers. The
arguments however directly apply to hearers as well.
That speakers have to distinguish between information they have already
uttered in the discourse and information which came from their general epistemic
models, can be shown by looking at discourses in which more than one object has
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been introduced. Suppose the speaker wants to provide her hearer with information
about one of the objects. Suppose moreover that she cannot use a pronoun to do so,
because none of the objects has been sufficiently foregrounded. Suppose that she also
cannot use a proper name because she does not believe that her hearer knows the
intended object under this name. In that case, the speaker will have to use a definite
description constructed on the basis of information which she can suppose her hearer
to know. Now, she can assume that her hearer has available information which was
uttered eralier in the discourse, whereas she cannot (generally) make this assumption
for information which comes from here general epistemic model and has not yet been
uttered [3]. Thus, she can use information uttered earlier in the discourse to construct
a definite description but not information which comes from her general epistemic
model. As an illustration, consider discourse (1).
(1) Yesterday, I met an elderly woman
and her daughter in Waverley station.
The daughter was wearing a pink dress.
A speaker cannot in general use the definite description the woman in the
pink dress or the pronoun she immediately after the first sentence to refer to one of
the objects introduced into the discourse. The speaker will only refer successfully if
she uses a 'disambiguating' description. But she can only construct such a description
if she distinguishes the information in the discourse, which is also available for the
hearer, from the information which came into the discourse specific epistemic model
from the general epistemic model, and which they cannot suppose their hearer to also
have. We now face a dilemma:- on the one hand, I have rejected the idea of having
two components, one for storing information derived from the text, another for storing
activated background information, as proposed by Sanford and Garrod. On the other
hand, it seems to be necessary to be able to distinguish between the two types of
information. In the next subsection I will use the idea of embedded models to solve
82
this dilemma.
3.2. Embedded models again
The dilemma can be solved by using the idea of embedded models introduced in
section 2.2. There I used this idea to account for mutual knowledge. Since the
discourse specific epistemic model has the same structure as the general epistemic
model, it will also have embedded models and we can use these to account for
activated mutual knowledge. Under ideal circumstances, speakers will assume that
the information which they have uttered in the discourse has been transferred to the
hearer. Given no indication to the contrary, the speaker will assume that the hearer
believes what she has said. So, after an utterance of a sentence the speaker will
suppose that the hearer now believes the information in the sentence. In the
terminology developed above, the information will be part of the speaker's secondary
discourse specific epistemic model.
However, speakers will under ideal circumstances also believe that hearers
believe them to hold the views which have been expressed in the sentence. That is,
the speaker will assume that the hearer now realizes that the speaker believes what
has just been said. In other words, the tertiary model in the speaker's discourse
specific epistemic model will be similar to the secondary model. This of course makes
it mutually known according to the speaker. Obviously, something similar happens
for the hearer.
The distinction between information which comes from the speaker's general
epistemic model and has not yet been verbalized, and the information which has been
verbalized in the discourse can now be rephrased in terms of mutual knowledge. The
information coming from the speaker's general epistemic model exists in her primary
83
discourse specific epistemic model alone and is not yet mutually known and can
therefore not be used in constructing the definite description in discourse (1). The
information which has been uttered in the discourse, on the other hand, can be
assumed to be mutually known and can therefore be used in discourse (1). The
conclusion is that by using embedded models, which we need for independent reasons
anyway, we can distinguish between information which the hearer received in the
discourse and information which comes from his long-term knowledge base alone. The
first type of information is mutually known in the discourse specific epistemic model,
whereas the second type is not. We thus see that the distinction which led Sanford
and Garrod to distinguish between implicit focus and long-term text memory can be
made in one component using machinery which was independently motivated.
4. The discourse model
The last component in the system for representing the human language processor is
the discourse model. It models yet a further degree of activation and contains the
most activated knowledge relevant to the discourse under consideration. Its main use
is in the explanation of pronouns, and it will used thus in chapter 6.
For the speaker the discourse model contains a representation of the
informational content of the utterance she is currently producing. For the hearer, the
discourse model contains a representation of the informational content of the
utterance he is currently processing. The exact moments a representation of the
content is placed in the discourse model are slightly different for speaker and hearer.
A speaker knows in a sense what the informational content of her utterance will be
before she actually produces it. A speaker plans and knows what she is going to say
in advance. A hearer on the other hand is in a less priviliged position, because of
factors such as his knowledge about the speaker, his beliefs about the speaker's
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beliefs about him, his knowledge about the topic under discussion etc, the hearer may
have a fairly accurate idea about what the speaker is going to say, but he cannot be
sure until the speaker has actually produced the utterance.
It follows from the above considerations that for the speaker material is
transferred to the discourse model before it is verbalized in the discourse.
Verbalization thus is a process which takes as input material in the speaker's
discourse model and produces as output a utterance. Obviously, there has to be some
feedback mechanism. While the utterance is produced, speakers will keep track of
what they are saying, simply because they will have to check whether the utterances
produced are actually what they want to say. It has been suggested to me that this
indicates that a speaker may not put material in her discourse model until after the
utterance has been produced. However, given the fact that the speaker sometimes
does not notice that what she actually says is not what she wanted to say, I would
suggest that what a speaker does when she is producing an utterance is compare an
interpretation of the utterance she is producing with material already available in
her discourse model and thus checks the correctness of the actual utterance.
Two things have to be noted. First, I do not want to imply that the speaker
places all information which she wants to transfer in one particular discourse, or even
all information she want to transfer in one utterance, in the discourse model at once.
Verbalization probably takes place on a left to right basis and one reason may be the
way in which the information is activated. Consider for instance sentence (2),
occurring as the first sentence of a discourse.
(2) You remember this guy we met in the pub
just off Princesstreet last Friday +
or was it Thursday, I can't remember +
anyway, that guy found himself a job today.
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The speaker knows in advance the chunk of information she wants to
transmit to her hearer. However, she has to use language and thus is forced to
encode it in a linguistic string. The problem is that in general she will not be able to
transfer this chunk of information in one sentence. She therefore has to package the
information. The first step the speaker has to take in the generation of this
utterance, is to set up a new discourse object in her discourse model. She has to
activate into her discourse model a token corresponding to the mental object which
she believes to be a mental representation of the object she wants to provide
information about. She then lexicalizes this and thus instructs her hearer to set up a
corresponding discourse object, i.e. the speaker instructs the hearer to search his
knowledge base for a corresponding mental object which he is then to activate as
well. Presumably, one of the reasons for using the complex description in (2) is to
make the hearer's search of his general epistemic model easier. The speaker then
attaches the 'property' of finding a job to this discourse object and lexicalizes this bit
of information, and instructs her hearer to do so as well. If everything goes all right,
then the hearer will also attache the property 'finding a job' to his discourse object.
So, the fact the speaker has to use language to transmit information and therefore
cannot transmit the complete chunk of information at exactly one moment in time (as
she presumably could do if she could communicate telepathically), means that she has
to package it. This is reflected in the way the information is activated into the
discourse model.
The second thing to note is that the speaker also has to keep a record of what
she has said and what she can as a consequence assume to be activated in the
hearer's mind. As will be argued in chapter 6., the need for this is most clearly shown
by the behaviour of pronouns. In the present system, this is modelled in the same
way as the distinction between what which the speaker presumes to be mutually
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known and what she believes to come exclusively from her own general epistemic
model is modelled in the discourse specific epistemic model.
5. Dynamics of the model
Having discussed the various components in the model, it is now time to turn to the
dynamics of the model. The discussion will be split in two parts, in the first part I
will discuss how the processes underlying the production of discourse are modelled in
the system, i.e. how the speaker is modelled, and in the second those underlying the
comprehension of a piece of text, i.e. how the hearer is modelled.
5.1. Speakers
In transactional language use the speaker has the intention of transmitting some
information to her hearer. The processes by which she does so, are slightly different
depending on whether the utterance she is producing is the first utterance in a new
discourse or a new episode in a discourse, or whether the utterance is part of an
ongoing episode in discourse. I will discuss the former case first.
5.1.1. New episodes
In order to be able to transfer information which she supposes to be new to her
hearer, the speaker will first have to activate this information. In a new (episode of a)
discourse, before the speaker has produced an utterance, this information resides in
the speaker's general epistemic model. Activation of information is modelled as a
transfer from the general epistemic model into the discourse specific epistemic model.
The speaker then has to package this information on the basis of what knowledge she
ascribes to her hearer. The packaging is reflected in the order in which the
information is activated to an even higher degree and placed into the discourse
87
model. From the discourse model it is then verbalized and subsequently uttered.
The model gives some necessary conditions for the speaker to be able to have
the intention of providing the hearer with new information. The speaker can only
have this intention if she can indeed assume that the information was not known to
her hearer before the discourse. This is modelled in the model as a discrepancy
between the speaker's primary general epistemic model which represents her own
views and beliefs, and her secondary general epistemic model, which models her
views about her hearer's views. There must be some information in the primary
general epistemic model which is not present in the secondary general epistemic
model.
Using the same terminology one can also give sufficient conditions for the
speaker to have the intention to elicit new information from her hearer by asking
questions. Thus, the speaker can only ask a question for new information if she has
reason to believe that the hearer has the relevant information. In this case the
speaker assumes that the informational content of the hearer's general epistemic
model is richer than that of her own and she is asking the hearer to provide her with
the information she expects him to have available. It has to be admitted that this
cannot be modelled with the machinery as it stands, because a belief on the part of
the speaker that the hearer knows more about something than she herself, is not
something that can be modelled simply by comparing what the speaker believes and
what she believes the hearer believes. Rather, it is a "meta-belief' on the speaker's
part about her hearer's beliefs, and the model as it stands cannot cope with meta-
beliefs.
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Clearly, the explanation of the intentions of providing or eliciting new
information is a very partial one. Although the model allows one to give some
conditions which have to be fulfilled in order for the speaker to have these intentions,
it still is unclear where her intention to speak in the first place comes from.
5.1.2. Ongoing discourses
The processes underlying the production of discourse are modelled slightly differently
in the case of sentences which are not at the beginning of a new (episode of the)
discourse. One can assume that in those cases the speaker need not consult her
general epistemic model in order to activate the information she wants to transfer.
She will have activated the information she wants to transfer in her Discourse
Specific Epitemic Model already, and can therefore use the information in her
discourse specific epistemic model directly. The rest of the processes will be the same.
5.2. Hearers
The processes for the hearer also differ slightly depending on whether the utterance
to be processed is the first one of a new (episode of the) discourse or not. In the first
case, one can assume that none of the information in the utterance has been activated
before; in the latter case some of it already exists in an activated form in the hearer's
mind.
5.2.1. New episodes
In the case of a new (episode of) discourse, the hearer first receives some linguistic
material. He places a preliminary interpretation of this in his discourse model and
consults his general epistemic model to see if he can find long-term knowledge
corresponding to the material in the discourse model. If he can, he will activate it
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into the discourse specific epistemic model.
5.2.2. Ongoing discourses
The case of utterances which are not the start of a new (episode of) a discourse, the
processes are slightly different. We can assume that speaker and hearer will in
general obey what Clark and Haviland (1977) call the given-new contract. This
implies that the utterance the speaker produces contains information which the
speaker will assume to be already known to the hearer and information which the
speaker assumes to be new to the hearer. If this is the case, and Haviland and Clark
(1974) and Clark and Haviland (1977) give good arguments that it is, then the
processes underlying the understanding of a piece of discourse must be different in
the case of utterances which are not the beginning of a new episode in the discourse.
The hearer can be supposed to have the given information available in his discourse
specific epistemic model. The need of consultating the general epistemic model is thus
replaced by the need of consulting the discourse specific epistemic model in the case of
given information. However, for the new information the hearer will still have to
search his general epistemic model, and activate the relevant background
information.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter I discussed the overall architecture of the human language processor.
The model is at first sight very similar to that of Sanford and Garrod but avoids some
of the problems raised in connection with it in the previous chapter. The three
components in the model, the general epistemic model, the discourse specific
epistemic model and the discourse model, are though of as distinct levels of
knowledge activation. Each of the three partitions contains embedded models which
90
are used to represent the beliefs processors ascribe to their fellow interlocutors.
I briefly discussed the way knowledge is stored in the various partitions of
the model. I argued that knowledge is stored around conceptual entities which are
relatively large chunks of knowledge. In chapter 5. I will return to this question and
expand on the brief remarks made here.
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Footnotes:-
1. The discussion is limited to 'mutual belief/knowledge'. The reason is that the only
type of discourse I will consider here is dyadic, i.e. involves only one speaker and only
one hearer. The notion of 'common belief (Lewis, 1969) or 'joint belief
(McCawley,1979), which is relevant to discourses involving more processors (Clark
and Carlson, 1982), is a rather straightforward generalization of the notion of mutual
belief knowledge. It can be accounted for along the same lines as mutual
belief/knowledge is accounted for here.
2. a and b mutually know p
if a knows p, b knows p, &
a knows that b knows p,
b knows that a knows p, &
a knows that b knows that a knows p,
b knows that a knows that b knows p, &c
3. There are obviously cases where the speaker can assume that the hearer has
available in an activated format information which has not been uttered in the
discourse. One can use this observation to argue that the relevant distinction then is
not between information which was uttered in the discourse and information from the
long-term knowledge base, but rather between information which is mutually known
and information which is not.
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Chapter 5:- Knowledge Representation
1. Introduction
In chapter 2. I argued that a complete theory of discourse production and discourse
comprehension provides both a theory about the overall architecture of the human
language processor, and a theory about the specific structures it uses or constructs in
discourse. In chapter 4., I provided an overall model for the human language
processor. In this chapter, I will propose a theory of the specific representations used
by the processor. In chapter 3. I argued that the structures used in language are
identical to those used for storing knowledge. The question of the structure of the
mental models used in discourse is therefore identical to the problem of knowledge
representation, a question which has received ample attention in the field of AI, (for
an overview, see chapter III of Barr and Feigenbaum (1981)).
I will not discuss the different knowledge representation schemes proposed in
the literature in any great detail. Rather, I will give a system for knowledge
representation called a Knowledge Representation Structure (KRS). I will first outline
the intuitive motivations behind it. Then the grammar of KRS will be defined. Then a
denotational semantics for part of this knowledge representation structure will be
defined and finally, I will turn my attention to those parts of the knowledge
representation language for which no model theory has been given.
2. Intuitive motivation
In section 2.1. of chapter 4. I introduced the notion of conceptual base and conceptual
entity. A conceptual entity is the basic unit in the knowledge base. It consists of a
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conceptual base and a set of descriptions or beliefs. The conceptual base is the focal
point around which the descriptions collocate and thus ties the different beliefs
together. The overall picture is of an organization of the knowledge base around
conceptual entities with beliefs in them, each of which can point to other conceptual
entities.
The notion in the AI literature upon which this view of knowledge
representation is based is the notion of frame, which was originally introduced by
Minsky (1975). Kuijpers (1975) defines the notion as follows:-
A frame is a structure which represents knowledge about a very limited domain. A frame
produces a description of the object or action in question, starting with an invariant structure
common to all cases in its domain, and adding certain features according to particular
observations.
The descriptors attached to a frame are called slots. One can distinguish
between many different kinds of slots. Some slots just give a simple value for an
attribute which an instantiation of the frame in question is assumed to have. Others
contain procedures which can be called if a value for an attribute has to be
determined. A third type of slot represent the fact that whenever there is an
instantiation of a frame, then another object is also expected to be present. Thus, one
can expect waiter-slots to be attached to the restaurant frame. I will call this third
type of slot object-slots.
The slots in a frame can be seen as ordered with at one extreme properties
which are true of all instances of the frame and at the other extreme default
properties, properties which are assumed to be true unless there is evidence to the
contrary. Frames, or prototypes, are thus not just sets of default properties as is
suggested by Israel and Brachman (1984).
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It is interesting to note that this way of viewing knowledge representation
has become more central in AI, especially with the advent of the object-oriented style
of programming underlying languages such as Smalltalk-80 (Goldberg and Robson,
1980) and LOOPS (Bobrow and Stefik, 1983) and pioneered by Hewitt (1977).
Bobrow and Winograd (1977) define a knowledge representation language
KRL which is based on intuitions which are very similar to the ones outlined here.
They argue against representing knowledge around sets of facts and in favour of an
organization of the knowledge base around conceptual entities with beliefs attached
to them. They argue that one needs many different types of conceptual entities, such
as objects, relationships between objects, scenes, events, etc. I want to distinguish
specifically between two different types of conceptual entity, namely mental objects
and concepts. Mental objects are chunks of knowledge about particular or specific
objects. Concepts are chunks of knowledge about the properties which members of
certain classes of objects typically have. The distinction corresponds to the distinction
between individual and generic concepts which Brachman (1979) makes in KL-ONE.
It is less general however since Brachman's concepts can also be used to represent
relationships between objects etc.
A knowledge base can then be seen as a set of mental objects and concepts.
Since the conceptual basis of a conceptual entity is seen as a hook around which
properties collocate, every conceptual entity in a knowledge base has a conceptual
basis which is unique to it.
In the next section we will define a Knowledge Representation Structure
(KRS) which will be used to make the ideas outlined in this section somewhat more
precise. But before we turn to the formal system it is necessary to be clear about the
status of the formal system. I will distinguish between KRS as a purely formal
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system, KRS as a representational system with a denotational semantics, and finally
KRS as a vehicle for clarifying the intuitions outlined in this section and making
them more precise.
At one level, the representation language I will present can of course be seen
as a purely formal system more or less on a par with the language of first-order
predicate calculus. As such, it will have to meet all the requirements usually put on a
formal system:- it must be clear what the basic expressions are and how they can be
combined in order to construct more complex expressions. The definition of the syntax
of KRS will be given in section 3.
However, it is not enough to define the syntax of KRS. For a formal language
to be acceptable as a representation language we will also have to provide it with a
semantics (Cf Hayes, 1977). We will have to make clear what the expressions in the
language stand for. Those advocating logic for knowledge representation give as one
of their main arguments for their position that their representation language does
have a denotational semantics, whereas this is not the case for other knowledge
representation schemes. Frame-based systems and semantic networks in general lack
a semantics. An exception is Hayes (1977) who sketches a translation of Bobrow and
Winograd's KRL into first-order logic. In section 4. of this chapter, I will give an
alternative partial model-theory for the particular frame-based system defined here
which is more direct and therefore more intuitive. I will also argue in section 5. why
only a partial model-theory is possible.
Finally, the formal system I present is intended to clarify some of the
intuitions outlined in the previous section and in chapter 4. about knowledge
representation in the human language processor. The formal system is thus a
formalization of the frame based view of the knowledge representation also
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underlying Bobrow and Winograd's KRL. The terms chosen for the complex
expressions defined in section 3. will reflect this intuitive background.
Given the distinction between the formal system itself, the model-theory for
the formal system and the status of the formal system as clarifying intuitions about
knowledge representation in the human language processor, the status of KRS vis-a¬
vis other frame-based knowledge representation schemes in general and KRL in
particular can be made clear:- both KRS and KRL are based on the same intuitions.
KRS is less expressive than a lot of other representational schemes in the sense that
everything which can be expressed in KRS can also be expressed in these other
schemes but not the other way around. This certainly applies to KRL. KRS however
has the advantage of having at least a partial model theory, which is more direct
than Hayes' treatment of KRL. As far as intuitions are concerned, KRS is based on
the same intuitions as KRL and other frame-based systems. The major innovation of
KRS over other frame-based knowledge representation schemes thus lies in the fact
that a model-theory is defined for it.
3. A representation schema for conceptual entities
3.1. Introduction
In this section I will define a knowledge representation scheme which makes some of
the intuitions outlined above more precise. The knowledge representation scheme,
KRS, resembles Bobrow and Winograd's KRL, but is less expressive. I will therefore
first discuss a number of restrictions on KRS. Then I will give the syntax of the
formal system.
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3.2. Limitations on expressive power
There will be a number of limitations in the formal definition of the notion of
conceptual entity in KRS. First, although it was argued in chapter 4. that in order to
represent the beliefs of other processors, one had to be able to attach embedded
mental models to a conceptual base I will not take this possibility into account here.
Thus, I will be able to represent only the processor's own beliefs, although it will be
shown that the system can be extended to allow for embedded mental models.
A second limitation concerns the fact that although I claimed that the beliefs
were ordered with at one extreme properties which every instantiation of a
conceptual entity has and at the other default properties, I will only consider two
possibilities here. Beliefs are either properties considered essential by the processor or
default properties. Thus, the beliefs in a conceptual entity are either considered to be
necessary or are characteristics which hold true only if there is no indication to the
contrary.
A third limitation concerns the range of conceptual entities. I will only
consider mental objects and concepts, i.e. those conceptual entities which are mental
representations of objects or classes of objects. I will therefore not be able to express
for example beliefs about relationships between objects. Other knowledge
representations schemes such as KRL, do allow for other types of conceptual entity,
and their larger expressive power is mainly the consequence of this restriction in
KRS.
A final limitation concerns the fact that the only types of slots I allow are
object-slots and slots ascribing simple properties. I thus do not allow for slots
containing procedures for determining the value of an attribute. Again, KRL does
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contain slots of this type and therefore is more expressive.
3.3. Syntax of KRS
In this section I will give formal definitions of the central notions in KRS, the notions
of conceptual entity and knowledge base. In the definition of a conceptual entity I
need a language for expressing beliefs. I will therefore first define a belief
representation language BRL which is to play this role.
3.3.1. BRL
The definition of BRL is given in definition (1).
Definition 1
Belief Representation Language (BRL).
Vocabulary:-
The set of basic expressions of BRL is the union of
1. a set of specific individual terms, Ind
2. a set of unspecified individual terms, Var
3. a set of generic terms, Gen
4. a set of predicate letters, Pred
There is a function i from Pred to {1,2,3,..}, assigning the number of open
places to a predicate. A predicate letter P such that i(P) = n will be
called an n-ary predicate letter.
Terms:-
t is a term if and only if t is an element of Ind, Var, or Gen.
Grammar:-
The well-formed formulas (wffs) of BRL are defined by the following
rules:-
1. if tl,..,tn are terms, and P is an n-ary predicate letter, then
P(tl,..,tn) is a wff.
2. if X is an element of Gen, and t is a term, then (t ISA X) is a wff
3. if F is a wff, then not(F) is a wff.
I will use the following meta-variables:-
a,b,c for specific individual terms
x,y,z for unspecified individual terms
X,X1,X2 for generic terms
t,s,u for terms
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P,Q,R for predicate letters
F,G,H for formulas
BRL contains so-called generic terms which will be used as the names for
concepts. Since a concept name can be used both in ascribing a property to an
individual, as in (1), which would be translated into BRL as (2), and in ascribing a
property to a concept, as in (3), translated as (4), I include generic terms in BRL. In a
standard logical language generic terms function as one-place predicates.
(1) Harry is a man.
(2) (HARRY ISA MAN)
(3) A man is a person.
(4) (MAN ISA PERSON)
BRL contains the predicate ISA which can appear both between specific
individual terms and generic terms and between two generic terms. This fact will be
reflected in the semantics where all ISA-statements will be treated in the same way.
It has been argued that such a uniform treatment of ISA-links is problematic because
ISA-links allow for different interpretations. A distinction is often drawn between
ISA-links asserting set-membership and those asserting a subset-relationship. In (2)
for example the ISA-link has to be interpreted as asserting that the referent of Harry
is an element of the set which is the referent of Man, whereas in (4) a subset-
relationship is asserted between the referent of Man and that of Person.
A lot of workers in semantic networks take this criticism seriously and
include different types of ISA-links in their systems. So, in KL-ONE there is a
distinction between the links superc for superconcept and individuates, superc-links
hold between concepts, or generic concepts in KL-ONE terminology, whereas
individuates-links hold between mental objects, individual concepts in KL-ONE
terminology, and (generic) concepts. Mental objects inherit information from the
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concepts to which they stand in the individuates relationship. Concepts in their turn
may inherit information from their super-concepts. Mental objects may then inherit
information which the concepts themselves have inherited from their super-concepts.
We thus have a transitive inheritance relationship.
This criticism of ISA-links and the reply of including two types of ISA-links
are the consequence of an extensional interpretation of one-place predicates such as
MAN and ANIMAL. The problem arises because one interprets predicates as
"referring" to a set of individuals. If one interprets them intensionally as "referring"
to a concept, as one is urged to do by Brachman (1976,21), then the problem
disappears. One can see ISA-sentences as asserting that the first argument of the
ISA-link inherits the properties from the second argument. The model-theory I define
gives an intensional interpretation of generic terms and thus allows a uniform
treatment of ISA-links.
Apart from the above difficulty, ISA-links pose another problem. Not all
information attached to a concept is inherited by the lower conceptual entity, as
examples (5) and (6) illustrate.
(5) a. Horses are widespread.
b. Sir Wattie is a horse.
c. Therefore, Sir Wattie is widespread.
(6) a. Mammals are widespread.
b. The giant panda is a mammal.
c. Therefore, the giant panda is widespread.
The examples show that certain properties are not inherited by conceptual
entities lower down a generalization hierarchy, conceptual entities which appear as
the first argument of an ISA-link. In section 4.2.3. I will discuss the question of which
properties are not inherited along ISA-links. I will also discuss a possible (semantic)
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characterisation of properties of this kind. Meanwhile, the discussion will be
restricted to properties which are inheritable.
The reader will have noticed that definition (1) does not give a specific
language but rather a language type. What specific language one has depends on the
choices one makes for Ind, Gen and Pred. In the rest of this chapter I will use the
language BRL1 defined in the definition below to illustrate various points about the
formal definitions.
Definition 2
An example language BRL1.
The set of basic expression of BRL1 is the union of
1. the set of specific individual terms, Indl, {HARRY,TOM,MARY,CLARA}
2. the set of unspecified individual terms, Varl, {xl,x2,x3,...}
3. the set of generic terms, Genl, {MAN,WOMAN,PERSON,DOG,ANIMAL}
4. the set of predicate letters, Predl, {OWN,MARRIED,BEAT,GIVE} with
i(BROWN) = 1, i(OWN) = i(MARRIED) = i(BEAT) = 2, i(GIVE) = 3









In the other definitions, we need to refer to the individual terms in a formula
F occurring as individual terms, Ind(F). This notion is defined as follows:-
Definition 3
Let F be a formula, then Ind(F) is defined as follows:-
1. if F is of the form P(tl,..,tn), then Ind(F) = {tl,..,tn}.
2. if F is of the form (t ISA X), then Ind(F) = {t}
3. if F is of the form not(G), then Ind(F) = Ind(G).
3.3.2. Belief representations
We will now define the notion of belief representations. Belief representations are
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formal constructs whose intended use, as their name suggests, is the representation of
the beliefs in a conceptual entity. They are the counterpart of descriptions in KRL.
A belief representation is either a straightforward ascription of a property to
the conceptual entity of which the belief representation is part, or it is a description
of a relationship between this conceptual entity and other conceptual entities. In the
latter case, it is possible that one wants to include a number of extra conditions on
whatever the conceptual entity stands in relation to. Thus, a belief representation is
either a single formula, or an ordered set of formulas consisting of a formula
involving the conceptual entity in which the belief representation is to occur and
some other entities, together with a number of additional conditions on these other
entities. In each of the other conditions the only terms which can occur are the terms
occurring in the first formula.
Earlier I mentioned the possibility of slots containing procedures for
calculating the value of a certain attribute. KRS does not allow for this possibility.
The reason for this limitation is the expressive poverty of BRL. BRL is a purely
declarative language which does not even contain conditionals. If we wanted to
extend the present definition of KRS to allow for the inclusion of procedures on slots,
we would have to extend BRL to make expression of procedures possible.
Definition 4
a belief representation BR is an ordered set of formulas of BRL <Fl,..,Fn>
such that for each Fi (0 < i < n + 1) ind(Fi) is a subset of ind(Fl) and if F1
contains a negation, then it does not contain an unspecified individual term.
Belief representations whose first formula contains an unspecified individual
term are used to represent object-slots. Given our intuitive understanding of an
object-slot as a representation of the expectation that whenever an instantiation of
the frame is present another object is present as well, the first formula in an object-
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slot cannot contain a negation.
Example (8) shows a few examples of ordered sets of formulas which are
belief representations, whereas the sets of formulas in (9) are not allowed under
definition (4).
(8) <OWN(HARRY,CLARA),(CLARA ISA DOG),BEAT(HARRY,CLARA)>
<MARRY (HARRY,x),(x ISA WOMAN),(x ISA PERSON) >
< (HARRY ISA ANIMAL) >
(9) < (HARRY ISA ANIMAL),(CLARA ISA ANIMAL)>
<GAVE(x,y,CLARA),(z ISA DOG)>
The sequences of formulas in (9) are not allowed as belief representations
because they contain terms in the second formula in the sequences which do not occur
in the first formula.
3.3.3. Conceptual entities
Given the definition of a belief representation we can now give the central definition
of KRS namely the definition of the notion of a conceptual entity. Again, the
construct defined is a purely formal construct whose name reflects its intended use.
Definition 5
a conceptual entity is a triple <CB,EP,DP> with
1. CB an element of Ind or Gen
2. EP a finite set of belief representations such that if F1 is the first element
of a belief representation in EP, then CB is an element of ind(Fl)
3. DP a finite set of belief representations such that if F1 is the first element
of a belief representation in DP, then CB is an element of ind(Fl)
4. EP and DP not both empty.
The first element of a conceptual entity, CB, is the conceptual base. If CB is
a specific individual term, then the conceptual entity in question is a mental object; if
CB is an generic term, then it is a concept. EP and DP are the sets of essential and
default properties respectively. Since CB is the conceptual base around which the
beliefs collocate, it has to be a term in the first element of a belief representation.
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After all, the belief representation is supposed to be a representation of a belief about
whatever the conceptual entity is a mental representation of.
One of the limitations in the definition of a conceptual entity is the
impossibility to represent embedded mental models in conceptual entities. One can
however extend the definition to allow for this possibility:- in addition to one pair of
essential and default properties in a conceptual entity representing the processor's
own beliefs, one can allow for the inclusion of several other such pairs, each of which
can then be regarded as representing an embedded mental model.
Example (10) illustrates the definition of a conceptual entity. It defines a
mental object corresponding to Harry. There are three essential beliefs, namely that
Harry is a man, that Harry is a person, and that Harry is married to Clara, who is a
woman. There is one default belief, namely the belief that Harry owns a dog. It will
be noted that in this belief I use a variable, thus representing an object-slot.
(10) < HARRY,
< < (HARRY ISA MAN)>
< (HARRY ISA PERSON) >
<MARRIED(HARRY,CLARA),(CLARA ISA WOMAN)> >
< <OWN(HARRY,x),(x ISA DOG)> > >
3.3.4. The knowledge base
We now define the notion of knowledge base. Since the conceptual base of a
conceptual entity is the hook around which beliefs collocate, the conceptual base is in
principle enough to identify a conceptual entity. We therefore want to make sure that




A knowledge base (KB) is a collection of conceptual entities such that if
<CB1,EP1,DP1 > and <CB2,EP2,DP2> are elements of KB and CB1 =
CB2, then EP1 = EP2 and DPI = DP2
3.4. Conclusion
In this section I defined a knowledge representation scheme which makes precise the
intuitions discussed in section 2 of this chapter. In particular, I defined the notions of
conceptual entity and knowledge base. In the next section I will define a denotational
semantics for these notions.
4. A partial denotational semantics for KRS
4.1. Introduction
In this section I will define a denotational semantics for parts of KRS. The need for a
semantics for KRS arises from the fact that KRS is a representational language.
Hayes (1977) characterises a representational language as one which has a semantic
theory, i.e. "an account ... of how expressions in the language relate to the
individuals or relationships or actions or configurations, etc., comprising the world, or
worlds about which the language claims to express knowledge." Hayes claims that a
formal language becomes a representational language because its expressions carry
meaning and the semantic theory defines the meanings of the expressions.
The advantages of giving a denotational semantics are twofold. First, giving
a denotational semantics allows one to justify the inferences which are defined for the
language. A valid argument is an argument of which it is impossible that the
premises are true while the conclusion is false. By defining precisely the conditions
under which a sentence in the language is true, we can justify the inferences which
we allow. In section 4.3. I will use the denotational semantics to argue that the
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uniform treatment of ISA-links in terms of inheritance of properties is indeed
justified. Thus, every argument of the form "if (t ISA X) and P(X), then p(t)" is
justified because in section 4.3. I will show that whenever the premises of the
argument are true, then the conclusion is true as well.
A second advantage of providing a denotational semantics for parts of KRS
lies in the fact that it allows us to determine whether a given knowledge base is
consistent. A set of sentences is consistent if it is possible for all sentences to be true
at the same time. Again, by specifying precisely the conditions under which sentences
are true, it is possible to determine whether a given knowledge base is consistent.
In section 2. I distinguished between three different ways of looking at KRS.
We can regard KRS purely as a formal language, or as a representation language, or
as a vehicle for clarifying intuitions about the way knowledge is stored in the human
language processor. The discussion in this section is purely at the level of KRS as a
representation language. None of the points made in this section should be
interpreted as having any psychological relevance. The intention is to show that KRS
is acceptable from a logical point of view, and there is no psychological motivation for
the points made in this section whatsoever.
Hayes (1977) gives a partial semantic treatment of KRL which involves
sketching a translation algorithm from KRL into multi-sorted predicate logic. Hayes's
treatment has the advantage of translating KRL into a well understood and widely
known logical formalism. It has the disadvantage that a lot of the intuitions
underlying KRL are lost. My semantic treatment is a translation algorithm from KRS
into a logical language based on the theory of arbitrary objects developed by Fine
(1983,1985). It thus involves translating KRS into a less well-known formalism. The
advantage however is that the logical formalism reflects the intuitions underlying
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KRS more directly.
In the definition of conceptual entities I distinguished between essential and
default properties. In the remainder of this section I will restrict myself to essential
properties. In section 5. I will turn to default properties.
The outline of this section then is as follows:- first, I will argue that a model-
theoretic treatment of KRS is indeed possible. Then I will give an intuitive
introduction to the notion of arbitrary object and other notions in the theory of
arbitrary objects. After that I will make the intuitions about arbitrary objects precise
by defining a model-structure. I will define a language AL which contains names for
arbitrary objects. I will also define an interpretation for AL. Then I will define a
translation algorithm from conceptual entities into AL, thus giving an indirect
denotational semantics for them.
4.2. Model-theory
In model-theory one defines a relationship between certain set-theoretic constructs
called interpretations and expressions from the language one is defining the model-
theory for. The intuitive meaning of this relationship is truth (or provability or
warranted assertability if you are an intuitionist). As this notion pertains to
propositions, this in turn presupposes that the central construct in the
representational system for which the model-theory is defined is a proposition. But
the central constructs in KRS are conceptual entities. It might therefore appear that
one cannot define a model-theory for KRS. However, Furukawa, Takeuchi, Kunifuji,
Yasukawa, Ohki and Ueda (1984) provide a way of looking at conceptual entities
which would make the notion of truth applicable to KRS as well. They define a a
logic-based object-oriented programming system called MANDALA. MANDALA
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contains the equivalent of conceptual entities which are called Units Worlds.
Furukawa et al. propose to regard Units Worlds as sets of axioms. Thus, each Units
World is treated as a set of axioms. We can of course adapt this idea to KRS and
regard a conceptual entity as a set of axioms with each belief representation in it
corresponding to a separate axiom. This implies the problem of giving a model-
theoretic semantics for KRS largely reduces to giving a model-theoretic interpretation
for belief representations and the language out of which they are constructed, BRL.
4.2.1. Arbitrary objects
As said above, in the model-theory I will use the notion of 'arbitrary' or 'generic'
object which was re-introduced into the philosophical literature by Kit Fine
(1983,1985). Fine develops a formal system incorporating arbitrary objects, and shows
how the notion can be usefully employed in the context of systems of natural
deduction. Since my motivation is different from Fine's, the details of my system
differ as well. I will try to point out some of the differences between the theory
proposed here and Fine's original theory, but since Fine's theory is richer than mine,
the reader is advised to consult Fine (1985) for a detailed exposition of Fine's system.
Fine's theory of arbitrary objects incorporates three different notions:- the
notions of arbitrary object, of object-dependence, and of value assignment. Fine
clarifies his notion of arbitrary objects as follows. In addition to real objects of a given
kind, there is an arbitrary object of that kind. Thus associated with the set of men,
there is the arbitrary man. Conversely, associated with a given arbitrary object, there
is its value range, the set of real individuals which are possible "instantiations" of the
arbitrary object. An arbitrary object has all generic properties which all individuals
in its value range have, notion to which we will return in section 4.2.3. An arbitrary
object can therefore be regarded as the prototypical object of its kind.
109
The notion of arbitrary object can be seen as the counterpart of concepts in
KRS. Concepts can also be regarded as prototypical objects. Similarly, the real objects
in Fine's theory may be regarded as counterparts of mental objects in KRS.
The second notion in Fine's theory of arbitrary objects is the notion of object-
dependence. This notion is intended to capture the intuition that sometimes the real
object which one takes as the instantiation of one arbitrary object depends on the real
object which one chooses as the instantiation of another. Thus, if x is an arbitrary
number, and y = x.x, then y is a dependent arbitrary object and the value one can
assign to y depends on the value one assigns to x.
The relationship between an arbitrary object and another arbitrary object
which is dependent on it is similar to the relationship between a concept and one of
its object-slots. Just as the value associated with a dependent arbitrary object
depends on the value associated with the arbitrary object it is dependent on, the
object which is taken as the instantiation of an object-slot depends on the object which
is the instantiation of the concept. I will use the notion of object-dependence to give
an interpretation of object-slots in concepts.
In Fine's theory it is not the case that for every value assigned to an
arbitrary object, there is also a value assigned to each of its dependent arbitrary
objects. Let a for example be an arbitrary integer. Then the square root of a is an
arbitrary object which is dependent on a. But it is obviously not the case that we can
assign a value to this dependent arbitrary object for every value we assign to a.
Given the fact that I will use the notion of object-dependence for the
relationship between concept and object-slot, I will use a very strong notion of object-
dependence. As the discussion is limited to the essential properties of a conceptual
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entity, the existence of an object-slot means that for every instantiation of the
concept, there is also an instantiation of the object-slot. Condition 2 of definition 7
will reflect this.
Finally, the notion of value assignment captures the idea that arbitrary
objects get real objects assigned to them as their instantiations. Since the value of one
arbitrary object may be dependent on the value of another, one cannot arbitrarily
assign real individuals to arbitrary objects. A value assignment tells one which
individuals can be simultaneously assigned to various arbitrary objects.
The notion of value assignment bears a resemblance to the intuitive
understanding of ISA-links, (t ISA X) means that t is a possible instantiation of X. In
the terminology of the theory of arbitrary objects, we can say that (t ISA X) means
that there is a value assignment which assign t's referent to the arbitrary object
denoted by X. Since KRS also contains ISA-sentences in which both terms are generic
individual terms, we need a richer notion of value assignment than Fine's original
notion. Fine (1985) briefly discusses the possibility of allowing arbitrary objects to be
the values of higher-level arbitrary objects but does not develop this idea any further
because he does not need it for the particular application he is interested in. Given
my aim of providing a model-theoretic interpretation for conceptual entities, I will use
the richer notion of value assignment. Thus, I will allow lower level arbitrary objects
to be instantiations of higher level arbitrary objects. In my system, the arbitrary
woman can for example be an instantiation of the arbitrary human being.
ISA-links are normally used to establish a generalization hierarchy with at
the top the most general concepts and at the bottom mental objects. Given that value
assignments are going to be used in the semantic interpretation of ISA-sentences, The
notion of value assignment I define will have to reflect the fact that ISA-links
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normally establish a generalization hierarchy. Condition 7 of definition 7 ensures that
this is the case.
4.2.2. A-models
Fine makes the notions of arbitrary object, value assignment, and object dependence
more precise by defining an A-model. An A-model consists of a normal model for
first-order predicate logic plus three extra items:- a set of arbitrary objects A, which is
disjoint from the set of real individuals; a dependence relation between arbitrary
objects <, a binary relation on the set of arbitrary objects; and a set of value
assignments V, a set of partial functions from the set of arbitrary objects into the set
of real individuals. All three have to meet a number of extra conditions, which follow
from our intuitive understanding of the notions involved.
My notion of an A-model differs from Fine's in a number of respects. First,
the set of value assignments V is not a set of partial functions from the set of
arbitrary objects into the set of real individuals, but rather a set of partial functions
from the set of arbitrary objects into the union of the set of real individuals and the
set of arbitrary objects. This reflects the fact that we allow arbitrary objects to take
lower level arbitrary objects as their values. Secondly, the extra conditions which the
set of arbitrary objects A, the set of value assignments V and the dependency relation
< have to meet are different from the conditions they have to meet in Fine's A-
models. Rather than pointing to the differences I will define my own notion of an A-
model. The reader who is interested in Fine's notion is referred to Fine (1985).
Before we can formulate the conditions which A, < and V have to meet, I
will first define two notions which we will need, namely the notions of dependency set
and value range. The dependency set of an arbitrary object a, dep(a), is defined as
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{b | b in A and a < b}.
Thus, dep(a) is the set of all individuals a is dependent on. The value range of an
arbitrary object a, VR(a), can be defined as the set
{j in the union of A and I | v(a) = j for some v in V}.
VR(a) thus consists of all arbitrary and real objects which can be instantiations of a.
We will now formulate a number of conditions on the set V of value
assignments. First, we assume that if there is a value assignment v in V such that
v(a) is defined, then there is a v' in V such that v' is defined for all elements in dep(a).
We will call such a value assignment completed for a. The intuition is that the value
assigned to a dependent arbitrary object is determined by the values assigned to the
arbitrary objects it is dependent on. Thus, if a value assignment assigns a value to an
arbitrary object, then it must be possible to extend it to a value assignment which
assigns values to each arbitrary object it is dependent on. Condition 3 of definition 7
reflects this.
Secondly, although arbitrary objects can themselves be instantiations of
higher-level arbitrary objects, we want to prevent that an arbitrary object is the
instantiation of itself. Thus, regarding functions as two-place relations, every value
assignment v in V has to be irreflexive (Cf condition 5 of definition 7.)
Thirdly, we want to establish a generalization hierarchy of arbitrary objects.
Therefore, we want to prevent that one value assignment assigns an arbitrary object
a to a (higher level) arbitrary object b whereas another value assignment assigns b to
a. Thus, if v(a) = b for some v in V, then there is no v' in V such that v'(b) = a. (Cf
condition 6 of definition 7.)
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Fourthly, ISA-links are in general considered to be transitive. Thus, if (t
ISA X) and (X ISA Y) then (t ISA Y) as well. We want our notion of value
assignment to reflect this. Thus, if a is in VR(b) and another arbitrary or real object c
is in VR(a), then there is v' in V such that v'(b) = c. Because of reasons which will be
made clear in section 4.2.3 we also want the converse:- if a is not in VR(b) and c is in
VR(a), then there is no v' in V such that v'(b) = c. (Cf condition 4 of definition 7.)
A final condition on the set of value assignments is hinted at by Fine in his
brief discussion of the extended notion of value assignment used here. He writes that
a natural "typing" assumption on the higher level arbitrary objects is that if one
takes their values, and then the values of these values, and so on, then eventually
one hits on real individuals. This typing assumption is also required because we want
to use values assignments in establishing ISA-hierarchies which have mental objects
at the bottom level. To formulate this requirement, let a be an arbitrary object with
value range VR(a). Then define a partial ordering ord over VR(a) as follows:- if b and
c in VR(a), then if there is a v in V such that v(b) = c, then ord(c,b). The typing
assumption then is that the minimal elements in VR(a) under the partial ordering
ord are all real individuals where a minimal element min is an element of VR(a) such
that for no element t in VR(a) ord(t,min). (Cf condition 7 of definition 7.) ord is
guaranteed to be a partial ordering (namely irreflexive and transitive) by the other
conditions we have put on V.
The object-dependence relation < also has to meet a number of conditions.
First, the dependence relation is irreflexive. No arbitrary object depends on itself for
its instantiation. Second, the dependence relation is transitive. If a < b and b < c,
then a < c, if only indirectly. Thirdly, the converse of the dependence relation is
well-founded, i.e. there is no infinite sequence of arbitrary objects <al,a2 a3,...>
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such that
al < a2 < a3 <
When we start assigning individuals as instantiations to arbitrary objects, we will
stop somewhere. There has to be an arbitrary object whose value can be determined
independently of any other arbitrary objects. (Cf condition 1 of definition 7). It
follows from these conditions that the dependence relation has to be asymmetric, i.e.
that there are no two arbitrary objects a and b such that a < b and b < a [1].
A further condition on the object dependence relation is that if a < c and an
arbitrary object b is in VR(c), then there is also an arbitrary object a' in VR(a) which
is dependent on b The values which are assigned to a' can be determined by looking
at the values a receives when c is assigned the value which is also in VR(b). Thus, if
a < c and b in VR(c), then there is an arbitrary object a' < b, such that if there is a
value assignment v in V with v(c) = i and v(a) = j, and there is a value assignment
v' in V such that v'(b) = i, then there is a value assignment v" in V completed for a'
such that v"(a') = j and v"(b) = i. In other words, we can determine the value
assigned to the arbitrary object which is dependent on the less general arbitrary
object by looking at the value assigned to the corresponding arbitrary object which
depends on the more general arbitrary object. Condition 8 of definition 7 reflects this.
An example will clarify this condition. The arbitrary man is an instantiation of the
arbitrary person. Since every human has a mother, the arbitrary mother is an object
which is dependent on the arbitrary person. The arbitrary man now also has a
dependent arbitrary object which is an instantiation of the arbitrary mother, and
could be called the arbitrary man's mother. Moreover, the values assigned to the
arbitrary man's mother given a certain value assigned to the arbitrary man, is equal
to the values assigned to the arbitrary mother given that that particular instantiation
of man is assigned to the arbitrary person.
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In definition (7), these intuitive ideas are combined in the definition of an
admissible A-structure.
Definition 7
Let < I, A, <, V > be a quadruple such that I and A (the sets of real and
arbitrary objects) are disjoint and not both empty, < is a binary relation on
A (the dependence relation), V is a set of partial functions from A into the
union of A and I (the set of value assignments)
Let a, b, c and a' in A.
For a in A, let dep(a) = {b in A | a < b}.
For a in A, let VR(a) = {j in the union of A and I| v(a)=j for some v in V}.
Then <1 ,A ,< ,V> is an admissible A-structure iff
1. the relation < is irreflexive, transitive and its converse is well-founded
2. if a < b, v in V, v(b) is defined, then there is a v' in V such that v(b) = v'(b)
and v'(a) is defined.
3. if v in V and v(a) is defined, then there is a v' in V such that v' is defined
for all b in dep(a)
4. if a in VR(b), then VR(a) is a subset of VR(b) and if a is not in VR(b), then
the intersection of VR(a) and VR(b) is empty.
5. for no v in V, v(a) is equal to a.
6. if v(a) = b for some v in V, then there is no v' in V such that v'(b) = a
7. the minimal members of the partial order (VR(a),ord) are elements of I
where ord(x,y) if there is a v in V such that v(y) = x
8. if a < c and b in VR(c), then there is an a' in A such that a' < b, a' in
VR(a) and if for some v in V, v(c) = i and v(a) = j and for some v' in V, v'(b)
= i, then there is a v" in V such that v"(b) = i and v"(a') = j
4.2.3. Properties of arbitrary objects
Kit Fine (1983) discusses the relation between the properties of an arbitrary object
and those of the real objects in its value range. He proposes the principle of generic
attribution which says that an arbitrary object has all the properties which all objects
in its value range have and conversely that if an arbitrary object has a certain
property then all objects in its value range have it. Although this seems an intuitive
principle, there are some problems with it. Consider for example the property of being
a real man. Clearly, this property is true of all individual men, but not of the
arbitrary man. Or, consider the property of being an arbitrary man. Clearly, this
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property is true of the arbitrary man, but not of all individual men. On the basis of
these considerations, Fine distinguishes between generic and classical predicates.
Intuitively, a generic predicate applies to an A-object only as a representative of a
class of individuals, whereas a classical predicate applies to an arbitrary object as an
object in its own right. With this distinction in mind, Fine then restricts the principle
of generic attribution to generic predicates. There is no corresponding principle for
the classical predicates. I remarked earlier in section 3.3.1. that there are certain
properties which are not inherited by conceptual entities lower down the ISA-link. We
can now see that the uninherited properties are Fine's classical predicates, predicates
which do not apply to the concept as a representative of a class of individuals but
rather as an object in its own right.
However, even if we restrict Fine's principle of generic attribution to generic
predicates, it is still too strong for our purposes. An arbitrary object is a prototypical
member of a kind. It receives its properties in virtue of the fact that it is this
prototypical member. Thus, it must be true that if the prototypical member has the
property then all members of the kind have the property. In other words, the
following weaker principle of generic attribution is true:-
P(a) -> (x)(x in VR(a) -> P(x))
but the reverse need not be true. Suppose that by some strange coincidence which is
completely unrelated to the fact that they are members of a certain kind, all members
of a given kind turn out to have a certain property, then we would not always want
to say that the prototypical member of the kind also has the property in question.
P may of course be a negative property, such as "is not brown". These
properties will be inherited as well. After all, if the prototypical member of a kind has
a negative property, and has it in virtue of the fact that it is the prototypical member
117
of a given kind, then all its instantiations will not have the property either. A similar
argument can be used to say that if a is not in VR(b) and j is in VR(a), then j is not in
VR(b). After all, if a is not an instantiation of b in virtue of the fact that it is a
prototypical member of a kind, then every other member of that kind cannot be an
instantiation of b either.
The existence of classical and generic predicates is caused by the fact that
one can look at arbitrary objects and concepts in two slightly different ways. In the
first place, one can regard concepts as representatives of a certain kind of individuals
and as prototypical members of that kind. On the other hand, one can regard concepts
as objects in their own right. In the object-oriented programming language LOOPS
(Bobrow and Stefik, 1983), this "ambiguity" is made explicit. LOOPS includes
classes, which can be seen as the counterpart of our concepts. Classes are defined as
descriptions of one or more similar objects, and classes have instances, objects
described by that class. But LOOPS also has metaclasses, classes whose instances are
classes. When a class is regarded as an instance of a metaclass, it is regarded as an
object in its own right, and the predicates which hold of a class as an instance of a
metaclass can be seen as the LOOPS counterpart of classical predicates.
One can envisage extending KRS to also include classical predicates. The
treatment of classical predicates I advocate is to distinguish syntactically between
generic and classical predicates, rather than the LOOPS solution of allowing
metaclasses. The main reason for preferring this solution to LOOPS is the fact that it
is very simple to give a semantic account of classical predicates, whereas it is harder
to see how to give a satisfactory semantic account of metaclasses.
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For AL, the language into which we will translate conceptual entities, I will
assume that all predicates are generic. In the interpretation of AL, I will therefore
make use of the notion of a well-behaved set. This notion is defined in the following
definition. The definition can be straightforwardly extended to a definition of well-
behaved relationships.
Definition 8
Let < I, A, <, V > be an admissible A-model. Then a subset S of the union
of I and A is well-behaved if and only if for every a in A which is also an
element of S all elements in VR(a) are also in S and if a is not in S then the
intersection of VR(a) and S is empty.
By restricting the interpretations of predicates in AL to well-behaved sets
and relations, we make sure that the weaker principle of generic attribution holds. If
a predicate is true of an arbitrary object and the arbitrary object therefore is in the
extension of the predicate, then all its instantiations will be in the extension of the
predicate as well and thus have the property as well.
If we restricted the interpretation of classical predicates to non-well-behaved
sets as defined in definition (9), we would ensure that classical predicates are not
inherited lower in generalization hierarchies. We thus see that from a semantic point
of view the distinction between classical and generic predicates can be made clear.
Definition 9
Let < I, A, <, V > be an admissible A-model. Then a subset S of the union
of I and A is non-well-behaved if and only if for every a in A which is also an
element of S not all elements in VR(a) are also in S.
The language AL contains two classical predicates, namely ISA and Dep.
Dep is the linguistic counterpart of the object dependence relation. It is generic in
both its open places. After all, a < b, does not imply that a < c for c in VR(b), or c
< b for all c in VR(a). ISA is generic in its first open place but not in its second. After
all, although (a ISA b) implies that (c ISA b) for all c in VR(a), it does imply that (a
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ISA c) for all c in VR(b). It is for this reason that we do not include Dep and ISA in
the set of predicate letters of AL but rather introduce them syncategorematically. We
can thus restrict the interpretation of predicate letters of AL, which are all generic
predicates, to well-behaved sets.
4.2.4. The language AL
To interpret conceptual entities they will first be translated into a language which
contains names for arbitrary objects AL. AL is defined as follows:-
Definition 10
AL contains as basic symbols:-
a set of individual constants, C
a set of individual variables, V
a set of names for arbitrary objects, N
a set of predicate letters, Pred, together with a function i which assigns
to every element of Pred its number of open places.
The set of terms of AL is the union of C and N.
The well-formed formulas (wffs) of AL are
if P is a predicate letter with i(P) = n, and tl,..,tn are terms, then
P(tl,..,tn) is a wff.
if tl and t2 are terms, then (tl ISA t2) is a wff.
if al and a2 are elements of N, then Dep(al,a2) is a wff.
if F is a well-formed formula which contains an individual constant c
and does not contain any occurrences of the variable x, then (x)[Fx/c] is a
wff, where Fx/c is obtained from F by replacing some occurrences of c in
F by x.
if F is a well-formed formula which contains a name for an arbitrary
object a and does not contain any occurrences of the variable x, then
(x)arb[Fx/a] is a wff.
if F is a wff, then (not F) is a wff.
if F1 and F2 are wffs, then (F1 & F2) is a wff.
AL contains two different quantifiers, one for quantification over real
individuals and one for quantification over arbitrary individuals. The other
connectives and the existential quantifiers (Ex) and (Ex)arb are defined in terms of
negation, conjunction and universal quantification in the normal way.
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The semantics for AL is given in the following definition.
Definition 11
An interpretation for AL is a pair consisting of an admissible A-model <1, A,
<, V > and an interpretation function f such that
if t in C, then f(t) in I.
if t in N, then f(t) in A.
if P in Pred, then f(P) is a well-behaved i(P)-place relation over the union of
A and I.
for a well-formed formula F, f(F) is defined:-
if F is of the form P(tl,..,tn), then f(F) = 1 if <f(tl),..,f(tn)> in f(P) and 0
otherwise.
if F is of the form (tl ISA t2), then f(F) = 1 if f(tl) in VR(f(t2)) and 0
otherwise.
if F is of the form Dep(tl,t2), then f(F) — 1 if f(tl) < fit2) and 0 otherwise,
if F is of the form (x)[F'], then f(F) = 1 if for some individual constant c not
in F', the formula obtained from F' by replacing all occurrences of x by c is
true in all interpretations which are exactly like the current one except
possibly for the interpretation assigned to c, and 0 otherwise,
if F is of the form (x)arb[F'], then f(F) — 1 if for some name for an arbitrary
object a not in F', the formula obtained from F' by replacing all occurrences
of x by a is true in all interpretations which are exactly like the current one
except possibly for the interpretation assigned to a, and 0 otherwise,
if F is of the form (not F'), then f(F) = 1 if f(F') = 0, and 0 otherwise,
if F is of the form (F1 & F2), then f(F) = 1 if f(Fl) = f(F2) = 1, and 0
otherwise.
4.2.5. The translation of KRS into AL
We are now in a position to define a translation algorithm from conceptual entities
defined in KRS into sets of axioms in AL. The basic idea is to see conceptual entities
as sets of axioms with every belief representation in it a separate axiom. As belief
representations in conceptual entities in KRS are sets of formulas of BRL, the basic
problem is to define a translation algorithm for BRL. The only exception concerns the
unspecified individual terms in BRL which will treated differently depending on
whether they appear in a belief representation attached to a concept or in one
attached to a mental object.
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In order to translate a belief representation into a formula of AL, one first
has to define a basic translation function between the vocabulary of BRL and the
vocabulary of AL. A basic translation function assigns an individual constant of AL to
every specific individual term of BRL, a name for an arbitrary object in AL to every
generic term of BRL, and an n-place predicate letter of AL to every n-place predicate
letter of BRL. Given a basic translation function tr we can now define an algorithm
for translating a belief representation BR attached to a conceptual entity with
conceptual base X in KRS into a formula of AL:-
1. place an ampersand (&) between all formulas of BRL in BR to give BR'
2. replace every expression in BR' by the expression in AL assigned to it by
tr, if any.
3. if BR' does not contain an unspecified individual term, then return BR'
and stop.
4. if BR' contains an unspecified individual term y and X is a generic term,
then replace y by the first variable x in Var not occurring in BR', conjoin
Dep(x,a) for all names of arbitrary objects occurring in BR', and put (Ex)arb
in front of the resulting formula. Set BR' to the result and go to 3.
5. if BR' contains an unspecified individual term y and X is a specific
individual term, then replace y by the first variable x in Var not occurring in
BR' and put (Ex) in front of the resulting formula. Set the result to BR', and
go to 3.
A few examples will illustrate how the algorithm works. In 3.3.3. I used an
example similar to the following to illustrate the definition of a conceptual entity in
KRS. In the original example the last property was a default property. Since the
present discussion is restricted to essential properties, it is now included as an
essential property.
< HARRY,
< < (HARRY ISA MAN) >
< (HARRY ISA PERSON) >
<MARRIED(HARRY,CLARA),(CLARA ISA WOMAN)>
<OWN(HARRY,x),(x ISA DOG) > > >
Let us assume that the basic translation function tr assigns h to HARRY, c
to CLARA, where h and c are individual constants in AL. Moreover, tr(MAN) — man,
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tr(PERSON) = person, tr(WOMAN) = woman, and tr(DOG) = dog where man,
person, woman, and dog are names for arbitrary objects in AL. Finally, tr(MARRIED)
= married and tr(OWN) = own where married and own are a 2-place predicates in




married(harry,clara) & (clara ISA woman)
(Ex)(own(harry,x) & (x ISA dog))
As a further illustration, consider the following concept which represents
part of someone's concept of man.
< MAN
<(MAN ISA PERSON) >
<HAS(MAN,x), (x ISA MOTHER)>>
Assuming that tr is as above, and moreover that tr(MOTHER) = mother, a
name for an arbitrary object, and tr(HAS) = has, a two-place predicate, the
translation of this conceptual entity in AL is the following.
(man ISA person)
(Ex)arb(has(man,x) & (x ISA mother) & Dep(x,man))
We thus see that a conceptual entity can be translated into a set of axioms in
AL. Since AL has a well-defined model-theory, we have thus, in an indirect way, also
provided a model-theory for conceptual entities in KRS.
4.3. ISA-links
I argued in section 3.3.1. for a uniform treatment of ISA-links in terms of property
inheritance, (t ISA X) means that t has all the properties which X has. I also said
that the model-theory would reflect this. In this section I will prove this assertion.
Since the model-theory is restricted to the essential properties in conceptual entities,
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we can prove the correctness of the claim only as far as essential properties are
concerned.
In order to prove that the uniform treatment of ISA-links in terms of
property inheritance is correct, we have to prove that if the translation of (t ISA X)
into AL is true in an admissible A-model, and the translation of essential properties
in the conceptual entity with conceptual base X is true in this A-model, then the
translation of the formulas obtained by replacing X by t in every one of these belief
representations is also true in this A-model. The following theorem proves this
conjecture. In the definition we will make use of the notation sub(B,X,t) which
denotes the result of replacing every occurrence of X in B by t.
Theorem (soundness)
let int = <Am,f> be an interpretation for AL. Let int | = P mean that P is
true in int. Let BR be a belief representation attached to a conceptual entity
with conceptual base X. Then
if int |= transit ISA X) and int |= trans(BR)
then int |= trans(subst(BR,X,t))
Proof by induction on the length of BR.
Suppose that BR contains only one formula of BRL. Assume that int | =
transit ISA X), then int |= (tr(t) ISA tr(X)), i.e. f(tr(t)) in VR(f(tr(X))) Assume
that int |= trans(BR)
la. Let BR = <(X ISA Y)>, then trans(BR) = (tr(X) ISA tr(Y)). Thus
fltr(X)) in VR(f(tr(Y))). But then by condition 4 in Definition 7. VR(f(tr(X)) is
a subset of VR(f(tr(Y))). So, f(tr(t)) in VR(f(tr(Y))) Hence int |= (tr(t) ISA
tr(Y)) and hence, int | = trans(subst(BR,X,t).
lb. Let BR = <not(X ISA Y)>, then trans(BR) = not(trlX) ISA tr(Y)).
Thus f(tr(X)) not in VRlfitrlY))). But then by condition 4 in Definition 7. the
intersection of VR(f(tr(X)) and VR(f(tr(Y))) is empty, and f(tr(t)) is therefore
not in VR(f(tr(Y))). Hence, int |= notltr(t) ISA tr(Y)) Hence, int | =
trans(subst(BR,X,t)
2a. Let BR = <P(X)>, where P is a 1-place predicate letter in BRL. Then
trans(BR) = tr(P)(tr(X)). Thus, f(tr(X)) in fitrlP)). But, fltr(P)) is a well-
behaved set and therefore VR(f(tr(X)) is a subset of f(tr(P)). Hence, fitrlt)) in
f(tr(P)), int | = tr(P)(tr(t)), int | = trans(Subst(BR,X,t)) Obviously, this proof
can be extended to all predicate letters in BRL.
2b. Let BR = <not(P(X))>, where P is a 1-place predicate letter in BRL.
Then trans(BR) = notltrlP)ltr(X))). Thus, fltrlX)) not in f(tr(P)). But, f(tr(P))
is a well-behaved set and therefore the union of VR(f(tr(X)) and f(tr(P)) is
empty. Hence, f(tr(t)) not in fitr(P)), int |= not tr(P)(trlt)) and Hence, int | =
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trans(Subst(BR,X,t)) Obviously, this proof can be extended to all predicate
letters in BRL.
3. Let BR = <P(X,x)> where P is a two-place predicate letter and x is an
unspecified individual term. Then trans(BR) = (Ex)arb[tr(P)(a,x) & Dep(x,a)]
where a = tr(X).
Case a. Let t in (t ISA X) be a generic term and tr(t) therefore stands for
an arbitrary object in VR(a). Then the truth of trans(BR) and condition
8. in Definition 7. guarantee that there is an arbitrary object dependent
on tr(t) which makes (Ex)arb[tr(P)(tr(t),x) & Dep(x,tr(t))] true. Hence int
| = trans(Subst(BR,X,t))
Case b. Let t in (t ISA X) be a specific individual term. Then tr(t) stands
for a real object in VR(a). Let b be an arbitrary object for which
trans(BR) is true. Then b < a. But, there is a v in V such that v(a) =
tr(t). Then by condition 2 of definition 7, there is some v' in V such that
v'(a) = tr(t) and v'(b) is defined. Either v'(b) is a real object, in which
case (Ex)[tr(P)(a,x)] = trans(Subst(B,X,t)) is directly true, or v'(b) is an
arbitrary object, in which case the truth of trans(Subst(B,X,t)) is
guaranteed by the fact that tr(f(P)) is a well-behaved set.
The induction step is straightforward.
We thus prove the correctness of the uniform treatment of ISA-links in terms
of property inheritance. In section 3.3.1. I discussed the fact that such a uniform
treatment of ISA-links had been criticised because ISA-links often had different
meanings. Sometimes they asserted set-membership while at other times they
asserted a subset-relationship. I argued that this criticism, and the normal reply of
introducing different types of ISA-link, were the consequence of an extensional
interpretation of one-place predicates. The 'intensional' treatment which I proposed
allows one to treat ISA-links uniformly in terms of property inheritance and thus
allows one to give a formal basis to the intuitions which formed the original basis for
the introduction of ISA-links. It thus follows that neither the original criticism nor
the normal reply to it are necessary.
4.4. Conclusion
In this section I defined a model-theory for the structures defined in section 3. thus
defining a denotational semantics for an expressively poor frame-based knowledge
representation scheme. I also used the model-theory to prove the correctness of the
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uniform treatment of ISA-links implicit in the definition of KRS.
5. Default properties
In the previous section I gave a denotational semantics for part of KRS. I explicitly
restricted the model theory to the essential properties associated with a conceptual
entity. In this section, I will turn to default properties. I will distinguish between two
problems with default properties, a logical and an epistemological problem. I will first
discuss the logical problem and briefly sketch two possible solutions to it. Finally, I
will turn to the epistemological problem.
5.1. The logical problem of defaults
What I will call the logical problem of defaults is the question whether it is possible
to give a translation algorithm for a knowledge base containing concepts which have
default properties associated with them into a well-understood logical formalism. In
particular, given a knowledge base in which there is a conceptual entity that has a
property overwriting a default property associated with a concept to which it has an
ISA-link, is it possible to translate the set of formulas in this knowledge base into a
well-understood logical formalism? In section 4 of this chapter, I proposed such a
translation for essential properties. The question is whether something similar can be
done for default properties.




< <(ELEPHANT ISA ANIMAL) >




< <(CLYDE ISA ELEPHANT)>
<white(CLYDE)> >
< >>
Thus, in the knowledge base we have two conceptual entities, a concept
ELEPHANT and a mental object CLYDE. The concept ELEPHANT has two essential
properties associated with it, namely that it is an animal and that it has a mother
which is also an elephant. There are also two default properties, namely that
elephants are grey, and that elephants are four-legged. The mental object, CLYDE,
has two essential properties associated with it, namely that Clyde is an elephant and
that Clyde is white.
The translation algorithm formulated in section 4.2.5. gives the following
result for the essential properties associated with the conceptual entity ELEPHANT:-
(elephant ISA animal)
(Ex)arb(has(elephant,x) & (x ISA mother) &
(x ISA elephant) & Dep(x,elephant))




For essential properties, we have the principle of generic attribution (section
4.2.3), and its semantic counterpart, the notion of a well-behaved set:- if an arbitrary
object has a property and x is an instance of that arbitrary object, then x has the
property as well. Formally,
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P(a) -> (x)((x ISA a) -> P(x)) & (x)arb((x ISA a) -> P(x))
Using this, we can conclude from the translation of the essential properties that clyde
is an animal as well, and that clyde has a mother which is an elephant.
As far as the default properties are concerned, we would like to be able to
conclude from the above knowledge base that Clyde is four-legged, but not that Clyde
is grey. Thus, the second default property associated with elephants should be
inherited by Clyde, but the second should not. If it were, then we would be able to
derive that the contradiction that Clyde was both white and grey. But the above
knowledge base is not contradictory. Indeed, the whole point of making grey a default
property of elephants was to allow it to be overwritten at lower concepts. The logical
problem of defaults then is the problem whether it is possible to give a translation of
the default properties associated with elephant in the above knowledge base which is
consistent with these facts.
In the following two sub-sections, I will sketch two possible solutions to the
problem. The first one proposes a relatively complex translation for default properties,
the second a more complicated treatment of isa-links.
5.1.1. A first possible solution
The first possible solution to the logical problem of defaults as formulated in the
previous section is based on the observation that the principle of generic attribution
allows one to eliminate names for arbitrary objects from the language [2], Without
going into details, one could use the following first-order formulas as the translation
for the essential properties in the example knowledge base above.
(x)(elephant(x) -> animal(x))
(x)(elephant(x) -> (Ey)(has(x,y) & mother(y) & elephant(y)))
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One could try to find a similar first-order translation for default properties. If
one does, then one immediately observes an important difference between essential
and default properties. Note that essential properties can be treated completely
"locally", i.e. in order to find a first-order translation for essential properties, one only
has to take into account the property itself. But if we apply this same translation
algorithm to the default property associated with ELEPHANT, then we would get
(x)(elephant(x) -> grey(x))
which would be the wrong result because we would end up with Clyde being both
grey and white. Therefore a "local" treatment of defaults is impossible and that we
need a "global" treatment.
Given the definition of default properties as properties which are expected to
be true of all instances of the concept unless there is evidence to the contrary for a
given instance, the "global" nature of defaults should come as no surprise. After all, if
there is evidence to the contrary, then this evidence should be stored in the
knowledge base as well. Thus, a treatment of defaults which does not take into
account the state of the rest of the knowledge base is bound to fail.
Although a "local" treatment of defaults is not possible, this should not be
taken to imply that in order to translate default properties into sentences of first-
order logic, one has to take into account the entire knowledge base. It is possible to
determine precisely which parts of the knowledge base have to be taken into account.
Since defaults are inherited unless there is evidence to the contrary associated with
the instances of the concept, we only have to take into account information associated
with the instances in translating default properties. Thus, in the example given
above, in order to translate the default property associated with ELEPHANT we only
have to look at the information associated with the instances of ELEPHANT. In this
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case, there is only one instance, namely CLYDE. The proposal then would be to
translate defaults exactly as if they were essential properties but to mention
exceptions explicitly in the antecedent. Thus, the default property associated with
ELEPHANT would then be translated as>
(x)(elephant(x) & not(x = clyde) -> grey(x))
Note that one does not have to look at the entire knowledge base when one is
translating from KRS into a standard first-order language. One can make use of the
fact that if there is counter evidence for a default property associated with a concept,
then this will be explicitly stored with instances of this concept. Thus, by using the
fact that the information which indicates possible counter-examples to default
properties can be found by following ISA-links in the reverse order, we can get
around the problem of the "non-local" nature of default properties and a logical
treatment of defaults seems possible.
Although this approach seems to give the right results, there are two
problems associated with it. First, there is the problem that finding the appropriate
translation can become very cumbersome and complicated in knowledge bases where
they are deep complicated hierarchies. Suppose that associated with the concept
LIVING-OBJECT there is the default property "is able to reproduce itself'. Then
given the enormous number of instances of this concept which there might be in the
knowledge base, checking whether there is counter-evidence for a particular instance
becomes a very complicated and tedious process. Finding a translation for a default
property such as this becomes at best a very time-consuming process.
A second problem with the above translation algorithm is the fact that it
only works for static knowledge bases. Whenever a proposition is ascribing a property
to a lower level conceptual entity, one should not only add the proposition in question,
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but one also has to check the translation of potentially all the higher level conceptual
entities the current conceptual entity is an instance of. After all, if the newly ascribed
property overwrites one of the default properties of a higher-level conceptual entity,
then the translation of this conceptual entity will have to be changed.
5.1.2. A second possible solution
A second possible solution to the logical problem of defaults was suggested to me by
Henry Thompson (personal communication). It relies on a completely different
translation of the knowledge base. The proposal is probably best introduced by way of
an example. I will initially restrict myself to two-place predicates. Consider then the
following knowledge base.
<ELEPHANT,













The translation algorithm is relatively clear-cut. The only thing to note is
that e-link is used for essential properties, and d-link for default properties.
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The next step is to define the three-place predicate "has-prop" which defines
the notion of property inheritance. The intuitive reading of the predicate "has-prop" is
something like the first argument stands in the relation denoted by its second
argument to the third argument. We also define the intermediate predicate "stored"
which like "has-prop" is a three-place predicate and whose intuitive meaning is that
it is explicitly stored in the knowledge base that its first argument stands in the
relation denoted by its second argument to the third argument.
(x)(y)(z)((e-link(x,y,z) v d-link(x,y,z)) -> stored(x,y,z))
(x)(y)(z)((stored(x,y,z) v
(Ew)(has-prop(isa,x,w) & e-link(w,y,z)) v
(Ew)((u)(-(u = z) -> -(stored(x,y,u)) &
has-prop(isa,x,w) & d-link(w,y,z)) ->
has-prop(x,y,z))
The second axiom reflects our intuitive understanding of property
inheritance. It says:- an object x stands in the relationship y to an object z if either it
is stored under x that it stands in the relationship y to z, or if it is an instance of a
concept that has as one of its essential properties that it y's to z, or if it is not stored
under the object that it y's to something other than z, and it is an instance of a
higher-level object which has y-ing to z as one of its default properties. The
qualification in the last disjunct is necessary because we would otherwise be able to
derive both has-prop(colour,clyde,white) and has-prop(colour,clyde,grey) from the
above knowledge base.
There are various problems associated with this proposal however. It is a
matter of further research whether they seriously undermine the proposal. A first
problem is that we have restricted ourselves to two-place predicates in the knowledge
base and that we might get some problems if we allow predicates with any number of
arguments. Also, there might be some problems with object-slots. A second problem
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concerns the fact that the first-order language into which we translate presupposes a
relatively complicated ontology. In order to get the semantics right, one has to allow
individuals and relationships between individuals as primitive objects in the ontology.
Note that the problem of giving an adequate semantics to the language which is used
might get very complicated when we allow predicates with any number of open places
in the knowledge base.
5.2. The epistemological problem of defaults
In the previous section I discussed the logical problem of defaults:- can we find a
satisfactory proposal for translating knowledge bases containing default properties.
But there is also another problem which I will call the epistemological problem. The
problem is what to do if a default property has been inherited because at the time of
inheritance no contradictory evidence was there, but later contradictory evidence did
become available. As one wants to keep the knowledge base consistent, this means
that one of the propositions has to be retracted. The solution which I sketch here is
based on work on belief revision systems (also called truth or reason maintenance
systems) which allow for the retraction of propositions in a knowledge base. It is
beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a complete review of the literature in this
area. I will only briefly discuss the basic ideas underlying this work and sketch how it
might be used to give an account of default properties. The interested reader is
referred to Doyle and London (1980) for an extensive bibliography.
5.2.1. Belief revision systems
Let us, for the sake of this discussion, assume that a knowledge base is simply a set
of propositions. Then we can define a belief revision system as a reasoning system
that can cope with retraction of some of the propositions in its knowledge base. The
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problem of course is that retraction of a given proposition has repercussions for other
propositions in the knowledge base. Thus, if a given proposition is retracted, then one
also has to retract - or at least try to re-prove - those propositions in the knowledge
base which were derived using the retracted proposition. We will call this 'forward
belief revision'.
But the situation is more complicated. Suppose that because of some
observation, we discover that some non-axiomatic proposition in the knowledge base
has to be retracted. Then we have to look at the propositions which were used in its
derivation. After all, if the conclusion of a valid argument turns out to be false, then
one of the premises must be false as well. In order to maintain the consistency of the
knowledge base we will have to retract the premise in question. We will call this
'backward belief revision'.
Both forward and backward belief revision have a number of consequences
for the way propositions are stored in a knowledge base. In order for forward belief
revision to be efficiently possible, one stores with every proposition pointers to
propositions which were derived using it. If it then turns out that a given proposition
changes its truth value, one can use these pointers to determine efficiently which
other propositions have to be revised. For backward belief revision to be possible we
store with every proposition in the knowledge base some justification, i.e. with every
proposition we store some information about how it came to be included in the
knowledge base. The proposition could have been an axiom, or it could have been
derived using other propositions. In the latter case, we have to store pointers to the
propositions which were used in its derivation. When we discover that a non-
axiomatic proposition in the knowledge base has to be retracted, we can use these
justifications to track down the premises used in its derivation, i.e. we can do so-
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called 'dependency-directed backtracking'. (McAllister, 1980).
5.2.2. Defaults in belief revision systems
Using the ideas of belief revision systems, we can now outline a proposal for dealing
with the epistemological problem of defaults. The basic idea is to store with every
axiom in a belief revision system whether it is an essential property or a default
property. We can then use this information to influence the belief revision process.
If we find out that a given proposition is false, then we can still use the
pointers stored with it to propositions which were derived using it to determine which
other propositions in the knowledge base must be revised. Thus, defaults can be
treated as any other proposition as far as forward belief revision is concerned. The
main change concerns backward belief revision. Let us suppose that a non-axiomatic
proposition has to be retracted. Then, at least one of the proposition used in its
derivation must be responsible for the fact that the proposition in question was
originally derived. The point in doing backward belief revision is to blame one of
these propositions, to retract the culprit and then to do backward and forward belief
revision on it. In the belief revision system I am sketching here, this step will be
different if the culprit turns out to be a default proposition. In this case, it is not
necessary to retract the culprit. All one has to do is store the proposition which
originally changed its truth value as an exception with the default proposition in
question. After all, the main difference between default properties and essential
properties is that the former are only true if there is no evidence to the contrary,
whereas the latter are always true. The fact that one of the propositions derived from
a default property turns out to have the wrong truth value, means that there is
evidence to the contrary for this particular case. However, the fact that a counter¬
example has been found, while critical for an essential property, is not necessarily
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lethal for a default property.
The following example illustrates the proposal. Suppose that (11) is a default
property in some knowledge base KB, while (12) is an essential property in KB.
(11) Birds can fly.
(12) Birds have wings.
Suppose that we find out that (13).
(13) Fred is a bird
Then we can derive both (14) and (15) and with these proposition we will
store some justifications, i.e. pointers to the axioms used in their derivation.
(14) Fred can fly.
(15) Fred has wings.
However, when we have a closer look at Fred, we see that Fred is a kiwi and
therefore cannot fly and does not have any wings to speak of. Thus, we find out that
both (14) and (15) are false. Assuming that there is no reason to doubt the truth of
(13), in a standard belief revision system this would mean that one had to retract
both the proposition that birds can fly and that birds have wings. In our revised belief
revision system, we would have to retract only the latter proposition. After all, it was
assumed to be an essential property in KB and we have just found a counter-example.
Therefore, it cannot be true without qualification. The proposition that birds can fly
on the other hand was supposed to be only a default property and thus is assumed to
be true of birds only if there is no evidence to the contrary. The fact that we have
evidence to the contrary for Fred is immaterial.
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The reason we store the exceptions with default properties has to do with the
fact that too many counter-examples may make one doubt the truth or usefulness of
the default property. Thus, if I believe as a default that Scots are mean, then too
many generous Scots will force me to revise my opinion. The question of how many
counter-examples are needed is a very hard one.
5.3. Conclusion
In this section I discussed default properties in some detail. I mentioned two
problems which arose out of the notion of default, a logical and an epistemological.
For both problems, I outlined possible solutions. There is no doubt that more work is
needed here.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter I discussed some intuitions about the way in which knowledge may be
represented in the human language processor. I made these intuitions more explicit
by formally defining an expressively somewhat impoverished knowledge
representation scheme. I defined a model-theory for part of the knowledge
representation language. I then sketched an alternative treatment for that part of the
knowledge representation language for which there was no model-theory. In the next
chapter I will use some of the intuitions underlying the knowledge representation
scheme to discuss some expressions in natural language.
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Footnotes:-
1. Suppose that a < b and b < a. Then we can construct an infinite sequence of
arbitrary objects such that
al < a2 < a3 < ...
For every odd i, let ai = a and for every even i let ai = b.
2. Strictly speaking, the principle of generic attribution could only be used to
eliminate names for arbitrary objects if it was an equivalence. However, it is one-
directional for reasons discussed in 4.2.3. Therefore, we cannot eliminate names for
arbitrary objects completely. However for the purposes of the discussion here, this
complication is not critical.
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Chapter 6:- Reference and referring expressions
1. Introduction
The system developed in chapter 4 and chapter 5 is ultimately intended to be used in
a theory of discourse comprehension and discourse production. In this chapter, I use
the model to sketch analyses for some expressions in English, namely indefinite NPs,
definite descriptions, personal pronouns and universally quantified NPs. I will show
that the idea of having various partitions in the overall model for the human
language processor reflecting various degree of activation of knowledge is relevant for
the distinction between definite descriptions and pronouns. I will also argue that the
distinction between concepts and mental objects which was formally defined in
chapter 5. is relevant for the distinction between singularly referring expressions and
universally quantified expressions. But before I turn to a discussion of these various
expressions, I will first discuss some of the consequences which the model has for the
notion of reference.
2. Reference
The theory I put forward in chapters 4 and 5 above has a number of consequences for
the analysis of reference. According to the traditional' or 'absolute' notion of
reference which in the modern literature can be traced back to Frege (1892), the
referent of a linguistic expression is an object of some sort in the world or in a model.
Thus, the referents of singular referring expressions are objects in the world or model
while the referents of sentences are truth values. Frege never was explicit about the
referents of predicate expressions, but it was certainly within the Fregian tradition
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that Carnap (1947) proposed to see the referent of a n-ary predicate, or the extension,
as a n-ary relation between individuals. According to the traditional view of
reference, the referent of an expression is determined once and for all, and is
independent of the state of speaker and hearer. This notion of reference is captured
by the interpretation function in a model for first-order logic.
Given my aim of providing a model for the processor, I am not primarily
interested in the notion of reference. The central question is how a hearer grasps
what the referent of an expression is on a certain occasion of use. We are interested
in "how language and the world are related in the human mind, ... how the mental
representation of sentences is related to the mental representation of the world."
(Johnson-Laird, 1982;6-7). At least from the cognitive point of view adopted here
reference always has to be seen as mediated through the mental representations
discourse participants entertain of the world.
The process of referring is analysed as follows:- if a speaker wants to provide
her hearer with information about an object, then this presupposes that she has
activated her knowledge about this object, that she has activated one of her
conceptual entities. People do not construct sentences without being aware of what
they want to say. Thus, the act of referring is mediated through the mental
representation the speaker entertains of the intended referent.
The process of understanding a referring expression is analysed as follows:-
the hearer when interpreting an utterance in which the speaker introduces a new
object into the discourse, is modelled as setting up a new discourse object. He will
then try to establish a connection between it and knowledge in the long-term
knowledge base. This means that he will either find an already existing conceptual
entity which in some sense fits the expression the speaker used, or that he will create
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a new conceptual entity. Thus, for the hearer the process of understanding a referring
expression essentially involves a process of establishing a relation between the
expression and a conceptual entity in his knowledge base, which either existed before
the utterance was processed or came into existence as a consequence of processing the
utterance. In both cases, I will use the term cognitive access for the relation holding
between the expression and the conceptual entity.
Clearly, a speaker does not just use referring expressions to introduce new
objects into the discourse. She can also use referring expressions to talk about already
established discourse objects. In these cases, the hearer can access the discourse
objects directly, and there is no need to establish a relationship between discourse
objects and conceptual entities.
When the hearer has cognitively accessed a conceptual entity it is possible
that he assumes that there is a direct relation between it and some real-world object.
He can take the conceptual entity he has cognitively accessed to be the representation
of some external object. If he does, he will take the speaker to be referring to this
real-world object. However, whether he can determine what the real-world referent of
the expression in question is, depends on whether he has enough information in the
mental object he has cognitively accessed.
The following is a graphical representation of the cognitive notion of
reference [1],
1 4 1









It is important to realise that whenever a referring expression is used by a
speaker there is a cognitive access relation between this use of the expression and one
of the speaker's conceptual entities, and also a cognitive access relation between the
expression as used by the speaker and one of the hearer's conceptual entities.
However, there need not necessarily be a correspondence relation between either or
both of these conceptual entities and one or more real-world objects. If there is no
such relation, then the expression used to access the conceptual entity also fails to
refer.
My analysis of reference is not simply a reformulation of the traditional
notion of reference in mental terms. The notion of conceptual entity which I use is
richer than the notion of object which is used in the standard account of reference.
Cognitively accessing a conceptual entity is more than establishing a relation
between an expression as used on a certain occasion and an entry in the knowledge
base. It involves the activation of a large chunk of knowledge. The richer notion of
conceptual entity will turn out to be an advantage mainly in the analysis of definite
descriptions and universally quantified NPs.
In chapter 5 I distinguished between two types of conceptual entity, namely
mental objects and concepts. In section 3 of this chapter I will discuss cognitive access
of mental objects, whereas I will turn to cognitive access of concepts in section 4.
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3. Cognitively accessing mental objects
3.1. Introduction
In this section I will discuss three types of expression which the speaker can use to
instruct her hearer to cognitively access mental objects:- non-generic or particular
singular indefinite NPs, singular definite descriptions and singular personal
pronouns.
3.2. Singular Indefinite Noun Phrases
The analysis of reference led to the conclusion that the reference relation has to be
seen as essentially involving cognitive access of some cognitive object. Singular
indefinite NPs can stand in a cognitive access relation to two different kinds of
discourse objects. The discourse object can either be a mental object or a concept. In
the first case, which I will call the particular use, the indefinite is interpreted as an
instruction to cognitively access a specific mental object which is new in the sense
that it has not been talked about before in the discourse. In the second case, the
generic use, the indefinite will be interpreted as an instruction to cognitively access a
concept. I will discuss particular uses in more detail in this section and I will return
to generic uses in section 4.
3.2.1. Other uses of indefinites
Before I discuss particular uses in more detail, I want to make clear that the claim
that in the particular use of an indefinite the speaker instructs her hearer to access
cognitively a mental object does not apply to all non-generic uses of indefinites.
There are a number of examples which are not covered by the analysis proposed here.
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Du Bois (1980), who defends a similar thesis about indefinites, explicitly
limits the discussion to the occurrences of indefinite NPs which are used to speak
about an object as an object with continuous identity over time. Karttunen (1976)
gives a test which can be interpreted as determining whether an indefinite is used in
such a way:- an indefinite is used to speak about an object as an object only if it
justifies the occurrence of a co-referential pronoun or definite description later in the
text. These criteria rule out a number of non-generic uses of indefinites. One case
concerns the use of an indefinite in a predicative nominal, exemplified in (1).
(1) John is a doctor.
The phrase a doctor is not used to speak about an object as an object, and
does not allow for a subsequent co-referential definite pronoun or definite description.
Another use which is ruled out by the above criteria is illustrated in (2).
(2) Nigel and Alan went out for a pint.
The speaker does not use the indefinite a pint to speak about an object as an
object. Moreover, subsequent co-referential pronouns or definite descriptions to refer
to the pint are not allowed. Du Bois uses the term 'object incorporation' for examples
of this type. His explanation is that the discourse participants treat the entire
predication as a unary concept:- both speaker and hearer have a concept going out for
a pint. There are equivalent expressions involving object incorporation which do not
contain indefinites, such as kicking the bucket and having sex.
Another use which is explicitly ruled out by Du Bois and Karttunen is
occurrences of indefinites within the scope of a negation, as in (3) a car in sentence (3)
is not used to talk about an object as an object and does not allow for a subsequent
occurrence of a co-referential pronoun.
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(3) Bill did not buy a car.
I will however return to examples like these in 3.2.3. because the situation is
more complicated than it appears at first sight.
Before we move on, it must be stressed that the test which Karttunen (1976)
proposes mentions co-referential pronouns. It is possible to follow sentence (l)-(3) by
sentences containing pronouns which have the indefinite as their antecedent. (4)
would be an example for (3).
(4) They are too expensive.
Although they in (4) has a car in (3) as its antecedent, it is not co-referential.
Rather, they refers to the type of objects of which a car is an example. But this
relation is not one of co-referentiality and therefore does not meet the Karttunen
criterion. I will ignore pronouns of this type here.
3.2.2. Understanding and producing indefinites
In a particular use of an indefinite a hearer is instructed either to create a completely
new mental object in his discourse model, or to activate into his discourse model a
mental object which has not been activated earlier in the discourse. In the first case,
the mental object which the hearer creates in his discourse model, will be marked as
an instance of the concept which has to be activated into the hearer's discourse
specific epistemic model. The concept will correspond to the noun used in the
indefinite. This use is most common in cases where the speaker wants to provide
information to the hearer about an object the latter did not know about before. An
example is:-
(5) I met a girl last night.
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In the other case, the hearer is instructed to activate a mental object into the
discourse. Thus, the speaker assumes that the hearer has a mental object in his
General Epistemic Model and instructs him to activate it. This use is most common in
cases where the speaker wants to elicit information from the hearer about this object.
An example is:-
(6) You have a new girl friend, I hear. Tell me about her.
Note that the speaker could have used a definite description here. Thus, in
this context (7) is almost equivalent to (6).
(7) Tell me about your new girl friend.
The main difference is that unlike in (7) in (6) the speaker first explicitly
states that she knows about the existence of the hearer's new girl friend. The role of
the I hear in (6) is presumably to check up on this information. Other examples of
this use also have hedges of this type. It follows that examples of this kind are less
appropriate if the existence of the object in question is mutually known to hearer and
speaker. Intuitively, this prediction holds.
The main problem posed by indefinites as far as speakers are concerned are
the circumstances under which the speaker uses an indefinite rather than any other
"referring" expression such as a proper name or a definite. It has been claimed that
the main difference between indefinites and definite descriptions is that the former
are used for first mentions and the latter for second and subsequent mentions (e.g.
Heim, 1982). The claim is false at least as far as definite descriptions are concerned:-,
definite descriptions can be used to introduce objects into the discourse which have
not been explicitly mentioned before, but only if the speaker makes some specific
assumptions about the information available to the hearer in the discourse specific or
the general epistemic model (Cf section 3.3.). If these conditions do not apply, then
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the speaker will use an indefinite.
The analysis put forward implies that from a cognitive point of view
indefinites can be used as fully referring expressions. Indefinites can be used when
the speaker has cognitively accessed a mental object which she believes to stand in a
correspondence relation to some object in the world. And in response to an indefinite,
a hearer may create a mental object (or cognitively access an already existing mental
object) which he also believes to correspond to some real world object. Fodor and Sag
(1982) claim that there are a number of ways in which the speaker can signal that
the indefinite is meant to be interpreted as a full referring expression. They claim
that the indefinite article is lexically ambiguous between a referential and a
quantifier reading. In the case of quantifier readings, the indefinite is used as an
existential quantifier whereas in the referential reading the indefinite is used as a
referential expression. They then give a number of factors which favour a referential
reading over a quantifier reading.
Before I discuss the various ways in which a speaker can signal that she
intends the indefinite to be taken as a referring expressions, I want to provide two
arguments against the alleged lexical ambiguity of the indefinite. First, Fodor and
Sag admit that the distinction they draw is very close to the referential attributive
distinction drawn by Donnellan (1966). But the referential attributive distinction is
not restricted to indefinites but can also be drawn for definite descriptions (Cf
Donnellan, 1966) and proper names (Stalnaker, 1970). Hence, one is forced to
conclude that there is a similar semantic ambiguity for all expressions for which the
distinction can be drawn, such as for example the definite article. Second, given the
importance of the resolution of the alleged ambiguity for the interpretation of
utterances, one would expect the lexical ambiguity to be particular to English, and
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not to exist in most other languages, no matter how closely related they are. After
all, other lexical ambiguities disappear when one translates the ambiguous lexical
item from one language into another. However, the indefinite article shows the same
"ambiguity" in Dutch, German and French as it shows in English, thus indicating
that there is good reason to believe that there is no such lexical ambiguity.
Although it is dubious that the indefinite is lexically ambiguous, Fodor and
Sag's observations remain and require another explanation. We can re-analyse the
alleged referential attributive analysis in terms of the amount of information the
speaker has available in the conceptual entity she has cognitive accessed. If the
speaker believes that she has enough information available to be able to identify the
object, then we are dealing with what Fodor and Sag call a referential reading.
Otherwise, we are dealing with a quantifier reading [2], An argument for this
position comes from Prince's work on a type of indefinite which Fodor and Sag argue
favours a referential reading.
Prince (1981) discusses this indefinites. Expressions of this type are usually
used in special registers, such as the one for telling jokes. Examples are:-
(8) This Irishman comes into a pub and ..
(9) There is this Irishman trying to ..
Prince (1981) argues that this type of expression is an indefinite. Firstly,
occurrences of this this in discourse have to be replaced by the indefinite article
rather than the definite. Secondly, unlike definite descriptions or demonstratives,
they occur in "there is" constructions as illustrated by (9). Prince shows that there are
some differences between the a/an indefinites and the this indefinites. First, when this
indefinites are used, data collected from free speech show that there is a higher
probability that the referent will be referred to again within a few clauses than when
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an a/an indefinite was used. Thus, Prince concludes, this indefinites are often used to
signal the introduction into the discourse of a new topic. Second, there is a difference
in presuppositional behaviour. Like definite descriptions, this indefinites usually carry
an existence presupposition in the sense that the speaker who uses one is committed
to the existence of the referent of it [3]. Hence, it is not cancellable under negation.
Unlike the corresponding sentence with an a/an indefinite, i.e. (10), sentence (11)
does commit the speaker to the existence of a specific car which Bill liked but did not
buy.
(10) Bill did not buy a car he liked.
(11) Bill did not buy this car he liked.
The fact that the speaker is committed to the existence of the referent, and
the fact that this indefinites are mostly used to introduce a new topic into the
discourse, support the conclusion that whenever the speaker uses a this indefinite, she
strongly suggests to the hearer that she has more information available about the
object. It is thus more likely that the indefinite will get a referential reading in the
sense of Fodor and Sag.
Fodor and Sag give a number of other factors which have some effect on
whether an indefinite is likely to be used "referentially". They mention a correlation
with descriptive richness, i.e. the amount of information packed into the indefinite.
Thus, the indefinite in (12) is more likely to be referential for the speaker than
attributive.
(12) Sandy didn't see a squirrel that was
chasing its tail around the oak tree.
Indefinites of the form 'a N of mine' such as a friend of mine are also likely to
be referential for the speaker, as in (13).
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(13) A friend of mine gave me 10 pounds.
Another factor favouring a referential understanding is non-restrictive
relative clauses. If an indefinite is followed by a relative clause of this type, then a
referential understanding is almost certain.
(14) A student in the syntax class, who has a
Ph.D. in astrophysics, cheated on the exam.
Now, a speaker uses an expression referentially in Fodor and Sag's sense if
she has attached to the mental object that she cognitively accessed when constructing
the expression, knowledge which she believes enables her to identify the object. In the
previous pages I have mentioned a number of ways in which the speaker can signal
that she intends the indefinite to be taken referentially.
3.2.3. Indefinites and existential quantification
In formal semantics, indefinites are generally analysed as involving an existential
quantifier. Thus, sentence (15) is analysed as (16) which is true just in case there is at
least one dog such that Socrates owns it.
(15) Socrates owns a dog.
(16) (Ex)(dog(x) & own(Socrates,x))
Heim (1982) lists two arguments for analysing the indefinite in this way
rather than as a referring expression. The notion underlying Heim's arguments is the
absolute notion of reference.
For the first argument, consider (17).
(17) Socrates does not own a dog.
If a dog is an expression which refers to a particular object, then (17) must
mean that that particular thing is such that Socrates does not own it, just as (18)
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means that Socrates does not own that particular thing referred to by Fido.
(18) Socrates does not own Fido.
However, even though this might be one reading of (17), one can clearly use
the sentence to make a stronger claim:- the claim is not that Socrates does not own
some particular dog, but the claim is that Socrates does not own any dog, i.e. that for
all dogs Socrates does not own them. The existential quantifier analysis generalises
to this case. Thus, (19) is a logical translation of (17) which expresses this stronger
claim.
(19) not(Ex)(dog(x) & own(Socrates,x)).
The second argument relies on the behaviour of indefinites in sentences
which also contain universally quantified NPs. Unlike real referring expressions, the
argument goes, indefinites exhibit scopal properties. Thus, (20) does not imply that
every child owns the same object, something which, as (21) shows, one would expect if
a dog was a referring expression.
(20) Every child owns a dog.
(21) Every child owns Fido.
The above arguments notwithstanding, the analysis of indefinites as
involving existential quantification runs into an intuitive problem. Intuitively,
indefinites carry a uniqueness implication. After an utterance of (22), which is a
repetition of an earlier example, there is a strong intuition that there is exactly one
dog the discourse participants are talking about.
(22) Socrates owns a dog.
It is important to make clear in what sense indefinites carry a uniqueness
implication. Uses of indefinites clearly do not always imply uniqueness in the world
in the sense that the predicate used to construct the expression necessarily applies to
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one and only one object. Thus, sentence (22) would still be true if it turned out that
Socrates owned more than one dog. Indefinites do however carry a uniqueness
implication in the sense of uniqueness in the discourse. After all, it is entirely
possible to continue a discourse started by (22) with a sentence containing a pronoun
or an anaphoric definite description, expressions which are traditionally regarded as
implying uniqueness. If we follow (22) by any of these examples, the discourse would
not be called false if it should turn out that Socrates had more than one dog which bit
the postman, although it might be claimed that the speaker who knows that this is
the case has been misleading. Heim (1982) cites this observation as a counter¬
argument to the existential quantifier analysis of indefinites.
(23) It always bites the postman.
(24) The animal always bites the postman.
Seeing particular uses of indefinites as instructions to the hearer to
cognitively access a mental object solves both the problem of the uniqueness intuition
and the problem of personal pronouns and definite descriptions. In response to the
indefinite the hearer has activated or created a unique mental object which may be
accessed by means of a pronoun or a definite description, as I will argue in the next
section. However, this unique mental object does not have to correspond to a unique
object in the world, and uniqueness in the discourse therefore does not necessarily
imply uniqueness in the world.
It remains to be seen how this analysis can deal with sentences involving
negation and universally quantified sentences. In this section I will deal with the
problem posed by sentences containing a negation operator, whereas in the section 4.
I will deal with sentences in which there is a universally quantified NP.
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In chapter 4 I introduced the notion of embedded models which could be used
to represent the beliefs ascribed to other processors. Fauconnier (1979) extends what
is basically the same machinery and proposes to see negation operators as expressions
which the speaker uses to instruct the hearer to create an embedded negation space.
This analysis implies that analysis of indefinites as instructions to the hearer to set
up a new discourse object generalizes to those cases where the indefinite occurs
"within the scope" of a negation operator. If the indefinite occurs in such a position,
it is to be regarded as an instruction to the hearer to set up a new discourse object in
an embedded negation space.
An argument which can be put forward in defence of the embedded model
treatment of negation operators, is that there is a possible ambiguity in the
interpretation of referring expressions in sentences containing space-creating
operators. They can either be interpreted as an instruction to access cognitively an
object existing in the embedded model, or as an instruction to access cognitively an
object existing in the top-level model. This also is the case for sentences containing
negation operators. In formal semantics terminology, an indefinite which appears
"inside" a negation operator allows for both a wide scope reading, in which case it is
to be seen as an instruction to cognitively access an object in the top-level model, and
a narrow scope reading, in which case it is to be seen as an instruction to cognitively
access an object in the embedded negation-space. The embedded model treatment
makes predictions about which indefinites are more likely to be interpreted as
instructions to cognitively access objects existing at the top-level, (or about which
indefinites are more likely to receive wide scope). Certain indefinites were shown to
be more likely to receive referential interpretations in Fodor and Sag's sense. These
types of indefinites are thus more likely to receive an interpretation whereby the
hearer cognitively accessed an object in the top-level model, rather than in the
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embedded negation-space. Given the fact that marking an indefinite for a referential
interpretation implies that the speaker has enough information available to be able
to identify the object, this is what one would expect. In formal semantics terminology,
the more "referentially inclined" indefinites tend to have wide scope over the negation
operator. The following sentences corroborate this prediction:-
(25) I did not see a friend of mine.
(26) I did not buy this car I liked.
(27) John did not meet a man from Arkansas who
Mary had been going out with for twenty years
and who impressed everybody else by his knowledge
of pre-war British built motorbikes.
(28) Mary did not speak to a student in the syntax-class,
who has a PhD in astrophysics.
3.3. Definite descriptions
It has often been claimed that, apart from generic uses, definite descriptions have two
distinct functions. They can be used to access an already activated piece of
knowledge, or to instruct the hearer to activate a new piece of knowledge. The first
use will be called "anaphoric uses"; the second "introductory". I will argue that there
is a common factor between these two uses and that this common factor is central in
the explanation of definites.
Definite descriptions can of course be used generically. The explanation of
this use is very similar to that of generic indefinites which was discussed in the
section 4. of this chapter. The discussion here will therefore be exclusively concerned
with particular uses of definite descriptions [4],
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The basic claim about particular uses of definite descriptions is very similar
to the one made by Christophersen (1939). Since Hawkins (1978) explicitly bases his
analysis on Christophersen as well, there is a large similarity between his analysis
and mine. Christophersen wrote that a definite description used particularly, as
opposed to generically, stands for a particular individual known to both speaker and
hearer (Christophersen, 1939;28). Using the notion of mutual knowledge discussed in
chapter 5. and the notion of knowledge activation, I want to rephrase
Christophersen's claim as follows:-
a speaker, when making a particular use of a definite description, instructs the hearer
to cognitively access an activated mental object uniquely satisfying the description
which the speaker assumes to be mutually known or to be derivable from activated
mutual knowledge.
a hearer who is faced with the task of interpreting a particular use of a definite
descriptions, tries to find or derive a unique activated mental object which fits the
description.
The reasoning necessary for "deriving" mental objects is of the following
type. The speaker assumes that the hearer has activated some knowledge. In chapter
5, I argued that knowledge is represented in frames. Hence, whenever a processor has
activated certain knowledge, there will in general be a number of slots activated as
well. The objects which have to be derived in order to get an interpretation for a
definite description, are instantiations of object-slots in an already activated frame.
Since activated knowledge is modelled as existing in the discourse specific epistemic
model, one can say that the mental object which a processor is supposed to cognitively
access in response to a particular use of a definite description, must exist in the
discourse specific epistemic model as mutual knowledge, whether in the form of a
mental object in its own right, or as a filler for an object-slot in an activated
conceptual entity.
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The psychological literature is not entirely clear on the question of whether a
slot-filler is present when a frame has been activated. A number of experiments have
been done which can be interpreted as testing this hypothesis. If the slot-filler is
present when the frame has been activated, then one would expect definite
descriptions which are used as instructions to cognitively access these slot-fillers to be
just as easy to comprehend as definite descriptions which are used as instructions to
cognitively access explicitly introduced objects. Haviland and Clark (1974) and Clark
and Haviland (1977) did a number of experiments in which they compared discourses
in which an entity was explicitly introduced with discourses in which the entity was
strongly implied but not explicitly introduced. Haviland and Clark compared
discourses like (29) in which the existence of the beer was explicitly stated in the first
sentence with discourse of type (30) in which the existence of the beer was merely
implied by the first sentence.
(29) Mary unpacked the beer. The beer was warm
(30) Mary unpacked the picnic things. The beer was warm.
They found that definite descriptions referring to the entity in question took
longer in the second case than in the first. The reason is that in discourses of type
(30) the hearer has to establish a link between the picnic things and the beer.
Haviland and Clark call this process "bridging". To the extent that bridging occurs in
cases where the definite description in question is used as an instruction to
cognitively access a slot in a previously activated frame, the slot-fillers are not
present in the same way as explicitly introduced objects are.
However, the situation is not entirely clear-cut. Garrod and Sanford (1981)
did not find a bridging effect in cases where the entity in question is considered to be
a necessary part of the situation being described. In these cases, one can use an
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expression referring to the entity in question without an increase in comprehension
time even if the entity has not been explicitly introduced into the discourse before.
Thus, if one compares (31) to (32), there is no increase in comprehension time for the
case where the antecedent for the definite description the car was not explicitly
introduced.
(31) Keith drove to London last night.
The car kept breaking down.
(32) Keith took his car to London last night.
The car kept breaking down.
The conclusion which one can draw from these findings is that if the
existence of the slot-filler is strongly suggested by the frame which has been
activated, then there will be no increase in comprehension time for the definite
description. However, if the link between frame and slot is less strong, and the link
between unpacking picnic things and beer is less strong than that between driving
and cars, then there is an increase in processing time. In terms of the knowledge
representation scheme of chapter 5., this can be reformulated as follows:- if the
object-slot is among the essential properties, then there is no increase in processing
time; if the object-slot is a default property, then bridging is called for with an
increase in processing time.
Hawkins (1978,1982) rightly points out that uses of definite descriptions of
the slot-filler type are highly hearer-sensitive. Thus, if the notion of a grammar has
somehow been activated in the speaker's and the hearer's minds, then a use of the
definite description the deep structure is all right when one is speaking to a
transformational syntactician but would be inappropriate when one is talking to
someone who cannot be assumed to know much about the subject.
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Before I turn to some apparent counterexamples to the claims put forward
here, I will briefly discuss the referential attributive distinction which originates with
Donnellan (1966). Rather than discuss the literature produced in response to
Donnellan's paper in detail, I will briefly sketch my account of the distinction and its
consequences for the analysis of definite descriptions.
In section 3.2.2. I discussed Fodor and Sag's claim that the indefinite article
was lexically ambiguous between a referential and a quantificational reading. I also
said that they admitted that their distinction was very close to the referential
attributive distinction. I rejected their claim of the lexical ambiguity of the indefinite
article and proposed an alternative explanation of the observations which they use to
defend their thesis, which I will now generalise to the Donnellan distinction. Roughly,
a speaker uses a definite description referentially if she thinks that she has enough
information available to be able to identify the real-world object corresponding to the
mental object she has cognitively accessed. If this is not the case, then she uses it
attributively.
Johnson-Laird and Garnham (1980) also discuss the distinction. They rightly
point out that for every utterance there are two contexts:- one for the speaker and one
for the hearer. It is therefore possible that the same expression is interpreted
differently by speaker and hearer. Thus, although a speaker may use a definite
description referentially for herself, a hearer can interpreter it referentially or
attributively, and similarly for attributive uses. It follows that in general there are
four possibilities for every use of a definite description. The reader is referred to
Johnson-Laird and Garnham's paper for examples.
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The above explanation of the Donnellan distinction is drawn in terms of the
correspondence relation between the mental objects which speaker and hearer have
cognitively accessed and real-world objects. However, in both the referential and the
attributive use, speaker and hearer will have accessed a mental object, and the
account of definite descriptions put forward in this section, which is given in terms of
the cognitive access relation, therefore applies to both uses.
3.3.1. Some apparent counterexamples
There are a number of apparent counterexamples to the analysis of definite
descriptions proposed above. The definite description discussed most in the
philosophical literature is due to Russell (1905).
(33) The king of France is bald.
It is not difficult to find examples like it as the first sentences of newspaper
articles. An example is (34) which occurred as the first sentence of an article in the
Scotsman of 5 April 1984.
(34) The Queen is to visit the US during ..
Concentrating on sentence (34), this sentence poses two problems for the
basic claim concerning definite descriptions. First, the mental object corresponding to
the Queen cannot be said to be activated when the newspaper article is read. After
all, if one assumes it is, then one is faced with the undesirable consequence that all
information which is potentially relevant when reading a newspaper must have been
activated to some degree. This would lead to an overloaded discourse specific
epistemic model.
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A second problem concerns the uniqueness requirement. There is more than
one queen in the world and readers can be expected to be aware of this.
The first problem can be explained on the basis of the principle of
retrospective updating (chapter 2.):- if the hearer's knowledge base is not as the
speaker expects it to be judging by her utterance, then the hearer can retrospectively
update it in order to make true the assumptions which the speaker makes. Hence, if
the speaker signals that she expects the hearer to have some information available in
his discourse specific epistemic model, then the hearer, if he does not have it
available, can update his discourse specific epistemic model retrospectively and add
the relevant information when processing the utterance. Thus, when the reader comes
across the definite description in (34), he realizes that the writer acts as if she
assumes that the reader had activated a particular piece of knowledge. The reader
then retrospectively updates his knowledge base to make the speaker's assumption
true and activates a mental object satisfying the description.
The second problem can be solved if we realize that the uniqueness is not
uniqueness with respect to the entire world, but rather with respect to some
pragmatically defined set. Since readers of the Scotsman can be assumed to be aware
that normally the pragmatically defined domain is Britain, and since Britain has only
one queen, uniqueness is assured. The reasons the pragmatically defined set comes to
be known to the discourse participants can be of very different natures, a point to
which I will return in section 3.5.
The principle of retrospective updating will also explain a use of definite
descriptions which is relatively frequent in the beginning of novels and which was
mentioned in connection with the discourse of Sanford and Garrod's model in chapter
3. Writers often start novels with a definite description even though they cannot
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reasonably expect that the referent of the definite was known to their readers. In
these cases, readers will apply the principle of retrospective updating and put a
mental object corresponding to the definite description in their discourse model or
discourse specific epistemic model.
The principle of retrospective updating may appear to be rather ad hoc.
However, it is not without precedent in the literature. In chapter 2. I mentioned
Seuren's principle of backwards suppletion, and Clark and Marshall (1981 ;24-6) use a
similar principle to account for a use of definite descriptions which Hawkins (1978)
called the unavailable use. This particular use is exemplified by examples such as
(35) and (36).
(35) Bill is amazed by the fact that there is so much life on earth.
(36) The woman whom Max went out with last night was nasty to him.
Hawkins sees these examples as counter-examples to his claim that definite
descriptions refer to shared sets, or shared objects, based on shared knowledge. The
problem with (35) and (36) is that they can introduce information which is new to the
hearer into the discourse and hence cannot be explained in terms of (previously)
shared sets or objects. Hawkins' solution is to derive these sentences
transformationally from deep structures containing indefinites. Hence, (35) would be
derived from a deep structure which could also be realized by surface structure (37).
(37) That there is so much life on earth is a fact which Bill is amazed by.
Clark and Marshall point out that Hawkins assumes that the moment of
acquisition must always chronologically precede the moment of the reference act.
They claim that one can find counter-examples to Hawkins' assumption and that the
condition that the hearer has a shared set available before the reference act is too
strong:- the moment of the reference act can precede the acquisition of the relevant
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mutual knowledge. Clark and Marshal thus use a special instance of the principle of
retrospective updating of the knowledge base. But if we use the principle of
retrospective updating, then there is no motivation for Hawkins' transformational
treatment.
The Russellian analysis of definite descriptions is that sentences containing a
definite description assert that there is exactly one object which satisfies the predicate
used in the definite descriptions and that that objects also satisfies the main predicate
used in the sentence. Thus, the Russellian example (33) is analysed as asserting first
that there is exactly one object which is the king of France and second that that
object is bald.
(33) The king of France is bald.
The Russellian analysis implies that the main difference between indefinite
and definite descriptions is that the latter assert uniqueness in the sense that the
speaker asserts that there is exactly one object which satisfies the descriptor. It
follows that if one uses a definite description to refer to an object which is not the
only one to satisfy the descriptor, then the assertion one makes is false. Strawson
(1950) took exception to this point. His theory was that definite descriptions
presuppose that the object to which the definite description is used to refer uniquely
satisfies the descriptor. If there is no such object or if there is more than one, then the
sentence fails to have a truth value.
The analysis I propose is essentially Strawsonian in character. The
uniqueness and existence of the object which is intended as the referent of the definite
description is presupposed in the sense that the speaker assumes that the hearer has
activated the mental object corresponding to the intended referent. However, in cases
where this assumption breaks down, the principle of retrospective updating allows the
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hearer to behave in a way which is in accordance with the Russellian analysis. Thus,
if there is not an object already activated which uniquely satisfies the descriptor, then
the hearer can retrospectively update his knowledge base. The state of the knowledge
base after the retrospective updating is the same as after the interpretation of an
assertion stating that there is unique object satisfying the descriptor. It is in this
sense that sometimes definite descriptions can be taken as 'asserting' uniqueness and
existence.
The above remarks should not be taken to imply that the definite description
can be used in two different ways. The basic analysis is Strawsonian in character. It
is only when there is not unique mental object available yet that the definite
description warrants a Russellian analysis. However, this is not a different use of
definites but rather follows from the Strawsonian analysis and the independently
motivated principle of retrospective updating.
3.4. Pronouns
The last type of expression I want to discuss in this section are third person definite
singular pronouns, or pronouns for short, helshelit. The claim is that speakers will in
general use a pronoun to instruct their hearers to cognitively access one of the most
highly activated mental objects. The main difference with definite descriptions is the
degree to which the relevant knowledge is supposed to be activated. If the knowledge
is activated to a very high degree, and can be modelled as existing in the discourse
model, then the use of a pronoun is warranted. If the relevant knowledge is activated
to a lesser degree, and has to be modelled as existing in the discourse specific
epistemic model, then the use of a pronoun is less felicitous and the speaker will in
general use a definite description.
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In the literature on pronouns, three main principles have been used to
explain the interpretation of pronouns. Pronouns were classified as deictic, as co-
referential with their antecedent, or as being bound by their antecedent. The
semantic interpretation of the pronoun then depends on how it is classified. In deictic
uses of pronouns, the pronouns refers to some individual present in the non-linguistic
context in which the pronoun is used. One can then say that the meaning of the
pronoun is whatever it refers to. Clearly, this treatment of deictic uses of pronouns
depends on there being a clear cut distinction between deictic and non-deictic uses of
pronouns. I will argue in section 3.6. that it is hard to make this distinction precise
and suggest that the explanation of pronouns put forward here allows one to account
for both types of occurrences of pronouns on the basis of the same principles.
In non-deictic uses of pronouns, the interpretation of the pronoun is
dependent on the interpretation of another expression in the linguistic context in
which the pronoun is used. This expression is called the "antecedent". The
relationship between the antecedent and the pronoun can be either one of co-reference
or one of binding. In the former case, the pronoun is interpreted as referring to the
same object as the antecedent refers to. In the latter case, the pronoun is regarded as
a variable which is bound by its antecedent, which of course has to be a quantified
NP.
Linguists working within this framework have been searching for structural
criteria which determine whether in a sentence a given pronoun and a given NP can
be related as pronoun and antecedent. The main problem with this approach is that
the work is restricted to intra-sentential pronouns and does not say anything about
inter-sentential pronouns. Given that the explanations are given in terms of the
syntactic structure of the sentences in which the pronouns occur, it is not possible to
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extend the explanations put forward to also account for inter-sentential pronouns.
Rather than go into the different syntactic proposals, I will concentrate on
the processes taking place in the language processor when a pronoun is being used or
interpreted. This will throw some light on some of the the questions which formal
semanticists and linguists have struggled with. In this section I will concentrate on
the interpretation of "co-referring" pronouns, while I will discuss the "bound"
pronouns in section 4. I will also briefly discuss the notion of "deixis" in this section.
3.4.1. The interpretation of 'co-referring' pronouns
The convention governing the use of pronouns is that pronouns can only be used as
instructions to cognitively access mutually known mental objects which have been
activated to the highest degree by both hearer and speaker and are known by both
interlocutors to be highly activated by the other. In terms of the model presented
before, the speaker can only use pronouns as instructions to cognitively access
mutually known mental objects in the discourse model.
The hearer when interpreting a pronoun, faces the problem of deciding which
of the most highly activated objects is the intended one, the problem of pronoun
resolution. The set of possible candidates is usually somewhat restricted because of
the fact that personal pronouns carry some semantic information about number and
sex/gender. Presumably, hearers go through the possible candidates in parallel.
Whether a particular interpretation on the part of the hearer will be successful
depends on a number of factors including the property which is attributed to the
possible candidate for the interpretation of the pronoun and whether or not it is
compatible with information which is already available about the discourse object.
(Marslen-Wilson and others, 1981). The precise mechanisms which hearers use in
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pronoun resolution is another matter which will not concern me here. [5],
The role of antecedents in the approach taken here is radically different from
the role they play in other theories in which an anaphoric expression is seen as
having a special relationship with its antecedent and receiving its interpretation
through this relationship. Thus, in order to find the interpretation of a pronoun or an
anaphoric definite description, one will first have to find its antecedent. Only then can
one determine the interpretation of the pronoun.
In my account the role of the antecedent changes drastically. The antecedent
can be seen as an instruction to set up a discourse object in the discourse model and
to cognitively access a mental object. Since this mental object can be supposed by the
discourse participants to be highly activated immediately after the introduction and
for some time after, and to exist in the discourse model, the speaker can then use a
pronoun to instruct her hearer to cognitively access this mental object. If some time
has passed since the introduction of the discourse object in question, and it can be
supposed to have disappeared into the discourse specific epistemic model, then the
speaker can use an anaphoric definite description to instruct her hearer to cognitively
access it. The role of the antecedent can thus be seen as an instruction to activate or
re-activate a piece of knowledge which the speaker can then instruct the hearer to
cognitively access by means of a pronoun. Antecedents thus play a role in the
interpretation of pronouns only because they are used as instructions to activate a
certain piece of knowledge which was used later in the interpretation of the pronoun.
Pronoun interpretation thus is simply a matter of finding the appropriate referent in
the discourse model or the discourse specific epistemic model.
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3.4.2. Deixis
Another principle which is used in standard theories on pronouns is the notion of
deixis:- a deictic pronoun receives its interpretation be referring to an object present
in the non-linguistic context of the utterance. Standard theories rely on there being a
clear distinction between anaphoric pronouns and deictic pronouns. For the way
pronouns receive their interpretation differs radically depending on whether the
pronoun is classified as deictic or anaphoric. However, the situation is not as clear-cut
as standard theory would like.
Lyons (1979) argues that it is hard to make a clear distinction between deixis
and anaphora. He argues that deixis is both ontogenetically and logically prior to
anaphora. Using the notion of an intersubjective universe of discourse with a number
of addresses each of which has stored under it a set of propositions in which the
address occurs as a constituent, he argues that the accessibility of an address reflects
the degree of salience which it currently has in the universe of discourse. Pronoun
interpretation rests on the degree of salience; the more salient an object, the more
likely the speaker, other things being equal, to use a pronoun. But salience is itself
partly determined by recency of mention:- objects which were mentioned more
recently are likely to be more salient. Recency of mention however is a deictically
based notion. It has to be analysed as "relative proximity in time to the zero-point of
the utterance" and thus is always determined relative to the moment at which the
utterance takes place. Lyons concludes that anaphora rely on deixis and that in every
anaphoric use there is a deictic element.
Lyons discusses the following example, used to console a friend who just lost
his wife in a car crash.
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(38) I was sorry to hear the news; I saw her only last week.
The example is an illustration of the fact that salience in the universe of
discourse is determined no only by recency of mention, but also depends on other
factors, such as the mental state the hearer can be expected to be in. Lyons claims
that Buehler (1934) would classify the pronoun occurrence in (38) as deictic on the
ground that there is no linguistic antecedent, and that Crymes (1968) would classify
it as deictic on the basis that it is used to point to something in the intersubjective
experience or common memory of speaker and hearer. Lyons however rejects this
because
the notion of intersubjective experience or common memory - formalisable as part of
the universe-of-discourse - is the more general notion, without which anaphoric
reference, as it is traditionally conceived, cannot be explained. In the last resort,
there seems to be no reason to deny that the reference of her in the example ... is
anaphoric
According to Lyons then, there is no fundamental logical difference between
anaphora and deixis, and that any difference that there might be is quantitative
rather than qualitative.
The entity in my theory which most closely corresponds to Lyons'
intersubjective universe-of-discourse is the discourse model. If we substitute discourse
model for Lyons' notion of the universe of discourse, then all his arguments still go
through. The main difference is that discourse models are subjective and not
intersubjective and therefore are preferable from the processor-centric position taken
here. If one takes this line, then one is quite naturally led to a re-definition of deixis
and anaphora in terms of what is going on in the discourse participants' minds. This
line was taken by Buehler (1934) and further developed by Ehlich (1982) who defines
the deictic procedure as follows. (Ehlich 1982,325; cf Bosch 1983,224).
a linguistic instrument for achieving focusing of the hearer's attention towards a
specific item which is part of the respective deictic space.
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Ehlich defines the anaphoric procedure as follows:-
a linguistic instrument for having the hearer continue (sustain) a previously
established focus towards a specific item on which he has oriented his attention
earlier.
Under this definition, the pronoun in example (38) has to be regarded as
anaphoric and not as deictic the conclusion also drawn by Lyons. Pronouns can
therefore occur without an explicit linguistic antecedent and yet not be deictic.
Anaphorically used pronouns require that a piece of knowledge has been activated
previously. The speaker then uses the pronoun to instruct her hearer to cognitively
access this piece of knowledge. In deictic uses of pronouns, on the other hand, the
speaker uses the pronoun to focus the hearer's attention on an object which had not
been previously introduced into the discourse.
3.5. Different uses of definites and pronouns
In my theory speakers are modelled as using pronouns to instruct their hearers to
cognitively access a mental object in the discourse model, whereas they are modelled
as using definite descriptions to instruct their hearers to cognitively access a mental
object in the discourse specific epistemic model. The only difference between some
uses of definite descriptions and some uses of pronouns is thus the degree to which
the mental object has been activated before. It follows that the various uses of definite
descriptions which have been distinguished in the literature can also be found for
pronouns and the other way around. In this section I will try to show that this
prediction holds.
The following discussion will also illustrate another point. Processors may
have various reasons for believing that something has been established as activated
mutual knowledge. The distinction between the various uses of definite descriptions
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and pronouns will be shown to be a consequence of the various reasons a processor
may have to assume that a piece of knowledge is activated mutual knowledge.
Apart from the unavailable use mentioned 3.2.2. Hawkins (1978, 1982) lists
the following other uses of definite descriptions.
1. the anaphoric use
2. the visible situation use
3. the immediate situation use
4. the larger situation use based on specific knowledge
5. the larger situation use based on general knowledge
6. the associative anaphoric use
7. the unexplained modifier use
In the anaphoric use, a definite description is used as an instruction to
cognitively access an object which was explicitly introduced into the discourse
beforehand. There are two slight variations of this use. In the first one, the speaker
uses the actual information explicitly provided in the discourse, as in (39)
(39) I bought a car yesterday. The car was quite cheap.
In the other case, the speaker uses information which is derivable from the
information which was explicitly provided, as in (40).
(40) I bought a car yesterday but today the blooming machine would not go.
In both cases, the definite descriptions are used as instructions to cognitively
access a mental object which was set up earlier in the discourse in response to an
explicit linguistic expression.
Another example of the anaphoric use of definite descriptions indicates that
the term "anaphoric use" is maybe somewhat misleading. The following example can
be found in Seuren (1985), but the type of example is fairly common in newspaper
articles.
(41) Yesterday, a Swiss banker was arrested at
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Heathrow airport. The 53 year old bachelor ...
The example indicates that one can use a definite description as an
instruction to cognitively access a linguistically established mental object without
using information which has been asserted explicitly before. The above example relies
on certain background information about the typical Swiss banker. The following
example which is structurally identical to (41) is far less natural, simply because one
knows that the world-champion over 5000 metres is not very likely a 53 year old
Swiss banker.
(42) Yesterday, an athletics champion over 5000 metres
was arrested at Heathrow airport. The 53-year
old Swiss banker ...
The examples (41) and (42) clarify one aspect of my account of definite
descriptions. I claimed that the hearer had to find a unique activated mental object
which fitted the description. The example illustrates that an object fits a description
if the property used in the definite description is compatible with the information one
already has about the object in question irrespective of whether it has been derived
from background knowledge or from the linguistic input itself.
The anaphoric use of definite descriptions corresponds to the most natural
examples involving personal pronouns.
(43) I bought a car yesterday but today it would not start.
The anaphoric use of definite descriptions and pronouns depends on the
previous activation of information by linguistic means. Thus, in order for a use of a
definite description or a pronoun to be classified as anaphoric, the mental object
which the hearer is instructed to cognitively access has to have been activated into
the discourse linguistically.
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The second use of definite descriptions Hawkins distinguishes is visible
situation use in which the speaker uses a definite description to refer to something
present and visible in the situation shared by speaker and hearer. Consider for
example the situation in which there is a screwdriver visible in the situation in which
speaker and hearer find themselves. The speaker can then felicitously utter (44).
(44) Pass me the screwdriver please.
An example of the visible situation use involving a pronoun is example (45),
uttered when speaker and hearer are walking along the street and someone on the
other side starts drawing their attention.
(45) He is a friend of mine.
The visible situation use depends on the previous activation of knowledge
because of some feature of the environment speaker and hearer find themselves in.
Because speaker and hearer are aware of what is happening around them, and
because they assume of each other that they are aware of the environment, certain
aspects of it can be assumed to be activated and the speaker can use a definite
description or a pronoun to say something to her hearer about such an object.
The difference between the anaphoric and the visible situation use on the one
hand and the various other uses of definites and pronouns on the other, is that the
other uses all depend on the previous activation of a piece of knowledge which is not
identical to the mental object which the speaker instructs her hearer to cognitively
access. In the anaphoric use and the visible situation use the mental object has itself
been activated. In the various other uses the hearer has to draw some inferences in
order to find the mental object. The inferences which the hearer has to draw are of a
frame slot-filler type, where the frame is assumed to have been activated before. The
different uses of definites and pronouns can then be shown to be a consequence of the
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various ways in which the frame can be activated.
The fact that the hearer has to draw an inference in order to find the mental
object in question makes it more difficult to find examples involving pronouns. The
reason is that the descriptive content of definite description is much richer than that
of pronouns. Since one can in principle infer an enormous wealth of information from
activated background knowledge, one needs some information in order to know what
to infer. However, we will see that if the number of objects which figure in the frame
which is activated into the discourse specific epistemic model is small enough,
pronouns can be used.
A first reason which a speaker can have for assuming that certain pieces of
knowledge have been activated is the situation speaker and hearer find themselves
in. The immediate situation use relies on this. The difference with the visible
situation use is that the referent need not be directly visible. A common example is
found on notices such as (46).
(46) Beware of the dog.
A corresponding example involving pronouns is the following. When speaker
and hearer see a highly pregnant woman, then the speaker can felicitously utter (47)
without any explicit mention of either the woman or the child which speaker and
hearer think she is carrying.
(47) I wonder if it will be a boy or a girl.
Another reason background information can be assumed to have been
activated is the general situation speaker and hearer are in. Thus, if speaker and
hearer mutually know that American towns of a certain size have town-halls, then
when they drive into an American town of such a size, the speaker can felicitously
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utter (48), an example of the larger situation use based on general knowledge.
(48) I wonder where the town-hall is.
An example of this use involving pronouns is the following. We have general
knowledge that houses have inhabitants. So, when we come past an expensive
looking house, you can felicitously utter (49)
(49) I wonder how much they earn.
Another reason for assuming the activation of a piece of knowledge is the
knowledge speakers and hearers have about each other. Thus, if speaker and hearer
mutually know that the speaker goes to a certain bakery to get her lunch, then she
can happily utter (50). Hawkins calls this use the larger situation use based on
specific knowledge.
(50) I am going to the bakery.
Earlier we discussed an example of this type involving pronouns due to
Lyons (1977,672). The example is repeated below.
(38) I was sorry to hear the news; I only saw her last week.
Yet another way of activating background knowledge is by explicitly
mentioning the relevant knowledge in the discourse. This use underlies the
anaphoric use mentioned before. However, there is a closely related but slightly
different use which Hawkins calls the associative anaphoric use. In this case, it is not
the intended referent which was linguistically introduced but rather the frame in
which intended referent is a slot-filler. An example is (51).
(51) Somebody came past in a car. The exhaust fumes were terrible.
Examples of associative anaphoric use involving pronouns are given by Yule
(1981). Thus in (52) we find that the pronoun is used as an instruction to cognitively
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access the driver-slot of the (moving-) car-frame which was activated in the first part
of the sentence.
(52) the car's coming up the junction and he starts to turn right.
Yule discusses more examples of occurrences in free speech of pronouns
without explicit linguistic antecedents. One of his other examples is (53).
(53) well I saw a demolition order there actually - a few months ago - they said they
were going to demolish some of the flats - which is a pity - I don't know
what they're doing with Edinburgh though - as long as they don't do what
they did with Glasgow.
On the basis of this and other examples of antecedentless pronouns, Yule
(1982,319) claims that it is entirely possible that hearers sometimes do not actually
expend any effort working out the referents of pronouns. The underlying principle
might be that if a speaker signals in her utterance that the referent of a pronoun is
less important that the predicated information, then the hearer will not spend much
effort working out the referent. What hearers do on these occasions is interpreting the
speaker's message in terms of some information which the speaker marks for
attention, information which is predicated of some individual or group whose
referential identity is not at stake. Thus in (52) the reference of they is not relevant.
The message the speaker wants to convey can be understood without resolving the
referent of it.
There are two general points to be made about Yule's remarks. In the first
place, and Yule would certainly agree with this, there are certainly cases of
antecedentless pronouns where the referential identity of the referent of the pronoun
is an issue which has to be resolved. Some of the above examples illustrate this point.
For these cases, one needs something along the lines of my account. Secondly, even if
we admit that on certain occasions hearers do not try to determine what a pronoun is
used to refer to, the question remains what prompted the speaker to use a pronoun in
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the first place. Even if the hearer need not resolve the referent of a pronoun in order
to be able to understand the speaker's utterance, one still needs the notion of
knowledge activation because it still is the case that the speaker can only use a
pronoun to refer to the object which is the most highly activated in her own mind. (Cf
also Sanford, Garrod, Lucas and Henderson, 1983).
Another use which Hawkins distinguishes, the so-called unexplanatory
modifier uses, is illustrated in (54). Clark and Marshall (1981,23) correctly observe
that these use are what Donnellan (1966) has called attributive uses.
(54) The winner of the 1988 Olympic marathon ..
Donnellan illustrates the attributive use in a situation where Smith is lying
on the floor brutally murdered. The speaker who uses the definite description Smith's
murderer to refer to whoever murdered Smith is said to have used it attributively.
However, in the very same situation one could as well have used a pronoun and
express exactly the same information. Thus in the situation described above, one
might as well have used (55) without any risk of misunderstanding.
(55) He must be insane.
In this section I argued for my analyses of 'co-referential' pronouns and
definite descriptions. I argued that if my analyses are correct, and the main difference
between these two types of expressions concerns the degree to which the knowledge
which is cognitively accessed has been activated before, then for every example of a
type of use of definite descriptions, there must be a corresponding example for
pronouns, and the other way around. The above observations support this claim. Also,
I showed that the different uses of pronouns and definite descriptions can be
accounted for as the consequence of the different reasons one can have for assuming
that a certain piece of knowledge has been activated.
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3.6. Conclusion
In this section I discussed the expressions the hearer has available to instruct her
hearer to cognitively access mental objects. The speaker can use an indefinite to
introduce into the discourse a new mental objects, i.e. a mental object which was not
activated before in the discourse. I argued that a speaker can use either a definite
description or a pronoun to instruct her hearer to access an already established
mental object. Which expression is most felicitously used depends on the degree to
which the intended mental object can be assumed to be activated. I showed that one
of the predictions of this treatment, namely that for every use of a definite description
there is a corresponding pronoun use, and the other way around, was indeed borne
out by the facts. I also discussed some consequences of the analyses for linguistic
theory.
4. Cognitively accessing concepts
4.1. Introduction
Although a lot of work has been done in procedural semantics on the type of
expressions discussed in the previous section, much less has been done on the
expressions which I will discuss in this section, namely generics and universally
quantified NPs. I will argue that these expressions are used by speakers to instruct
their hearers to access concepts cognitively. The basic claim of this section then is
that generic indefinites and definites and universally quantified NPs of the sort
exemplified in (56) are used to instruct the hearer to access cognitively a concept.





The following discussion is restricted to generics and quantified NPs of the
sort exemplified in (56). I will not say anything about other expressions which are
usually regarded as quantifiers such as the numerical quantifiers one, two, three etc.
and the plural indefinite article some, or the quantifiers exemplified in (57).
(57) all (of) the boys ..
many of the boys ..
few of the boys ..
none of the boys ..
The reason for these restrictions is that a discussion of these various
quantified expressions would have to rely on a previous discussion of plural discourse
entities, something which is outside the scope of this thesis. The quantifiers are
either used to introduce plural objects into the discourse, e.g. some, or they are
anaphoric to plural discourse entities and thus rely on a previous introduction of such
an entity.
A final restriction is that the only occurrences of quantified or generic noun
phrases which will be considered are those in subject position.
In procedural semantics, language is primarily regarded as a vehicle for the
transfer of information from speaker to hearer. In order for it to be a successful
medium of transfer, language must in principle enable its users to transfer large
parts of their knowledge bases. For most types of knowledge language therefore can
be expected to provide the means by which processors can transfer knowledge of that
type. A large part of our knowledge is of a general type. In the previous chapter, I
used the term generic knowledge. Given the fact that language is likely to provide its
users with the means to transfer almost any type of knowledge, and given the
existence of generic knowledge, it is very natural to expect that language will enable
its users to transfer generic knowledge to each other. The basic claim of this section is
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that the means language provides for transferring information regarding concepts,
knowledge about classes of individuals, are generic and quantified noun phrases.,
Generics and quantified NPs are instructions to the hearer to cognitively access a
concept and attach the predication made in the sentence to the activated or newly
created concept.
The explanation of the difference between the different quantified NPs
crucially depends on the existence of a hierarchy in the properties attached to a
concept. As argued in chapter 5, the properties attached to a concept are ordered
along an axis with at the top level essential properties and lower down default
properties. The claim is that every universally quantified or generic NP is an
instruction to cognitively access the concept corresponding to the noun following the
quantifier and that the actual quantifier determines where in the hierarchy the
property mentioned in the predication of the sentence is to be attached. In the case of
the universal quantifiers like every and the equivalent quantifier all the property
predicated is to be attached among the necessary properties, many, most and
equivalent quantifiers are used for default properties, few is used for properties
which by default the frame does not have attached to it. (Cf Reiter 1980,82-83 for a
similar proposal for the non-standard quantifiers). Finally, no is used to predicate
properties which the frame necessarily does not have attached to it. Thus, the
information which is transferred by (58) is that a property which according to the
speaker is necessarily attached to the car-frame is that there are sparkplugs.
(58) Every car has sparkplugs.
In (59) the transferred information is that the default value for cars is
having sparkplugs, in (60) that the default value for cars is not having sparkplugs,
and finally in (61) that a necessary property for cars is having no sparkplugs.
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(59) Many cars have sparkplugs.
(60) Few cars have sparkplugs
(61) No car has sparkplugs.
The analysis of universally quantified NPs generalises to generic uses of
definite and indefinite NPs. This is an intuitively appealing result. Thus, generics
such as (62) and (63) instruct hearers to attach the property of having sparkplugs to
the car-frame.
(62) A car has sparkplugs.
(63) Cars have sparkplugs.
Unlike utterances involving "overt" quantifiers, when a speaker uses a
generic NP, she does not give the hearer explicit instructions as to whether the
property which is predicated of the concept is to be attached as a necessary property
or as a default value. This is in accordance with the fact that generic sentences often
are considered to be ambiguous or vague. Thus, (64) and (65) are often claimed to be
"less precise" versions of (66) and (67). [6].
(64) A dog is a mammal.
(65) A dog has four legs.
(66) All dogs are mammals.
(67) Most dogs have four legs.
The explanation for this phenomenon in the present theory would be that
generic sentences are essentially non-committal about where the predication made in
the sentence is to be attached in the hierarchy hanging off the concept denoted by the
generically used NP [7],
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The predication made in quantified sentences need not necessarily involve
"atomic" properties, such as is white. One can also use transitive verbs or In¬
transitive verbs, in which cases the predication involves one or two other NPs. An
example is (68)
(68) Everyone has a mother.
The treatment of this sentence in the present theory naturally follows from
the treatment of quantified NPs and that of indefinite NPs proposed in section 3.2.
Thus, in response to everyone in sentence (68), the hearer will cognitively access his
person-concept. He will realize that the property expressed in the predication has a
mother will have to be attached among the necessary properties. However, the
predication is not "atomic" but contains an indefinite NP and therefore requires
further analysis. I argued earlier that the speaker uses indefinites to instruct her
hearer to cognitively access new mental objects. In most cases this boils down to an
instruction to the hearer to create a new mental object. If everything goes according
to plan in (68), then this is what the hearer will do when he is processing has a
mother. However, unlike most of the examples discussed in the section on particular
uses of indefinites, the mental object is not created independently of everything else.
Rather, it is created as part of a property which is to be attached among the
necessary property hanging off the hearer's person-concept. Thus, in response to
sentence (68), the hearer will cognitively access his person-concept and create a
mental object which is dependent on the person-concept. In other words, he will create
a new object-slot to be attached to his person frame.
Some support for this analysis can be derived from the following
observations. If there is a strong expectation that something is an instantiation of a
frame which has a slot of a particular sort attached to it, then sentences like (69) in
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which the speaker uses a NP with a possessive pronoun to get at the slot in question
are quite natural, also in discourse initial position.
(69) John loves his mother.
However, if this is the correct explanation cases where such a connection is
unexpected are harder to interpret. Clearly, they are not impossible to interpret
because of the principle of retrospective updating:- one can always attach the slot to
the relevant frame in response to such a sentence, or adapt one's knowledge base in
another way. Thus in response to (70), which definitely is stranger than (69), the
hearer can either attach an elephant-slot to the frame the vicar is an instantiation of,
or set up a specific mental object as the mental representation of the particular
elephant the vicar owns.
(70) The vicar lost his elephant
The prediction is that if in preceding discourse one explicitly instructs the
reader to attach an elephant to the frame the vicar is an instantiation of, then the
strangeness disappears. This prediction is intuitively satisfied. Discourse (71)
illustrates this.
(71) Everybody in the village recently got an elephant from the
industrialist who has been on Safari to Africa. The vicar
got his elephant on Monday, whereas the verger got his
elephant on Tuesday.
4.2. The interpretation of bound pronouns
In section 3.4. I discussed those pronoun occurrences which in standard theories are
explained as involving co-reference between the pronoun and its antecedent. There is,
however, a class of examples in the literature which are standardly explained on the
model of variable-binding in first-order predicate calculus. I will turn to these now
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and present an alternative explanation, which has the advantage that it treats these
pronoun occurrences as not essentially different from the co-referring pronoun
occurrences.
According to the binding explanation some pronoun occurrences have to be
treated similar to variables in predicate calculus. If the antecedent of a pronoun is a
quantified expression then it is regarded as binding that pronoun occurrence. When
the sentence is translated into some logical language, the pronoun turns into a
variable which occurs within the scope of the translation of the antecedent and is
bound by it.
Examples of bound occurrences of pronouns then are (72) and (73) [8].
Example (74), which is similar in a number of respects, is usually treated as a
pronoun of laziness.
(72) Every dog loves somebody who loves it.
(73) Everybody believes that he is ill.
(74) Everybody has a mother and everyone trusts her.
Adopting the system developed in Montague (1973) (72) and (73) are
translated as (75) and (76) respectively.
(75) (x)(Ey)(love(x,y) & love(y,x))
(76) (x)(believe(x,*ill(x)))
One sees that in both cases the pronoun has been translated as a variable
which is bound by the translation of the antecedent, everybody. It is not clear how
one is to account for the pronoun in sentence (74). One cannot regard it as being
bound by the universal quantifier, nor by the indefinite in the first sentence a mother,
because this would imply that mother would receive wide scope over the universal
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quantified NP, implying that everyone had at least one mother in common.
My explanation of occurrences of bound pronouns relies on the notion of
knowledge activation and the treatment of generic and quantified expressions
proposed earlier. In response to a generic or quantified expression the hearer
activates a concept and interprets the predication as an instruction to attach a new
property to this concept. Bound pronouns are used to instruct the hearer that the
property to be attached somehow involves possible instantiations of the activated
concept. It is for example possible to use pronouns to put some special conditions on
object-slots which say that the slot filler has to stand in a certain relation to the
instantiation of the frame. (72) is an example of this use. The information transferred
is that one has to attach to one's dog-frame an object-slot such that an instantiation of
the frame stands in the love relation to a filler for that slot and moreover such that
the filler for that slot stands in the love-relation to the instantiation of the frame.
Using KRS, the knowledge representation scheme developed in chapter 5, in response
to (72) the conceptual entity dog will have the following belief representation added
amongst its essential property. I assume that DOG is the conceptual base of this
conceptual entity:-
<LOVE(DOG,x),(x ISA PERSON),LOVE(x,DOG)>
Other examples involve the idea of embedded models introduced in section
2.3. (73) is an example. The predication contains a 'space-creating' operator and the
property which is to be attached to the concept involves an embedded model. Personal
pronouns can then be used to instruct a hearer to cognitively access possible
instantiations of the frame, which can be assumed to exist in these embedded mental
models. A hearer faced with (73) is thus instructed to attach an embedded model to
his person frame which contains the information that the instantiation of the frame is
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ill. Using an ad hoc extension to KRS for embedded models, (73) gives rise to the
following belief representation, which would be added to the rich-person-concept.
Again, RICH-PERSON is assumed to be the conceptual base of the conceptual entity.
<BELIEVE (RICH-PERSON,
< <ILL(RICH-PERSON)> >)>
Example (74), finally, can be accounted for given the treatment of multiply
quantified sentences of section 4.2.:- in response to the first clause of the conjunction
the hearer will have activated his person-concept and attached a mother slot to it. As
a consequence, both the person frame and the newly created mother slot will be
highly activated. The pronoun then is used as an instruction to the hearer to
cognitively access the mother-slot. Thus, in response to the first conjunct in (74), the
following belief representation is added to the essential properties of the person-
concept.
<HAS(PERSON,x),(x ISA MOTHER)>
This mother slot is then available as the referent of her in the second
conjunct and in response to it the above belief representation is changed into
<HAS(PERSON,x),(x ISA MOTHER),TRUST(PERSON,x)>
The analysis of bound pronouns predicts corresponding cases involving
generic uses of indefinites and definite descriptions. After all, the analysis I proposed
for generic NPs is very similar to that for quantified NPs. The prediction is born out
by the facts.
(77) A dog always loves somebody who loves it.
(78) A rich man always thinks he is ill.
it in (77) and he in (78) have to be analysed as receiving their interpretation
through a mechanism similar to those (72) and in (73). Since it is difficult to see how
185
generics can be treated as quantifiers but have to be treated as terms referring to
kinds (Carlson,1977), the solution I propose for dealing with the so-called "bound"
variables is more general than the bound variable solution.
4.3. Donkeys revisited
In section 4.1. of chapter 3 I briefly discussed the so-called donkey sentences, of which
(79) is an example. Donkey sentences play an important role in those theories of the
mental representation of discourse which are based on truth conditional semantics. In
this section I will briefly sketch an alternative treatment of donkey sentences.
(79) If a donkey is hard-working, it'll be fed.
The problem posed by donkey sentences is the fact that indefinites occurring
in the antecedent of a conditional, henceforward 'donkey' positions, get a universal
import. Whether the indefinite should get full universal import, as Kamp (1981)
argues, or merely generic import, as Seuren (1985, 373-5) claims, is a bone of
contention. My intuitions are in agreement with Seuren's and before I sketch a
treatment of donkey sentences, I will put forward a few observations which show that
certainly not every indefinite in a 'donkey-position' can receive a 'donkey
interpretation'. What these observations are intended to show is that indefinites do
not get their 'universal' import purely by appearing in a 'donkey' position but that
other factors play a role as well. As some of these other factors are also important in
determining whether an indefinite can get a generic interpretation, these
observations are also intended as arguments for the intuition that indefinites in
'donkey' positions should be given a generic rather than a full universal
interpretation.
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First, indefinites which are strongly marked as favouring a referential
interpretation in the Donnellan sense (cf section 3.2.2.) can only with great difficulty
appear in 'donkey' positions, and if they do, they do not get a 'donkey' interpretation.
The indefinites in (80) and (81) show this. But indefinites which are marked as
favouring a referential interpretation cannot be given a generic interpretation either.
(80) If a donkey in the field, who has been working in
the Foreign Legion, works hard, it'll be fed.
(81) If a donkey of mine works hard, I feed it.
Another observations relies on the fact that whether an indefinite in subject
position can receive a generic interpretation is correlated with the tense and aspect of
the verb. Thus, in (82) the indefinite can be given a generic interpretation, whereas in
(83) this is much more difficult.
(82) A donkey works hard.
(83) A donkey had worked hard.
But if we form conditionals (84) and (85) with (82) and (83) as antecedents,
then we see that (84) allows a 'donkey' reading whereas it is much harder to get a
'donkey' reading for (85).
(84) If a donkey works hard, it will not get its owner into trouble.
(85) If a donkey had worked hard, it would not have gotten its
owner into trouble.
If we accept that indefinites which receive 'donkey' interpretations are indeed
generic, then donkey sentences are no longer a special case. The treatment of generics
which I proposed in the previous section applies to donkey sentences as well. A
'donkey' sentence is an instruction to the hearer to attach a new property to one of his
concepts. Thus, in response to sentence (79) a hearer will add the belief
representation to his donkey-concept that if an instantiation is hard-working, then it
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will be fed. If we extend the notation developed in chapter 5 to include conditionals,
then in response to (79), the hearer should add the following belief representation to
his donkey-concept.
<(IF (HARDWORKING DONKEY) THEN (IS-FED DONKEY))>
Because the indefinite is generic, the speaker is not entirely clear whether
this belief representation should be added to the essential properties or to the default
properties associated with the donkey-concept.
The reader will recall that I treat the generic term DONKEY as a denoting
term in the semantics of KRS. It denotes an arbitrary object. If KRS was extended to
allow for conditional belief representations as well, and the denotational semantics for
KRS was extended to cope with this, then the denotational interpretation of the above
belief representation would be reasonably straightforward:- it would be true if the
arbitrary donkey had the property of being fed if it was hard-working. Assuming
that this is a necessary property and using the principle of generic attribution
introduced in section 4.2.3. of chapter 4, this would entail that all individual donkeys
had this property as well. Under the assumption then that the property attributed in
a 'donkey' sentence is a necessary property, we arrive at the truth-conditional reading
of donkey sentences which was favoured by Kamp (1981).
4.4. Conclusion
In this section I proposed to see universally quantified NPs as instructions to the
hearer to cognitively access a concept. I made use of the proposals for knowledge
representation made in chapter 5. To the extent that the present proposal for the
mental representation of universally quantified NPs is successful, it can also be seen
as an argument for the particular form of knowledge representation I put forward.
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5. Conclusion
In this chapter I have re-analysed the notion of reference and argued that reference
always has to be seen as involving the cognitive access of certain entities in the
speaker's and the hearer's mind. I also provided analyses of the use and function of
various referring expressions and of quantifiers. In these analyses I made use both of
the model for the human language processing mechanism and especially the notion of
knowledge activation proposed in chapter 4., and the more detailed proposals about
knowledge representation in chapter 5.
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Footnotes:-
1. I will completely ignore the question what objects referring expressions in novels
etc. refer to. It might be possible to analyse these expressions completely in terms of
the conceptual entities existing in the speaker's and hearer's minds. If this is the
case, then these expressions do not refer at all. If such an analysis turned out to be
impossible however, then the only alternative which remains open would be to define
the notion of 'real-world' object so that it includes objects of this kind.
2. The situation is more complicated. As Johnson-Laird and Garnham (1980) point
out, there are two different contexts for every utterance, one for the speaker and one
for the hearer. It is therefore possible that the speaker intends different
interpretations for a given expression for herself than for her hearer. I will ignore
this complication here.
3. Prince observes that the existence presuppositions can be cancelled under at least
certain verbs of propositional attitude. Thus, 1'. is fine and certainly does not commit
the speaker to the existence of the big Glaswegian in question.
1'. Nigel says that this big Glaswegian
smashed his face, but I think he was
drunk and fell off his bike.
4. There are subtle differences between generic uses of definites and generic uses of
indefinites, but I will not discuss them here (see e.g. Hawkins, 1978)
5. There is a similarity between this explanation of pronoun resolution and the
focussing approach of Sidner (1983) and Grosz (1981). After all, one can regard
material which is present in the discourse model as being in focus. However, unlike
Sidner and Grosz, my proposal does not rely on the sort of structural and formal rules
that they propose. The basic assumption is rather that the information which is
already known about the possible candidates, because of previous discourse or because
of activated background knowledge, is critical.
6. As Phil Johnson-Laird pointed out to me universally quantified sentences often
show a similar vagueness. An example is
Everybody is wearing pink this season
7. I will ignore the differences between generically used indefinites, generically used
definite descriptions, and generically used bare plurals.
8. In what follows I will not consider other examples involving quantified expressions
as antecedents such as the ones exemplified below. The main reason is that they
involve plural pronouns. I would like to point out though that the fact that these
sentence (1') allows for a reading which makes it synonymous to (77) casts some
doubt on the generality of the binding explanation. This doubt is reinforced by the
fact that in what have to be pure binding cases singular pronouns are impossible with
quantified expressions whose grammatical number is plural, as (2') exemplifies.
(1') Every dog loves somebody who loves them.
(2') Most dogs love somebody who loves them.
(3') * Most dogs love somebody who loves him.
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Chapter 7:- Conclusion
In the previous six chapters I took a cognitivist or procedural view of language. The
central assumption of this approach is the belief that by looking at the mechanisms
which are used in language understanding and language production it will be
possible to gain a clearer insight in the nature and structure of natural language.
This thesis is an attempt to vindicate this belief. I developed a theory of the overall
architecture of the human language processor and of the detailed structures which it
uses in language production and constructs in language comprehension. I then used
this theory in outlining analyses of various expressions in English. In this chapter I
will discuss the major achievements and shortcomings of this thesis.
The thesis covers a broad range of subjects. Its main strength is the fact that
in it a consistent theory of the human language processor is outlined based on the
procedural view of language discussed in chapter 2. The usefulness of the model is
shown in chapter 6 in which a number of analyses of linguistic expressions in English
are sketched. The number of topics which are touched upon, is also responsible for the
main weakness of the thesis:- although a large number of problems are discussed,
very few of the solutions which are put forward, are worked out in any great detail.
Especially the linguistic analyses in chapter 6 are very sketchy and should be done in
more detail. An obvious way of getting around this problem would be to implement
the proposals made in chapter 4 and 5. Although I have written a PROLOG program
which "understands" descriptions of simple maps, no serious attempt has yet been
made to do this.
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In the remainder of this chapter I will discuss the various achievements and
shortcomings of the various chapters. In it I will also point to possible directions of
future research.
In chapter 2. I briefly outlined the procedural position in the semantics for
natural language and showed that some of the ideas developed in naturalistic
epistemology could be used to defend the cognitivist view of language against possible
objections. In particular, I showed that the intersubjectivity of language and the fact
that language can be used to talk about the world could both be accounted for if we
accepted the thesis of cognitive similarity, the thesis that our cognitive systems are
structurally more or less alike.
I argued that the cognitivist view has a number of consequences for theories
of language. First, there were a number of consequences for criteria of adequacy
which any satisfactory theory had to meet. Since language was to be studied by
looking at the mechanisms underlying its use, I concluded that satisfactory theories
had to meet both psycholinguistic criteria and linguistic criteria of adequacy.
Secondly, the cognitivist view had implications for the form of a satisfactory (and
complete) theory. Such a theory would make proposals about the overall architecture
of the human language processor and about the more detailed structures which are
constructed in language comprehension and used in language production.
The criteria of adequacy mentioned in chapter 2. were used in chapter 3 to
discuss critically a number of relevant proposals in the literature. First, I argued
against the Kintsch-Fodor programme of psychologizing formal semantics. I then
reviewed the proposals for the architecture of the human language processor made by
Sanford and Garrod, and by Johnson-Laird. Finally, I discussed a number of
proposals about the structures people built up when understanding a piece of
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discourse. One of the main conclusions of this chapter about the structure of the
discourse representations in the human mind was that these representations were
likely to be very similar in structure to the representations which were used to store
knowledge in general. This of course implied that the work done in AI in the area of
knowledge representation became crucial.
In chapter 4., I made a proposal for the overall architecture of the human
language processor. The system I came up with was at least at first sight very similar
to that of Sanford and Garrod, although the underlying view of the various
components in the system was rather different. I proposed to see the human language
processing mechanism as consisting of three different components which could be
thought of as modelling different degrees to which knowledge could be activated. I
distinguished between the discourse model, containing a representation of the
utterance being understood or produced; the discourse specific epistemic model,
containing the background knowledge relevant to the discourse, which came either
from previous discourse or from the long-term knowledge store; and the general
epistemic model, a component containing the background knowledge a processor
would bring to the discourse. Another important idea introduced in this chapter was
the idea of embedded models which were used to model the beliefs processors ascribed
to their fellow interlocutors. I used this to sketch a theory of how to model mutual
knowledge.
Since the model I propose is very much like the model of Sanford and Garrod,
the same psychological evidence which they put forward can be put forward for mine.
The model I propose avoids the difficulties which I raised in chapter 3. against
Sanford and Garrod's model. It can thus be seen as an improvement on their model.
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In chapter 5., I made a proposal for knowledge representation which was
based on the idea of a frame as developed by Minsky and bore a close similarity to a
knowledge representation scheme developed by Bobrow and Winograd. I argued for
an organization of the knowledge base around conceptual entities with essential and
default beliefs attached to them. I distinguished between two sorts of conceptual
entities, mental objects and concepts. I provided a model-theory for the structures
defined in this chapter, which made use of the notion of arbitrary objects developed by
Kit Fine. This model-theory has the advantage of being more direct than alternative
proposals in the literature, (e.g. Hayes, 1977).
I admitted that the formal knowledge representation system KRS was less
expressive than other systems which are based on more or less the same intuitions. In
particular, the only types of conceptual entity which were permitted, were mental
objects and concepts. KRS has to be extended to allow for the representation of
knowledge of relationships between objects, knowledge about (types of) events etc.
Although it seems to me that syntactic extension of the system to allow for the
representation of knowledge of this type is relatively straightforward, there are a
number of problems from a semantic point of view. If one wants to maintain the
direct semantic treatment for KRS, then Fine's theory of arbitrary objects will have to
be extended to allow for arbitrary relationships and arbitrary events as well. How one
would do this is an open question.
Chapter 6. finally was intended as an illustration of the viability of the
cognitivist view of language. I first discussed the notion of reference from the
procedural view. I then discussed various expressions in English, in particular
indefinite NPs, definite descriptions, pronouns and 'universally' quantified NPs.
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It is important to realize how the procedural view helped to clarify at least
some of the problems associated with these expressions. First, I was able to explain
the intuition that indefinites are used to introduce one and only one individual into
the discourse without necessarily implying uniqueness in the world. Thus, we were
able to square the existential quantifier analysis of indefinites with the intuition that
indefinites introduce one and only one individual into the discourse. Secondly, we
could show that the Russelian analysis of definite descriptions followed from the
Strawsonian analysis given the processing principle of retrospective updating which
was proposed on independent grounds. Obviously, without taking processing factors
into account this would not have been possible. Thirdly, I explained the difference
between pronouns and definite descriptions in terms of the degree to which the object
which the hearer was supposed to access had been activated. The objects which were
accessed by means of a pronoun existed in the discourse model, whereas those to be
accessed by definites existed in the discourse specific epistemic model. The prediction
which followed from this that all the examples found with pronouns had counterparts
involving definite descriptions and the other way around, was borne out by the facts.
Lastly, we were able to give an account of the universal quantifiers in processing
terms. The non-standard quantifiers such as most, few could be explained in terms of
the notion of default value, a notion which was introduced in chapter 5. on knowledge
representation. It is important to point out that while the first and second point could
be explained because we took the procedural view in general, the last two points
followed from the proposals about the architecture of the human language processor
and the proposals about the structure of the mental representations which are used or
constructed in language production and understanding.
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The linguistic analyses put forward are rather shallow. No attempt is made
to analyse all occurrences of one particular type of expression in English. Given the
fact that we are primarily interested in providing an overall theory of the human
language processor, and the fact that the linguistic analyses are intended as
illustrations of the usefulness of the particular proposals made here, this is maybe
unavoidable. More detailed analyses of the expressions discussed here, and of other
expressions in English, or any other natural language, would be useful since they
might pinpoint weaknesses in the present system and suggest possible extensions
and/or alterations.
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